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 For decades, the global food security strategy has operated on the assumption that poverty 
and hunger result from a state of underdevelopment, which can be alleviated through the 
distribution of technology to increase farm-level productivity. In more recent years, transnational 
corporate involvement within food security has led to a global imposition of intellectual property 
rights over seed and agriculture science, thus catalyzing a process of accumulation by 
dispossession. Those who have been dispossessed of their seed, knowledge, food cultures, and 
social relations of production, however, have not stood idly by. NGO, peasant and human rights 
organizations have galvanized around food sovereignty, a radical-rights based alternative to the 
business as usual approach of food security. Broadly defined, food sovereignty is the peoples’ right 
to define their own food and agriculture systems. It has also been described as ‘repossessing the 
commons’, or taking back those aspects of life, like seed, which have been commodified through 
corporate/neoliberal projects. One fall back to this approach, is that it does not address the crucial 
difference between having a right and doing what is right. The thesis explores this topic by 
reviewing the meaning of rights for both food security and food sovereignty. Then, using Robert 
Sack’s theoretical framework, the thesis suggests that we may use intrinsic geographic judgments 
to know whether the rights we promote actually lead to intrinsic progress, or a heightened 
awareness of the real and the good. Lastly, an empirical case study in Guatemala is explored to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
At a time when seed’s natural ability to reproduce is seen as an impediment to the 
alleviation of poverty and hunger, it is worth asking whether we are headed in the right direction 
when it comes to food and agriculture. Food security has long been the framework used by U.S. 
food and agriculture policies, as well as international aid, and private companies, involved with 
distributing resources to food insecure regions of the world. Megan Carney explains that when the 
concept of food security emerged at the first World Food Conference in 1974, it attributed poverty 
and hunger to problems of underproduction and outdated farming practices, thus ushering in the 
era Green Revolution technologies (Carney, 2009). Several decades later, food security still 
attributes poverty and hunger to underdevelopment, but the focus has shifted from artificially 
boosting raw yields and basic calories, to increasing “access to nutritionally adequate and 
culturally appropriate foods” (Carney, 2009, p.83).  These two perspectives, while focusing on 
different ends of food security, reduce poverty and hunger to superficial problems of insufficient 
trade “by prioritizing access to food rather than control over systems of production and 
consumption” (Wittman, 2011, p. 91). 
Peter Rosset observes that since the Green Revolution, three decades of neo-liberal 
privatization and free trade agreements have dismantled the national food production capacity of 
most countries around the world, replacing it with an artificial capacity, maintained by government 
subsidies to agribusiness, to produce agro-exports (Rosset, 2008). At the same time, the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have engineered greater demands for 
cheap food imports by forcing governments to end public sector grain reserves, as well as 
minimum price guarantees, credit, technical assistance and national markets for smallholder family 
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farmers (Rosset, 2006). Food security presents major issues to achieving meaningful progress 
because conventional understandings of ‘security’, as Rob White discusses, are rooted in 
conceptions which “reflect militarized notions of security, rather than those premised upon either 
universal human interests or the intrinsic worth of animals, plants and specific eco-systems” 
(White, 2014, p.840). Food security, in other words, represents an implicit goal of powerful 
countries to stave off conflict in developing regions of the world, in order to maintain control over 
economic systems of resource extraction and export-oriented production. Indeed, many authors, 
non-governmental, indigenous and grassroots organizations have discarded the shallow goal of 
food security altogether, replacing it with a deeper and certainly more radical goal, food 
sovereignty. 
The international peasant organization La Via Campesina, representing 148 organizations 
from 69 countries (Foran, 2014), brought the concept of food sovereignty to the world’s attention 
during the World Food Summit in 1996. Food sovereignty promises an alternative to the neo-
liberal model of food security by prioritizing and protecting local agricultural production, the right 
of farmers to control what they produce, the right of consumers to decide what they consume, and 
the right of countries to protect themselves from dumping vis-à-vis third countries (La Via 
Campesina, 2003). Wittman describes food sovereignty “not as an established paradigm/concept 
but rather a potential new framework emerging from a diverse set of contemporary grassroots 
production practices and political approaches” (Wittman, 2011, p.89). This framework, 
McMichael suggests, involves a tension between abstract globalism i.e., “food from nowhere” and 
concrete localism i.e., “food from somewhere” (McMichael, 2016, p.649), with the goal, as Alana 
Mann writes, of “re-centering agriculture as part of a larger project against the destructive 
imposition of market relations and commodification on every aspect of life” (Mann, 2014, p.3).  
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Jack Kloppenburg describes the work towards this goal as ‘repossession of the commons’ 
(Kloppenburg, 2010), resisting the commodification of knowledge and seed in agriculture. As Eric 
Holt-Giménez explains, knowledge “is a reflection of a set of social relations revolving around 
different forms of the commons” (Holt-Giménez, 2006, p.97). When farmers share local verities 
of maize or beans, for example, they not only exchange a material resource i.e., the seed, they also 
exchange vital information and knowledge about how to cultivate the seeds being shared, where 
to plant, under what conditions, and using which techniques. Sharing of labor, knowledge and seed 
is done carefully and consciously to help smallholders “cope individually and collectively with the 
risks inherent in farming” (Holt-Giménez, 2006, p.97). Unfortunately, through the imposition of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and other plant variety protections (PVPs), which restrict the 
free and open exchange of seed and knowledge, much control has been lost over the means of 
producing and reproducing the commons. Put simply, “who controls the seed gains a substantial 
measure of control over the shape of the entire food system” (Kloppenburg, 2010, p.368). 
Therefore, the alternative offered by food sovereignty to the neo-liberal model of food security can 
be described as an alternative rights-based framework, where the right of peoples to define their 
own food and agriculture systems is held paramount.  
Of course, rights-based language is nothing new when it comes to addressing poverty and 
hunger. A key difference between the rights promoted by food security and those promoted food 
sovereignty, however, is that the former is an example of negative rights, whereas the latter is an 
example of positive rights. In other words, food security promises the right to be free from 
something, such as hunger and malnutrition, while food sovereignty promises the right to have 
rights (Arendt, 1967), or more specifically, the right to have rights over food (Patel, 2009). Food 
sovereignty writers and activists, like Raj Patel, focus on the meaning of rights because to make 
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the right to define food and agriculture systems meaningful “is to require that everyone be able 
substantively to engage with those policies” (Patel, 2009, p.670). In a society with deep structural 
inequalities, especially within the international economic system, however, rights tend to privilege 
some individuals and groups at the expense of others. Therefore, in order to make food sovereignty 
meaningful, “the rights-based approach must be able to attack and change these structures” 
(Mowbray, 2007, p.548) In this way, while the goal of food sovereignty is certainly to protect and 
promote the right to have rights over food, this goal is preceded by the need to address society’s 
base inequalities of power, and to make progress towards a radical ‘moral universalism’ (Patel, 
2009). This last point, the connection between moral progress and meaningful rights, is one which 
has received the least attention thus far in food sovereignty literature. Without a clear 
understanding of where our rights are taking us, however, it is unlikely that food sovereignty will 
move us in any better a direction than the neo-liberal approach to food security. 
Professional and academic fields, such as planning, which often face normative ethical 
dilemmas in practice (Harper & Stein, 1992), express a similar concern, that the conventional 
liberal philosophy surrounding individual rights derives from, and perpetuates, “a basic 
agnosticism concerning conceptions of the good” (Anderson, 1987, p.27; cited by Cambell and 
Marshall, 2012). Within the material reality of planning activities, such as the development of food 
plans, Campbell and Marshall argue that simply remaining agnostic about the good, and focusing 
instead on protecting the right of individuals and communities to pursue their own self-interest, is 
more likely to paralyze our projects than it is to help us achieve collective goals (Campbell & 
Marshall, 2012). Worse yet, it leaves us without a clear moral picture of where we are going. As a 
result, emerging rights-based frameworks, like food sovereignty, are at risk of paralyzing their 
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own goals if they do not take seriously the moral foundation of the rights they wish to promote. A 
more radical view, situated in the reality of place, might help to ensure that this does not happen. 
The essential point of the thesis is that rights have a geographic basis. The right to 
something must take place somewhere, but if an individual or community is trying to exercise the 
right to food sovereignty in a region which is overrun by monoculture crops, genetically modified 
seed and export-oriented agriculture, it is unlikely that they will be able to exercise their right to 
its fullest extent. In the same way, the individual or community exercising the right to define their 
own food and agriculture system is, in effect, transforming the place in which they live into the 
type of place they think it ought to be. This is an inherently moral process, which stems from our 
geographic condition, or “the fact that we cannot accept reality as it is and so we create places to 
transform reality into what we think it ought to be and then transform this new reality, and on and 
on” (Sack, 2001a, p.107). Food sovereignty involves the transformation of reality so that people 
may exercise their right over food and agriculture. People make places for food sovereignty, not 
simply because they believe it creates more logical, sustainable, and fair food systems, but because 
they believe that these are the types of places we ought to have. Therefore, exercising the right to 
food sovereignty involves making places and moral decisions with an implicit geographic basis.  
Sack explains that when we create places, “delimited and controlled areas of space that 
contain rules about what may or may not take place” (Sack, 2002, p.114), we manifest the intimate 
relationship that geography shares between the real and the good. The places we create contribute 
to the real in terms of adding to, subtracting from, or transforming what was already there (Sack, 
2002). Certain places also contribute to the good, such as community shelters, public libraries, and 
loving homes. Not all places that contribute to the real, however, also contribute to the good. 
Human trafficking rings, sweat-shops, political prisons and countless other evil places certainly 
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affect reality, however, they detract from the good. Geography’s relationship between the real and 
the good is also manifested through our awareness. When place helps us to see reality more clearly, 
we become more aware of our own geographical agency and how it contributes to, or detracts 
from, the good.  This is crucial, Sack writes, “Because our degree of awareness of the real affects 
how we contribute to reality” (Sack, 2002, p.114). When we are less aware, when we see less 
clearly how our actions affect other people, places and environments, we tend to contribute to 
reality in ways that detract from the good, and perhaps in ways that we did not expect, because we 
were unaware. Therefore, Sack argues that an essential element of moral progress is moving 
towards the real and the good by creating places “that increase our capacities to see reality more 
clearly and that increase the variety and complexity of that reality” (Sack, 2001b, p.117). Within 
this framework, our rights are not curtailed. Rather, they given guidance as to the direction they 
ought to be taking us. Applied to food sovereignty, Sack’s moral geographic framework would 
help to ensure that as communities exercise their right over food and agriculture systems, they do 
so in ways which help to enrich rather than impoverish reality, thus setting themselves, and the 
places they are connected to, on a path toward intrinsic geographic progress, which food security 
fails to achieve.  
In Chapter 2, I take a closer look at the instrumental goals of what is often called the Global 
Food Security Strategy (GFSS). In particular, I examine the ways in which poverty and hunger are 
portrayed as consequences of underdevelopment, thus creating the assumption that food security 
is best achieved through the broad diffusion of improved seed technology to vulnerable groups. In 
Chapter 3, I explore further the meaning of rights within the framework of food sovereignty. The 
right to food was recently put to the test by the International Monsanto Tribunal (18 April, 2017), 
revealing that even when corporations are targeted for human rights violations, there is no 
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guarantee that the rights they violated will be restored and protected. This begs the question, “Is 
food sovereignty all about rights?” The answer, as I have already eluded to, is that food sovereignty 
is as much about exercising moral geographic agency as it is about making the right to food 
meaningful.  I have reserved Chapter 4 to make the case for moral theory in modern society. The 
prominent planning theorist and researcher, Bent Flyvbjerg, has much to say about the role of 
value-rationality in planning and democracy today, much of which disagrees with Sack’s argument 
that an independent and intrinsic good exists. I take this opportunity to address both sides of the 
argument and to demonstrate that no matter our theoretical position, we all must have an intimation 
of the good, and that the most reasonable next step is articulate what those intimations are, rather 
than remaining agnostic about it. In Chapter 5 I move into a full discussion of Sack’s moral 
geographic theory. Here, I stress the importance of the criteria with which we use to judge places, 
and how that criteria, either instrumental or intrinsic, informs how the structure and dynamics of 
place are put to use. Finally, in Chapter 6, I conclude with a case study analysis of a food 
sovereignty project taking place in the western highlands of Guatemala, in the municipality of San 
Lucas Tolimán. 
The project, Nutrición Nativa, is directed by the Instituto Mesoamericano de Permacultura 
(IMAP), a local, indigenous, non-governmental organization, working to extend more control over 
native seed to local farming communities while simultaneously addressing high rates of childhood 
malnutrition. The primary native seed being promoted in this project is amaranth, amaranto or 
bledo. This effort at food sovereignty is a place making project with moral implications that play 
out geographically through the places the project creates. In this chapter, I look at two specific 
places, IMAP’s permaculture institute, as well as sites of production, to analyze the sort of progress 
that is being achieved. To help with this analysis, I ask the following value rational questions: 
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1. Where are we going with planning for food sovereignty in San Lucas Tolimán? 
2. How are the mechanics of place used to achieve progress? 
3. Is this desirable? 
























Chapter 2: Food Security 
 
For all the effort that has been made to pin-point solutions to food insecurity, little attention 
has been given to the ways in which solutions are developed or to the values by which they are 
motivated.  In this chapter I will discuss the conventional approach to food-insecurity, which can 
be summarized as the promotion of increased innovation and diffusion of agricultural technologies. 
I look at who is involved, how we arrived at this solution, and the mechanisms by which it 
functions today.  
Who is Involved? 
On April 29th of 2015, David Lane, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. agency on Food and 
Agriculture, in an interview with Rosamond Naylor, the director of the Center on Food Security 
at Stanford, painted a complex picture of the future of global food-security. By 2050, we will have 
a population of 9 billion, and we will need to increase agricultural productivity by an estimated 
60%, using fewer inputs, with less land, and in the face of climate change (Lane, 2015). 
Productivity in the form of basic calories, however, is not enough to address the reality of food 
insecurity. Lane argues that we must make progress in nutrition, which comes from crop 
diversification and putting women and smallholder farmers at the center of food security strategies. 
He attributes our overemphasis on production to the goals of the Green Revolution, which taught 
us to equate progress to low food prices and less GDP going to agricultural labor. Lane believes 
that this metric of progress has given people a false sense of security when see low prices at the 
grocery store and less people toiling away on farms. Unfortunately, low food prices and even 
prosperity in some corners of the globe, does not necessarily mean that we are moving in the right 
direction, or that hunger and poverty will eventually fade away. The world was made painfully 
10 
 
aware of this reality in 2007 when spikes in global food prices ignited a period of extreme 
desperation and conflict across the global south (Agarwal, 2014). The Green Revolution might 
have transformed agricultural production in South East Asia, Central America and Africa. Its short-
term success, however, was founded on the broad dissemination and adoption of petrochemical 
technologies, such as synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, which themselves were subject to severe 
fluctuations in the global economy (Agarwal, 2014). 
Lane believes that we have been given a second chance to once again make agriculture the 
cornerstone of development in the global south. We must do so sustainably, however, and with 
small-holders and women at the center of the decision-making process. This belief reflects the 
vision of former President Obama’s Feed the Future Initiative (FTF). FTF is the U.S. government’s 
global hunger and food security initiative. Its mission is based on transforming the global approach 
to food security by connecting smallholder farmers and women to financial services, private 
innovators and markets (Progress Report, 2016). In his interview with Dr. Naylor, Lane reports 
that women agriculturalists are 30% less productive than men due to a gender bias in how technical 
assistance is administered through international aid programs (Lane, 2015). Considering that 
women make up over half of the agricultural labor force in many of the countries in which FTF 
operates, Lane warns that we may be undermining our ability to make a more food secure future. 
Working with smallholder and women farmers, however, presents new realities, such as limited 
access to land, degraded soils, limited financial means and discrimination, all of which the global 
food security strategy has never meaningfully addressed. Therefore, in order to place smallholders 
and women at the center of the food security initiative, Lane stresses the need for nations to partner 
with private industries to foster agricultural innovations that will cater to these groups. 
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One such effort has come in the form of FTF’s Feed the Future Innovation Labs, which 
connect twenty-four U.S. led universities to their partner regions in the global south. According to 
the 2016 FTF Progress Report, Feed the Future Innovation Labs have delivered more than 900 
innovations, such as new crop varieties, to help farmers increase yields, fight pests and adapt to 
changing climatic conditions (Progress Report, 2016). Heat-tolerant maize hybrids are especially 
popular in Africa and South Asia where FTF has partnered with eleven seed companies and 
university researchers to make more climate-resilient hybrids available to smallholder farmers 
(Progress Report, 2016).  Therefore, FTF’s mission does not stop at the development of new 
agricultural technologies. A critical second-step to their food security initiative is to increase 
access to these technologies, like hybrid maize, to smallholder farmers who are most vulnerable 
of the effects of climate change.  
FTF works as network, with eleven other U.S. Government departments and agencies 
managing partnerships and programs between local communities, regional organizations and 
private seed companies. In Zambia, Stewards Globe, a branch of the seed corporation AFRISEED, 
has expanded their brand of improved legume varieties by establishing growing contracts with 
small holder farmers. In 2015, Stewards Globe led the establishment of demonstration plots for 
AFRISEED’s improved common bean variety, and distributed seed packages to over 60,000 
farmers (Innovation Portfolio, 2016). In Ukraine, the agro-technology corporation Agrico, has 
partnered with the Swiss seed giant Syngenta, through FTF’s AgTechXChange program, to 
organize in-field training exercises with new heat resistant potatoes to replace heirloom varieties 
(Innovation Portfolio, 2016). And in Guatemala, FTF agencies have partnered Servicios Post-
Cosecha, a Guatemalan agro-technology corporation, with the International Potato Center to 
introduce improved varieties of potatoes under the brand name, Papais (Innovation Portfolio, 
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2016). On the surface, the goal of these actors, through their partnerships with one another, is to 
connect smallholder farmers to the global marketplace, to expand their economic opportunities 
and increase global food production. Central to these goals, however, is the assumption that private 
sector innovations are necessary to food security. The two branches of FTF which make this 
assumption clear are the Partnering for Innovation and AgTechXChange programs. These two 
extensions of FTF focus on bringing together companies who wish to commercialize agricultural 
technologies for smallholder use and developing strategies to connect smallholder farmers to the 
global marketplace. In other words, they hoped to create a more food secure future by increasing 
smallholders’ access to private-sector innovations. 
According to the AgTechXChnage Team, smallholders and the private sector have a hard 
time meeting each other half way. Smallholders lack both the purchasing power to afford improved 
inputs and the technical know-how to successfully apply them. While private businesses see many 
risks in catering to smallholder clients. This second obstacle is largely a result of the Green 
Revolution, which established innovation distribution networks designed to service large land 
holders. Now, however, that the U.S. government has made smallholders and women a central 
focus of their food-security strategy, Partnering for Innovation’s Director, Bob Rabatsky asserts 
that food security strategies must find ways to help the private sector to provide technologies to 
increase smallholder productivity, while earning a profit (Hamilton, 2016). In other words, they 
must find a way to entice private sector innovators to invest and take risks in an inherently poor 
market. This line of thinking assumes not only that the innovation and distribution of improved 
seed is the best solution to food insecurity, but also that the private sector is best positioned to take 
on the task. These assumptions are part and parcel of a recurring theme in global south 
development projects to pursue high-tech cures for hunger and poverty while ignoring far more 
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realistic and readily available solutions, such as raised fields, polycultures, native seeds and 
agroforestry systems (Tokar, 2014). 
How did we get here? 
At the center of any food-security strategy lies an ontological perspective on poverty, an 
idea of what poverty is, why it exists and how it might be resolved. This is precisely because food 
insecurity is a state of poverty, or a dimension of deprivation that relates to food and nutrition 
(FAO, 2008). For this reason, it is important that any critical glance at contemporary food security 
strategies be accompanied by an effort to understand how the strategy in question perceives 
poverty. As stated in the introduction, I am focusing on the food security strategy which promotes 
increased innovation and diffusion of agricultural technologies. And as I have indicated, this is the 
strategy pursued most earnestly by the United States’ Feed the Future Initiative, as well as the 
United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which I will demonstrate later in the 
chapter.  
What then is this strategy’s perspective on poverty? And in what ways does it affect our 
efforts to create a more food secure future? Much work has been done to illustrate the genesis of 
agricultural development over the past half century, from the Green Revolution to the Gene 
Revolution. Unfortunately, less work has been done to answer these two questions, which expose 
an underlying issue in the way we define and pursue progress, especially as it is related to food 
security and poverty. Let us first begin by understanding how food security is framed. The FAO 
employs a definition of food security derived from the 1996 World Food Summit which states; 
 
 
Food security exists when all people, at all times have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, and safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 





 How this definition works within the right to food framework will soon be discussed. First 
we must understand the direction that it sends us. Clearly, an important component of food security 
is improving food access. In their 2006 Policy Brief, the FAO discusses increased food access as 
those steps which improve individuals’ access to the necessary resources for sustained food 
production. These resources can include agricultural inputs, such as improved seeds, fertilizer, 
pesticide, and infrastructure, such as cold storage facilities, roads and food distribution networks. 
Food security then relies on places working better together to deliver the means for improved food 
access. This entails the formulation of new geographies, if you will, that better connect places 
where agricultural inputs are produced, to places where agricultural inputs are used, and finally, to 
places where food is purchased or acquired and consumed. And so, places work well when they 
show progress toward the goal of improved food access. Geographer Robert Sack likens this sort 
of progress to what he calls instrumental progress. The mix of places and the rules by which they 
are governed, he explains, are instrumental to meeting the goals of the project, but their meaning 
and purpose does not extend beyond the those goals. We will revisit this point at the end of the 
section, but to understand its full significance, we will first need to return to the question of 
poverty. 
 To say that the food security strategy perceives poverty through a single lens is perhaps too 
general a claim. After all, food security is an effort pursued by organizations both large and small, 
public and private, across the globe. It is certainly not my intention to lump more equitable and 
sustainable approaches to food security with those overtly in favor of purely industrial methods of 
agricultural production, of which there are plenty. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the 
conventional food security strategy is based on an antiquated belief, perhaps best described by the 
Geographer Lakshman Yapa, “that poverty arises from lack of development or underdevelopment, 
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a condition that can be eradicated with more development” (Yapa, 1993, pp. 255). Of course, 
development can take on a variety of forms depending upon the aspect of poverty being addressed. 
The development of new educational systems differs in appearance and purpose from the 
development of new health care facilities and both certainly differ from the development of 
agricultural production. Yapa suggests that while the differences between each form of 
development are certainly important, they should not distract us from the fact that development 
typically takes the place of a pre-existing nexus of social relations.  Health care development 
rarely, if ever, occurs in a place where people’s health had not been previously considered and 
addressed. Just as agricultural development has rarely occurred in places where no prior form of 
agriculture existed. The point Yapa makes is that development, whether it be the development of 
health care, education or agriculture, rarely implies the mere enhancement of pre-existing systems 
or services. Rather, it almost always implies the complete transformation or replacement of an 
existing process and the social relations upon which that process had previously relied.  
  In the realm of agriculture, development has often been decried for eroding traditional 
social relations of production, knowledge-transfer and general awareness of where food comes and 
how it is grown.  The latter of these concerns has been addressed with varying degrees of success 
by the establishment of fair-trade markets and other measures to increase the transparency of food 
production. Future agricultural development will likely introduce even more transparency to the 
marketplace as new traceability technology, such as Syngenta’s Farmforce software, makes it 
easier for smallholder farmers to track, record and make-searchable, information related to the 
production of their crops, where they were grown, what inputs were used, etc. The assumption 
remains, however, that new technological development is required to move agrarian communities 
away from a state of food insecurity and poverty, which brings us to a question concerning the 
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original goal of the food security strategy. If the goal of food security is to increase food access, 
and if most actors within the food security strategy perceive poverty and food insecurity as a state 
of underdevelopment, what then is development supposed to look like, and how exactly does it 
affect pre-existing networks of agricultural production?  
 Development, as I have indicated, is very circumstantial and depending on the scale, it can 
also be very abstract. The development of global, transcontinental and even regional agricultural 
networks must necessarily include a wide range of geographic scales both physical and social. For 
this reason, we find that economic models of development are often employed to guide how 
development is likely to occur given the project and the range of variables and scales involved. In 
the case of agricultural development, we see that economic models of diffusion were employed 
during the period of the Green Revolution to explain how hybrid seeds should filter through 
agrarian communities. Models were produced indicating that farmers, as rational actors, would 
adopt high-yielding varieties of hybrid seed if provided with sufficient access to capital, 
information, credit and irrigation technology (Yapa, 1993). The diffusionist paradigm of the Green 
Revolution posed two significant problems for the existing relations of agricultural production. 
First, by rationalizing the adoption of hybrid seed, a polarizing language was introduced to agrarian 
communities whereby those who could more easily adapt to the new technologies came to be 
known as “progressive farmers”, while those opposed to the use of hybrid seeds and their chemical 
inputs came to be known as “non-adopters” or “laggard farmers” (Yapa, 1993). Without 
considering the possible socio-economic and cultural reasons for the non-adoption of hybrid seeds, 
and by stigmatizing non-adopters for their seemingly irrational opposition to a perfectly “rational” 
form of development, the diffusionist paradigm created distinct divides in agrarian communities, 
between those farmers who would ultimately benefit from globalization, and those who would be 
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left behind. Second, by granting infallible authority to the agro-technological innovations produced 
in the Global North, the diffusionist paradigm provided little room to critically reflect upon the 
potential socio-environmental consequences of hybrid seed, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. 
Notably, little attention was given to fact that hybrid seeds replaced the former means of seed 
reproduction by inserting required chemical inputs into the reproduction process. Progressive 
farmers found little cause to object to the fundamental transformation of seed reproduction because 
native or non-hybrid crop varieties were quickly declining in market value. While objections from 
non-adopters went unheeded precisely because the diffusionist paradigm had already de-
legitimized their opinions in the eyes of those organizations and governments responsible for 
providing the technical means for agricultural development. As a result, hybrid seeds and chemical 
inputs opened new global markets for some farmers, they introduced scarcity for others.  
 Food security strategists have arrived at the conclusion that the Green Revolution did a 
poor job assuring an equitable diffusion of agro-technologies to smallholder farmers. They contend 
that pre-existing inequalities within agrarian communities resulted in concentrations of income 
gains among wealthier farmers who could more easily adopt new technologies. As an example, 
the FAO refers to a case study from the Philippines which shows that between 1965 and 1980 
farmers with access to irrigation, credit and implicit subsidies, benefited greatly from Green 
Revolution technologies which allowed them to produce high yielding cash crops at increasingly 
larger scales. This generated income gains for the already-affluent sector of the rural economy. As 
consumers, this class of the economy preferred imported, capital-intensive goods, over local, 
labor-intensive goods, thus draining revenue from the poorer sector of the economy (Bautista, 
1995). With examples such as this, the FAO suggests that if the gains from advancements in agro-
technologies were to be more equitably shared amongst smallholders, more capital would be 
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invested in the local economy and incomes overall would rise. Notably, this conclusion does not 
consider that the technology itself might be a contributing factor to the persistence of smallholder 
poverty. Rather it perpetuates the diffusion paradigm of development which guides most food 
security strategies today.  
 This conclusion should not be all too surprising because it reveals that the food security 
strategy has simply not moved beyond the confines of instrumental progress. As mentioned earlier 
in the section, instrumental progress implies that the geographies and places of food security 
projects are judged based on the goals of increased food access which, as I have shown, entail the 
diffusion of agro-technologies. The places involved in these projects are instrumental to the 
efficient distribution of new varieties of improved seed and external inputs. There is little 
indication, however, that these projects are judged for anything beyond the instrumental goal of 
increasing the distribution and use of new technology. This is potentially very problematic 
because, as the Green Revolution clearly demonstrated, places can be instrumentally good at 
meeting their goals, like production or distribution, while also being socially and environmentally 
disastrous. The following section takes a closer look at the mechanisms by which agro-technology 
and private sector innovations are being normalized within the contemporary food security 
strategy. 
How does it work? 
  So far, I have attempted to name the major actors in the global food security 
strategy. In the second section I showed how their rationality concerning poverty and development 
is built on the diffusion paradigm of development and a deeply held faith in the untapped potential 
of agricultural technologies. Referring to previous patterns of establishing food security, I 
indicated that diffusionism remains the central method of the global food security strategy. I also 
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noted, however, that the difference between the diffusion of technology today and the diffusion of 
technology during the Green Revolution is that today’s food security actors are focused on helping 
private sector innovations to reach smallholder and female farmers. In this section I will discuss 
the role of improved seeds and intellectual property rights in creating this private-industry-friendly 
environment.  
A key position held by the global food security strategy is that private companies need the 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in order to compete in the in the market for 
improved seed varieties to be used by smallholder farmers. In other words, without IPRs for new 
plant varieties, there would be little incentive to invest and innovate. This logic bears a more deeply 
held assumption that capital is a necessary ingredient for agricultural innovation. And while I will 
not attempt to completely refute this assumption, I do find it troubling that today’s dominant food 
security strategy finds it necessary to provide capital incentive to advance the evolution of seed. If 
not for the sake of capital accumulation, we ought to ask, why innovate? It would seem as though 
our civilization’s effort to end poverty and food insecurity could be characterized as one of means 
without ends. We seem to have more knowledge and resources than ever before to act on issues 
related to poverty and food insecurity, and yet we remain shackled to the rudimentary motivation 
of capital accumulation. We must move beyond this superficial notion of progress if we truly wish 
to develop a meaningfully solution to food insecurity. Unfortunately, we do not seem to be heading 
in that direction just yet. 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) Act of 1991, 
signaled an emboldening of intellectual property rights around seed, which is still gaining strength 
today. UPOV, or the “UPOV convention” as it is often called, was established in 1961 to help its 
67 member states spur the development of new plant varieties by granting breeders an intellectual 
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property right over their seed, known as the “breeder’s right”. The Act of 1991 represents the 
convention’s third and latest revision to their articles since they were last revised in 1978. This 
latest revision strengthened plant breeder’s rights by prohibiting farmers from saving protected 
varieties for their own use without a breeder’s authorization (UPOV, 1991, Article 14.1). 
Additionally, breeders have been given the right to “harvested material”, meaning any harvest 
obtained through the unauthorized use of protected plant varieties automatically belongs to the 
breeder (UPOV, 1991, Article 14.2). Perhaps even more troubling about UPOV 1991, is that 
farmers are prevented from patenting their own varieties, due to the convention’s strict patent 
requirements. According to articles 8 and 9 respectively, new plant varieties must exhibit traits of 
“uniformity” and “stability”, meaning, varieties cannot exhibit signs heterogeneity or different 
traits from one cycle of propagation to the next. Olivier De Schutter, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, makes it clear that these requirements exclude smallholder 
farmers, because their native and heirloom varieties, which are grown in-situ and not in a 
laboratory, are “inherently unstable and in permanent evolution” (UN General Assembly, 2009, 
Ch. II, A 13.) Because of these actions, UPOV 1991 has bolstered the professionalization of plant 
breeding while moving it further away from the act of farming. This should not be too surprising 
since a prominent negotiator of UPOV 1961, 1972, 1978 and now 1991, has in fact been the seed 
industry (Association for Plant Breeding for the Benefit of Society, 2011). 
More attention is now being given to how these protections endanger traditional plant breeding 
systems, food security and biodiversity. Ironically, the very incentive being used to attract private 
industry to agricultural innovation i.e., exclusive rights over plant material, is eliminating farmers 
from the reproduction process of seed. It is important to note that developing countries are not 
required to adopt UPOV legislation, however, many have been forced into compliance through 
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trade agreements, such as the Central American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, USA-Jordan and 
EU-Mexico (Jhunjhunwala, 2009). These agreements provide developing countries with direct 
access to export markets which tend to enforce strict adherence to UPOV regulations. 
 Another example of private business interests being manifested through policy, occurred 
during the 1994 Uruguay Round concerning the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
From this Round emerged not only the World Trade Organization, but also the Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement, or TRIPS, which states that all WTO members “shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system 
or by any combination thereof” (Article 27.3 (b) of TRIPS). Sui generis systems, are “unique” 
protection systems, which allow WTO member countries to define their own form of protection of 
plant varieties along with the appropriate manner of enforcement. Specifically, sui generis is 
portrayed as an opportunity for developing countries to create plant variety protections that better 
reflect the interests of traditional and indigenous farmers. In practice, however, many WTO 
member countries have not been made aware of this option and many have unknowingly become 
signatories of the default plant variety protections of UPOV, greatly diminishing farmer control 
over seed reproduction (Jhunjhunwala, 2009). In fact, India is the only country that has opted to 
develop its own plant variety protection system for the sake of preserving “farmers’ rights”, or the 
right to save, reuse and sell seed. 
 The UPOV Act of 1991 and the WTO’s TRIPS agreement are two examples of how 
specific international trade policies create a more attractive environment for private seed 
companies. Not only do they restrict farmers from saving or selling patented plant varieties, they 
make it virtually impossible for any farmer or seed cooperative to create their own protected plant 
varieties due to the restrictions of “uniformity” and “stability”. IPRs effectively provide the seed 
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industry with the legal means to make exclusive what had previously been an open and collective 
process. There exist, however, other non-legal means for the seed industry to exert control over 
the process of plant breeding.  
 Hybrid seeds, more commonly called “improved” seeds, are created through a closed 
pollination process commonly referred to as hybridization, in which the pollen of two different 
species or plant varieties is crossed by human intervention (Seed Savers Exchange, 2012). 
Hybridization occurs randomly in nature but it is done deliberately by the professional seed 
industry to yield certain patentable traits. Most commonly, the process of hybridization has been 
used to create high yield varieties of corn, wheat, soybean, rice and fingerlings. In countries like 
Guatemala, however, plant scientists also develop improved varieties of non-traditional export 
crops (NTXs), such as cauliflower, broccoli and snow peas, which are grown in the tropics and 
sold to vegetable markets in the United States and Europe (Isakson, 2014). In some cases, 
improved seeds do produce higher yields than native or heirloom seeds grown through traditional 
breeding processes. They do so, however, only temporarily as saved hybrid seeds generally 
produce increasingly poor and erratic yields though successive generations (Yapa, 1993).  Perhaps 
more important is the fact that improved seeds do not produce higher yields on their own. They 
are genetically engineered to respond to inorganic inputs, such as synthetic fertilizers and 
pesticides. Most of these inorganic inputs originate from the same company supplying the 
improved seed. The seed company Monsanto, for example, sells an improved variety of corn that 
must be paired with their pesticide Round Up. The all too conspicuous name for this popular 
product is, Round-Up Ready Corn.  
Therefore, improved seeds cannot be cultivated by farmers without also applying external 
inputs. Cultivation can also not continue unless farmers repurchase improved seed after each 
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harvest. This cycle of dependency is further exacerbated by the fact that synthetic fertilizers and 
pesticides, like improved seeds, become increasingly obsolete over time. Synthetic fertilizers 
supply nutrients directly to the plant, drawing nutrients away from the top-soil and eventually 
leading to erosion. Thus, higher quantities of fertilizer are required as the soil is drained of its 
organic content and its ability to support plant life. Increasingly large applications of pesticides 
are also required because pesticides destroy insect life indiscriminately thus eliminating natural 
predators. Overtime, pests develop genetic immunities to the chemicals being applied requiring 
that the agrochemical industry produce more powerful pesticide technology. Farmers are then left 
with the option of purchasing the new technology, applying greater quantities of the obsolete 
technology, or abandoning their efforts all together. With all these built-in restrictions, IPRs hardly 
seem necessary to prevent farmers form attempting to save and reuse improved seed. Nevertheless, 
in countries where IPRs are less strictly enforced, seed companies have employed genetic-use 
restriction technologies (GURTs) to maintain exclusive control over the reproduction of their 
innovation (UN General Assembly, 2009, Ch. III, A 41.). GURTs, or “terminator technologies”, 
serve no agricultural function other than to prevent seeds from germinating unless other proprietary 
chemicals are also applied (Kloppenburg, 2010).  
These protections granted to the private seed industry have not gone without critique. 
Olivier De Schutter has brought to the UN General Assembly’s attention that UPOV 1991 and 
IPRs over protected plant varieties, curtail farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange and sell seed. 
Despite this critique, however, improved seeds remain central to the global food security strategy. 
According to the 2016 FTF Progress Report, new policy reforms have been made to facilitate the 
development and distribution of improved, drought-tolerant, hybrids of maize soybean and rice to 
farmers in Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania and Ghana (Progress Report, 2016). On the surface, 
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these innovations, and their increased distribution to smallholders, appear to provide a logical 
solution to the food security problem, insofar as it is perceived as a problem created by a lack of 
development. Ironically, the development of new plant varieties is predicated on government, 
private and university access to the wealth of biodiversity available in developing countries near 
the tropics (Kloppenburg, 2010). The protections placed on these improved plant varieties, whether 
through IPRs, hybridization or GURTs, effectively privatizes the biodiversity created by farmers 
without their consent. This broad and complex process, which I have attempted to describe in some 
detail, has been summed up by the scholar and activist Vandana Shiva as nothing less than 
biopiracy, “the patenting of indigenous knowledge related to biodiversity” (Shiva, 2007, 371).  
Having poured over FTF’s food security strategies, it seems unlikely to me that it is their 
intention to separate farmers from the reproduction process of seed, nor to engage in biopiracy. 
Nevertheless, the authors which I have referenced in this chapter make it quite clear that the 
existing legal and ideological frameworks surrounding intellectual property rights and improved 
seed technology make it increasingly difficult for nearly all farmers to save and selectively breed 
new species of plants without violating either a trade agreement or the intellectual property rights 
of an individual or corporation. We should all be concerned with this subtle but profound shift in 
our agricultural system. It has caused farmers to grow fewer crops and to focus on high yield 
varieties which are bred for genetic uniformity, stability, and often, sterility. This system differs 
greatly from the past millennia of agriculture, in which farmers followed lessons observed in nature 
to develop complex and highly productive polyculture systems. A well-known example being the 
three sisters, which takes advantage of the natural relationships between corn, beans and squash. 
The three sisters design often serves as the starting point for the much more complex milpa system 
practiced throughout Mexico and Central America. In this system, the corn stock provides a 
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structure for the bean plant to secure itself to as it climbs toward the sun, while the bean plant fixes 
nitrogen in the soil. Nitrogen is absorbed by the squash which itself provides ground cover to 
conserve water and which flowers to attract pollinators. Polycultures, and agroecological systems 
such as these, have proven time and again to be more productive and sustainable in terms of both 
efficient food production and plant evolution than any modern-day example of genetic 
modification (Altieri, 2011). 
As today’s agricultural system pushes us in the direction of genetic uniformity and 
hybridization, we risk losing what little biodiversity we have left. Already, 90% of the crop 
varieties grown in the US over the past 100 years are no longer grown commercially (Muir, 2011).  
This matters greatly in the era of climate change because crops are better able to respond to 
environmental stressors, such as drought, pathogens and pests, when their population is more 
genetically diverse (Muir, 2011). For these reasons, it will become increasingly important that we 
develop a solution to food insecurity that does not also remove farmers from the reproduction 
process of seed by allowing private corporations to appropriate and privatize the knowledge and 
biodiversity of plant life. We need to develop a solution to food insecurity which places the 
intellect, ability and experience of farmers at the center of the reproduction process and the future 
development of crop diversity. Clearly, we cannot develop such a solution with the same mind set 
which has permitted the commodification of seed and agricultural knowledge. Therefore, the task 
of the following section is to focus on an entirely different ideological approach to thinking about 
and acting upon food insecurity. It is the idea that global food security can never truly be achieved 
until the rights of people and nations to define their own food and agricultural policies, including 
trade, development, aid and intellectual property rights, are upheld and protected. It is the idea that 
food sovereignty is a necessary precursor to food security. 
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Chapter 3: Food Sovereignty 
 
 Central to the understanding of food sovereignty is the belief that how our food is produced 
is just as important as food itself. This belief is born out of the antagonism felt by millions of 
smallholder farmers who recognize that the process of producing food today, using patented seeds, 
GMOs, systemic pesticides and synthetic fertilizers, is utterly inadequate for sustained food 
production, because it is a process imbued with the obsolescence of capitalism. This belief rejects 
the primacy of the free-market in agricultural development which promotes capital intensive, 
private-sector innovations as the best solution to food insecurity. Instead, it promotes what is 
practical, local, sustainable and just in all communities, to find the right steps, and not silver 
bullets, to meaningfully discuss and address the root causes of poverty and hunger. Most of all, it 
promotes peoples’ right to define their own food and agricultural systems understanding that it is 
through open public deliberation over such important issues that true food security strategies are 
created. It is this last point, the right to define one’s own food and agricultural system, which most 
clearly distinguishes the food sovereignty mindset from that of food security, but it is also the point 
about which food sovereignty advocates debate most passionately. 
 In this chapter I explore what it is that makes the rights-based approach of food sovereignty 
so contentious. At the center of the issue is the reality that food sovereignty is a ‘moral enterprise’ 
opposed to the business as usual approach to ensuring the human right to food. This opposition 
raises several questions that I will address in this chapter about the human right to food. Namely, 
“Is the right to food meaningful?” and “Is it all about rights?” These are critical questions because 
they force us to ask whether the current framework for ensuring the human right to food is working, 
and whether what it is working towards is truly desirable. This inquiry reveals perhaps even more 
important and compelling questions which have received much less attention. The questions I am 
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referring to are addressed by Robert Sack in his book, a Geographical Guide to the Real and the 
Good, and they concern the justification for rights within a liberal democracy. Namely, how do we 
know whether the rights which we demand are themselves good and how can we be sure that 
anything good will come from them? The concern is this, if the function of a liberal democracy is 
merely to protect and ensure our individual rights, what if anything is ensuring that we put our 
rights to good use?  Historical novelists like as Gary Cross have shown that an emphasis on rights 
and self-interest can easily devolve into a “consumers’ democracy” (Cross, 2002). In this scenario, 
progress towards food security is equated to individuals having more freedom to access goods 
from the market. It says nothing of the right to control how those goods are financed, produced, 
traded and distributed. This, I argue, is precisely the approach to food security that has given the 
human right to food its increasingly hollow connotation. 
Is the right to food meaningful? 
 To be clear, there have been, and there will likely continue to be, many definitions of the 
right to food. Food sovereignty represents one of many definitions and certainly not the first. Under 
UN General Comment 12, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights provide a 
definition to what they have chosen to call the ‘adequate right to food’. Which is now a central 
tenant of the current rights based framework of the FAO and the global food security strategy. 




The right to adequate food is realized when every man, 
woman and child, alone or in community with others, has 
the physical and economic access at all times to adequate 
food or means for its procurement (CESCR, 1999).  
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Within the General Comment 12 document, much is said about the meaning of the language 
in this definition. Special attention is paid to the meaning of physical and economic access. Both 
imply that vulnerable persons who lack the physical, mental or financial means of procuring food 
for an adequate diet should be ensured the equal right to food access. Rightfully, this includes 
‘landless persons’ and ‘indigenous population groups’ who might be without sufficient capital to 
access food through the market place as a consumer, while also being denied access to land to 
produce food sustainably. Interestingly, the individuals and communities from within this 
vulnerable segment of society also tend to represent those in favor of food sovereignty. Food 
sovereignty is a radical democratic project galvanized by the transnational peasant movement, La 
Via Campesina, to bring about peasant-driven agrarian reform. According to the Declaration of 
the Forum for Food Sovereignty in Nyéléni, Mali 2007, food sovereignty means,  
 
 
What should become clear when comparing these two interpretations of the right to food, 
is that the former characterizes an inherent or natural right to food, while the later characterizes a 
right to have a right. Food sovereignty does not demand a right to something that must be provided 
by someone else, but rather the right to do something for one’s self and one’s community. In this 
case, it is the right to define one’s own food and agricultural system. This distinction is crucial to 
understanding the flaws within the current rights-based framework employed by the UN, the US, 
the WTO and the global food security strategy in general. The most significant flaw being the fact 
that natural rights, or the inherent right to something because we are human and because we exist, 
themselves do not exist (Patel, 2009). For the right to food to be meaningful there must also exist 
a guarantor of food, or the means of food production, and a system by which the guarantor is held 
The right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through sustainable methods and their right 
to define their own food and agricultural systems - The 




accountable. Simply declaring the right to food in no way ensures that it will be upheld and that 
food will be provided, or that it will be provided in the same way, in all places, always. This of 
course does not mean that human rights do not exist, just that we are responsible for bringing them 
into existence. 
 The philosopher Hanna Arendt, to whom writer Raj Patel refers in his work, introduces 
the important concept of the right to have rights to help convey the essential argument that we are 
denied our rights when we are deprived of our ability to effect change on the world around us 
(Ardent, 1967). Following her logic, the right to food cannot be about the right to receive food or 
the means of food production, because those things could theoretically be provided under a military 
dictatorship which might simultaneously deny our right to take ‘action’ and express ‘opinion’ that 
would alter the status quo. The right to food must therefore begin with the right to action and 
opinion because it is only through this process that we create rights for ourselves. It is the only 
way by which rights can be brought into existence and made meaningful. This is a theoretical 
argument as to why the current rights-based framework cannot meaningfully ensure the right to 
food, because it does not ensure the right to have rights in the first place. It merely promises, with 
no legal means of guaranteeing, the provision of food access. Food sovereignty provides a more 
meaningful interpretation of the right to food because it begins by asserting the right to define 
one’s own food and agricultural system. In this way, food sovereignty departs from the 
conventional food security narrative which does not require that people be allowed to effect change 
in world around them, only that they be provided with the means to sustain an adequate diet.  
 There also exist concrete examples of how the current rights-based framework fails to 
meaningfully ensure the right to food. On October 15th and 16th of 2016, the Monsanto Tribunal 
was held at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. The Tribunal is an international civil 
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society initiative with the stated purpose of getting a ‘symbolic’ ruling against the world’s largest 
agrochemical company, Monsanto, for their violations of human rights, including the right to food, 
as well as their crimes against the environment, including ecocide. The symbolic ruling is meant 
to advance the conversation of how legal mechanisms can be established to hold multinational 
corporations accountable for human rights violations, because no such mechanisms currently exist. 
The Tribunal featured five internationally renowned judges from Canada, Mexico, Senegal, 
Belgium, Argentina and Australia, along with twenty plaintiffs and experts from five continents, 
and a total of 1230 signatory organizations, movements and institutions from around the world. 
Judges ruled on the questions of whether the firm Monsanto violated certain rights as recognized 
by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Human Rights Council (HRC). The Tribunal was 
organized around six questions ranging from whether the firm ‘is complicit in the commission of 
a war crime’ as defined by the ICC, and to whether the firm violated ‘the human right to food’, as 
defined by the ICESCR. In Article 11 of the ICESCR the right to food is interpreted as the ‘right 
to be free from hunger’. This interpretation ought to raise a red flag indicating its potential 
ineffectiveness, because it interprets the right to food as a ‘negative’ right, or the right to be free 
from something, and stops short of ensuring the right to effect change in one’s own food or 




[i]mprove methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, 
by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to 
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural 
resources (Article 11, 2a, ICESCR). 
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This policy leaves open many points of entry for administrative discretion. Perhaps the 
most significant omission is that it does not provide any indication as to who is responsible for 
‘improving methods of production’, nor whose ‘technical and scientific knowledge’ might be 
prioritized. Seeing, however, as the existing legal framework of the WTO overtly favors the private 
interests of multinational seed and agrochemical corporations, it is all too likely that those held 
responsible for ‘improving methods of production’ will remain the same corporate entities whose 
actions and technologies have led to the rapid erosion of farmers’ rights. The question put forth by 
the Tribunal as to whether the firm Monsanto has violated the ‘right to food’, as defined by Article 
11 of the ICESR, suggests that the firm’s actions, and or, technologies have infringed on UN 
member state’s’ abilities to ensure their citizens’ right to be free from hunger. Within each of the 
seventeen testimonials, however, are examples of State-run entities carrying out, either willingly 
or forcedly, the demands made by the Monsanto firm to require that farmers use their proprietary 
technology.  
In Argentina, the National Agricultural Technology Institute sponsored the use of 
Monsanto’s Round-up (RR) Soy and chemical herbicide, glyphosate. Over time, certain weeds, 
such as Johnson grass and pigweed, developed resistances to Round-up and glyphosate. Farmers 
were obligated to purchase more powerful herbicides, such as Round-up 2, Round-up Ultra Max 
and glyphsate 2.4-D to retain their access to the export market. Around the same time, Monsanto 
engineers began promoting X-tend, a new GM soybean with genetic resistance to glyphosate 2.4-
D. The application of which has the potential to wipe out any nearby non-herbicide resistant soy, 
effectively killing the firm’s competition, and forcing farmers to adopt the new GM variety 
(International Monsanto Tribunal, 2016a). 
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In Sri Lanka, in order to obtain agrarian loans, farmers were required to adopt Monsanto’s 
genetically modified seeds and agrochemicals. When first introduced, hesitant farmers accepted 
Monsanto’s donated products, but opted not to use them for fear of causing environmental damage 
to their fields. In turn, they were beaten and harassed by state-sponsored officers. Soon after being 
forced to adopt these technologies, rice farmers began noticing a decline in the number of 
beneficial frog species in their fields. In nearby streams, groups of dead fish began floating to the 
surface. In addition, previously uncommon health problems, such as kidney disease, spread 
throughout farming communities. In 2010, doctors from Rajarata University produced conclusive 
results connecting an outbreak in kidney disease to the use of the Monsanto’s agrochemicals 
(International Monsanto Tribunal, 2016b). 
On April 18th of 2017, the judges delivered their ruling to question two of the tribunal 








This decision, however precise and symbolic, will alone not ensure change in the structural 
issues of the international economic system that have allowed for these violations to occur. In fact, 
[t]hat Monsanto has engaged in practices that have negatively impacted the right 
to food. Monsanto’s activities affect food availability for individuals and 
communities and interfere with the ability of individuals and communities to 
feed themselves directly or to choose non-genetically modified seeds. In 
addition, genetically modified seeds are not always affordable for farmers and 
threaten biodiversity. Monsanto’s activities and products cause damage to soil, 
water and to the environment more generally. The Tribunal concludes that food 
sovereignty is also affected and underlines the cases in which genetic 
contamination of fields forced farmers to pay royalties to Monsanto or even to 
abandon their non-GMO crops due to this contamination. There is indeed an 
infringement on the right to food because of aggressive marketing on GMOs 
which can force farmers to buy new seeds every year. The dominant agro-
industrial model can be criticized even more strongly because other models - 




in certain ways we appear to be heading in the opposite direction. Less than a month before the 
Tribunal ruling, on March 27th of 2017, the European Commission approved the merger between 
US-based chemical companies Dow and DuPont, further concentrating the power over the means 
of food production into the hands of yet fewer multinational agrochemical corporations.  These 
coinciding events should serve as a sobering reminder that the human right to food has little 
meaning if it does not also ensure the right to have a right over food systems and the right to shape 
food policy. 
Is it all about rights? 
Raj Patel makes the rather compelling point, that “if we talk about food sovereignty, we 
talk about rights, and if we do that, we must talk about ways to ensure that those rights are met, 
across a range of geographies by everyone, in meaningful ways” (Patel, 2009, p.671).  The 
implication of his message is that certain conditions must first exist in order to make the right to 
shape food policy meaningful. These are of course the conditions pursued by any democracy; that 
all people be able to substantively engage with policy. A complication of food sovereignty, 
however, is that it demands that everyone be able to substantively engage with food policy across 
geographic scales, from the local to the global. Patel is right to point out that this demand quickly 
becomes an issue if we consider that everyone includes both multi-national agrochemical 
corporations as well as peasant farmers. Even within communities, systemic inequalities of power 
and privilege can and do concentrate control over the means of food production into the hands of 
the few. Nevertheless, food sovereignty rejects those social and economic circumstances, whether 
it be patriarchy or structural adjustment programs, which readily facilitate the uneven distribution 
of power within food and agriculture. It rejects the notion that the right to food simply implies the 
right to physical and economic access to food, made more accessible through a liberated global 
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market-place. Food sovereignty is founded on the steadfast belief that food is a human right and 
not a privilege, and that this right includes the right to shape food policy. 
The claim to rights is an effort on the part of La Via Campesina and the food sovereignty 
movement to dismantle the structural inequalities of the international economic system by ensuring 
that the interests and concerns of all food producers carry equal weight in the development of food, 
trade and agricultural policy. This means, for example, that the interests of Haitian rice farmers, 
who cannot compete with cheap imported rice from the United States, be given equal weight in 
the development of USAID policies, as say the private developers modified rice or U.S. rice 
farmers themselves. In this way, food sovereignty is also a call for democracy within the 
international economic system, beyond the borders of individual nation states.  It is a call for what 
the renowned political theorist, Seyla Benhabib, refers to as cosmopolitan federalism, or the 
application of norms and values of democracy at the transnational and global sphere (Benhabib, 
2005).  In her work on the disaggregation of citizenship, Benhabib argues that as our economies, 
cultures and societies become more transnational, we ought to ready ourselves for new “modalities 
of political citizenship”, or new ways of participating in the democratic process and ensuring rights 
beyond our own borders.  
Encouraging us in this direction, Benhabib points to the emerging tension within modern 
liberal democracy brought on by increasing transnational migration. In particular, she points to the 
tension “between the rights of humanity in our person and the rights that accrue to us insofar as 
we are members of specific republics” (Benhabib, 2004, p.27). This represents the dilemma of our 
political and geographic identity, that we are granted certain rights for the sake of being human 
and certain other rights for the sake of belonging to a particular group, whether that be the state, 
an international trade organization, or a group of nations, like the European Union. The disconnect 
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between these multiple identities is revealed by the varying degree of political inclusion that we 
are granted at different geopolitical scales and as we move through space. Although, Benhabib in 
her work is referring to the uncertainty of political inclusion and the rights of migrants and 
refugees, it is clear that a similar disconnect exists when we think about the political inclusion and 
the rights of smallholder farmers. On the one hand, smallholder farmers around the world, in 
Africa, South East Asia and Central America, are given new agricultural innovations in the name 
of food security and the right to food. While on the other hand, smallholder farmers are not 
included in the political process outlining the restricted uses of these new agricultural innovations, 
such as UPOV 91 and TRIPS, which inhibit farmers from ensuring food sovereignty, or any 
measure of control over the food they produce and consume.  
Patel and many others, such as the agronomist Miguel Altieri, have made it quite clear that 
smallholder farmers, who are responsible for producing roughly 70% of the world’s food on plots 
averaging 2ha (Altieri, 2011, p.3), are wildly unrepresented within institutions responsible for 
regulating agricultural trade and food policy. In an interview with Hannah Wittman, Paul 
Nicholson of La Via Campesina attributes the underrepresentation of smallholder farmers to the 
“social perception that large food chains feed society” (Wittman, 2009, p.681) , a claim that could 
not be further from the truth.  Yet we see that within the global food security strategy this same 
perspective serves as the guiding principle in expanding food security efforts. Evidence of this can 
be found within the language of the FTF’s 2011 Global Food Security Research Strategy report. 
In this report FTF researchers contend that the “productivity gains necessary to meet future food 
demand require developing new seeds that push the productivity frontier to the next level” (Feed 
the Future, 2011, p.4). To the untrained eye, the ideological power conveyed in the language of 
this approach might go unnoticed. When one begins to read more deeply, however, into FTF’s 
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well documented methods of poverty alleviation, one thing becomes very clear – that new seeds 
ought to be those developed in partnership with private sector innovators.  
Today, such innovators include, among others, the agrochemical firms Bayer and Syngenta 
which are closely involved with FTF’s Partners for Innovation program. As discussed earlier in 
the chapter, improved seeds induce scarcity by transforming what was once an integral part of the 
commons i.e., seed and agricultural knowledge, into a patented commodity. The justification for 
allowing seed to become one’s intellectual property is that the protections offered to private plant 
breeders will induce more competition between private plant breeders will produce greater 
varieties of high yielding, drought-tolerant, and pesticide resistant seed necessary, of course, in the 
face of climate change. This approach has been refined by FTF’s Partners for Innovation program 
to increase the availability and access of such innovations to peasant farmers and especially female 
farmers.  Their aim is to increase the global food supply by integrating more of these farmers into 
the international economic system and providing them with the means to produce certifiable, 
traceable and standardized crops.  
Rights are a main concern for the global food security strategy (GFSS), but they are not 
the same rights as those demanded by the food sovereignty movement. Namely, the rights being 
protected most vehemently by the GFSS are plant breeder’s rights which eliminate the right of 
farmers to save protected seed varieties. The legal mechanisms requiring that WTO member 
nations enforce plant breeder’s rights i.e., UPOV 91 and TRIPS, as I have said, inhibit the free 
exchange of seed between farmers who themselves were not politically included in the 
development of these laws. This is particularly disheartening considering the WTO is widely 
regarded as a model of democracy among international institutions. This also brings up another 
important point by Patel, that we must do more than appeal to the democratic institutions which 
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might one-day uphold the rights to food sovereignty, because these institutions are themselves 
mired in the “equality-distorting effects of sexism, patriarchy, racism, and class power” (Patel, 
2009, p. 670). We only have to look as far as the IPR agreements within the WTO to recognize 
that such institutions quite readily facilitate the male-dominated expansion of high-input, high-
cost, export-oriented agriculture over the community driven evolution of native seed and deep 
agricultural knowledge, which women and indigenous peoples are historically responsible for 
preserving and advancing. This, however, is not a call for the dismantling of democratic 
institutions. In a recent interview with National Public Radio, former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice gave a sobering reminder that institutions are not perfect, but they’re the 
bedrock of democracy. The rights-based approach to food sovereignty should be regarded as 
nothing less than an appeal to our institutions to uphold the most basic human rights, such as the 
right to food. It is important to recognize, however, that an appeal to human rights is but one way 
that food sovereignty will be brought about.   
To bring about food sovereignty, Patel suggests that we also focus our efforts on two other 
important tasks. The first is to examine the substantive processes by which food sovereignty is 
realized on the ground. The second is to take on activities and projects that will bring us closer 
towards Benhabibs’s depiction of a moral universalism, where “all human beings, by virtue of 
their humanity, are entitled to moral respect from others, and that such universal moral respect 
minimally entails the entitlement of individuals to basic human, civil, and political rights” 
(Benhabib, 1994, p.173). Patel is of the opinion that we cannot make the right to shape food policy 
meaningful until we first establish a society in which everyone is able to “substantively engage 
with those policies” (Patel, 2009, p.670). This requires that we first eliminate the basic inequalities 
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of power within society, as well as our institutions, which perpetuate the exclusion of 
disempowered people and communities from the political process. 
Others have come to similar conclusions. The International Assessment on Agricultural 
Knowledge Science Technology and Development, led by the World Bank’s chief scientist Robert 
Watson, finds the rights-based approach of food sovereignty to be “an explicitly moral enterprise 
that stands in contrast to the economic process of market-driven globalization” (Ishii-Eiteman, 
2009, p. 691). In other words, the conscious moral choice is being made to devolve “more 
responsibility and decision-making power to farmers, indigenous peoples, food workers, 
consumers and citizens for the production of social and ecological knowledge” (Ishii-Eitman, 
2009, p. 691). Of course, not all contemporary thinkers on the topic of human rights and food 
sovereignty agree with the rights-based approach. Jaqueline Mowbray from the University of 
Sydney School of Law, cannot help but question the efficacy of the rights-based approach, “since 
human rights law focuses on state responsibility” and “may not be a particularly effective tool with 
which to challenge the activities of non-state actors” (Mowbray, 2007, p. 556). If we consider that 
the ruling against Monsanto for violating the human right to food, under Article 11 of the ICESR, 
was merely symbolic, we can more clearly see Mowbray’s point.  
There is another reason, however, as to why a purely rights-based approach to food 
sovereignty might not be as effective, unifying or equalizing as its advocates would hope. Put 
simply, it is incomplete. The rights based-approach to food sovereignty is, as Robert Sack has 
described liberal democracy, “a process stemming from rights, and this is where the justification 
stops” (Sack, 2009, p. 240). The assumption made by this approach is that our right to define food 
and agricultural systems precedes our ability to know how to create good food and agricultural 
systems. It stops short of providing a way to determine whether the progress we make in the name 
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of food sovereignty is in fact good and meaningful progress. As Sack would argue, “it claims 
instead that rights precede the good” (Sack, 2009, p. 240). Within this approach, democracy 
functions instrumentally to assure that individuals and communities have the freedom to pursue 
their own self-interested goals in relation to food and agricultural policy. This return to liberal 
democracy seems to be where the most internationally recognized representatives of food 
sovereignty are heading. According to La Via Campesina, “food sovereignty is not the patrimony 
of any particular organization” (Patel, 2009, 680); it is not the responsibility of any central 
committee to determine what good food policy is. Therefore, food sovereignty seems to be moving 
towards Michael Sandel’s depiction of the liberal vision, that “a just society  does not promote any 
particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty 
for all” (Sandel, 1984, p. 82). I find this direction troubling for two reasons. First, it allows food 
sovereignty to remain a relative term, discounting the importance of a unified and moral sense of 
direction. Therefore, it inhibits the pursuit Patel’s radical-egalitarianism and Benhabib’s moral-
universalism which are necessary for food sovereignty, as a right, to be meaningful. Second, this 
direction encourages us to subscribe to a very uninspiring view of democracy. If we see democracy 
only as a means to tolerate one another while we pursue our own self-interests, we will forget that 
democracy is “integral to a moral way of life” (Sack, 2003, p. 242). In other words, it is our only 
means for becoming less insular and more aware of the world and of each other.   
Additionally, because the rights based approach presupposes the existence of a right to 
food sovereignty before food sovereignty can meaningfully exist, it detracts from the actions and 
progress being made towards food sovereignty on the ground today. In South East Asia, the 
Bangladesh Farmer’s Federation (BKF) and the Bangladesh Women Farmers’ Association (BKS), 
has lead landless peasants in place-based occupations of fallow farmland in the south of the country 
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where climate change is posing the greatest threat to the country’s food security. Through land 
occupation, the BKF and BKS directly challenge the capitalist tradition of accumulation by 
dispossession. Their efforts to repossess the commons are “consolidated through practices of food 
production, socialization, and the reproduction of labor power” (Routledge, 2016, p. 73). With 
their efforts they have distributed approximately 76,000 acres of land to more than 107,000 
landless families in Bangladesh. In South America, the Brazilian Movement of Landless Rural 
Workers (MST) are engaged in similar but larger scale efforts to bring about land reform through 
place-based occupations of large idle estates. Moreover, within the Zapatista Autonomous 
Municipalities of Chiapas, Mexico, entire communities have established place-based norms 
around agroecology to advance the decolonization of food systems and to foster more spaces for 
participatory-democracy and food sovereignty. 
While these examples are themselves quite significant, they represent only a small number 
of the total projects in which various forms of food sovereignty are being pursued and practiced in 
communities around the world today. And while each project necessarily pursues a unique vision 
of food sovereignty, from increased democratic participation in local agrarian policy to complete 
agrarian reform, they all engage in the same prefigurative process. Meaning, “they attempt to 
practice the future they wish to see” (Routledge, 2016, p. 74). Sack refers to this process as our 
geographic problematic or condition “of not being able to accept reality as it is and to continuously 
create places to transform it into what we think it ought to be” (Sack, 2001a, p. 107). Morality 
necessarily enters into this process at the point when we begin to articulate how places ought to 
be. And so, if we accept that our geographic condition exists then we must also accept that we are 
capable of making moral decisions to move toward or away from good food systems without first 
being granted the right to do so.  This is not to suggest that human rights are completely ineffective. 
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On the contrary, human rights are an essential means for us to communicate moral standards across 
an increasingly connected global society. Rather, as I have stated earlier, it is a reminder that 
human rights themselves do not occur naturally, and must be brought into existence through our 
own actions as moral agents engaged in the continual process of place making. For this reason, 
food sovereignty cannot be all about rights because food sovereignty is already being practiced 
outside of the movement’s desired rights-based framework. 
The message I hope to convey here is that food sovereignty is brought about not only by 
rights, but also by acting upon our own moral agency to create places which more closely reflect 
our image of what we believe more just, natural and truthful food systems ought to look like.  By 
creating, destroying and recreating places to better reflect this image, we necessarily imbue the  
places we create, and the projects that we use them for, with our own moral judgments, whether 
we choose to acknowledge that or not.  I believe a critical next-step in the dynamic scholarship on 
food sovereignty is to begin to articulate the positive aspects of this movement, and to answer the 
moral question, “What sort of places should we create?” For Sack, this question lies at the heart of 
our geographic condition. It is a question we must have answers to because, as Sack writes, we 
must have places. Unfortunately, this is a question that contemporary postmodern thinking 
discourages us from asking. Postmodernism tends to see morality as merely a product of the 
empirical, situated in our historicity and sociality which we are of course subject to, and yet cannot 
change. The problem with this increasingly popular mode of thinking is that it assumes a basic 
human inability to act outside of our own self-interest and situatedness. It limits our understanding 
of what progress can potentially mean by ignoring, or even rejecting, the possibility that we might 
also be capable of pursuing ends that are not beholden to human self-interest and which are derived 
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from facets of reality that we did not create. We can think about these facets of reality as the real 
and the good.  
The real and the good and their connection to geography is the foundation of Robert Sack’s 
moral geographic theory and the main topic of Chapter 5. The purpose of brining a moral theory 
into the discussion is not to provide absolute answers to the difficult questions concerning poverty 
and hunger. Rather, it is to provide a set of guideposts so that we may judge whether the places 
and projects we create to help alleviate food insecurity also move us in the right direction towards 
real moral progress. We must be willing and able to engage in this sort of dialogue, a dialogue 
with explicit moral foundations, because at some point the rhetoric surrounding food insecurity is 
made into decisions with real and tangible consequences. These decisions are most often attributed 
to the theoreticians and architects behind food and agricultural policy, but they are being 
increasingly made by planners; both in the professional sense, but also in the practical sense, by a 
diverse group of actors working on the ground to help communities define their own food and 
agriculture. Thomas L. Harper and Stanley M. Stein, in regards to the moral foundations of 
planning, write the “it is not possible to justify the goals of planning without appeals, whether 
explicit or not, to normative ethical theories” (Harper & Stein, 1992, p. 105). Therefore, another 
important topic of Chapter 5 looks at how Sack’s theory might help to articulate worthy moral 
goals for food sovereignty and for progress more generally.  
 Before diving into the mechanics of Sack’s moral geographic theory and its implications 
for food sovereignty, I believe it is important to first present the case for moral theory, and the 
articulation of values, in modern society. This is an important step, because it is here, at the 
intersection of morality and social praxis, where we as planners and social scientists are well 
positioned to offer valuable insight, or a sense of direction, to the questions “Where are we going?” 
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and “Is this direction desirable?” Unfortunately, it is here where we have historically neglected the 


























Chapter 4: Moral Theory in Modern Society 
 
Intellectual Virtues 
 What distinguishes the study of natural sciences and technology from the study of social 
science and planning? Are these intellectual virtues categorically different, or can one be 
approached from the same logical standpoint as the other? For the geographer and planning 
theorist, Bent Flyvbjerg, whose work on phronetic planning research builds upon the Aristotelian 
virtue of phronesis, or ethical praxis, social science and planning cannot be scientific in the same 
sense as the natural sciences or the development of technology. Whereas social science and 
planning are concerned with the “deliberation about that which is variable in human affairs” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 112), the natural sciences and technology are concerned with discovering and 
creating that which is invariable and widely applicable throughout society. Aristotle referred to 
these three intellectual virtues as episteme, techne and phronesis.  
In short, episteme is the intellectual virtue associated with the demonstration of scientific 
knowledge, or know why. Episteme is cumulative in the sense that new discoveries of context 
independent facts, such as gravity, heat and hunger, as rudimentary examples, contribute to the 
body of one’s epistemic understanding of the world. Over the centuries, intellectual contributions 
by Socrates, Plato and influential thinkers of the Enlightenment tradition, have made epistemic 
knowledge the dominant intellectual virtue of modern society, celebrated most commonly by the 
scientific method. Techne, or technical knowledge, is the intellectual virtue concerned with putting 
episteme to work through the application of technical skills, or know how. Techne, as interpreted 
by Flyvbjerg, has the objective of applying technical knowledge and skills to pragmatic or 
instrumentally rational decisions, where goals are consciously defined by the interests of those 
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employing technical skills to achieve a particular goal. The body of epistemic knowledge 
surrounding plant genetics, for example, might be employed by plant geneticists and molecular 
biologists to produce, by virtue of techne, pesticide resistant varieties of corn or soybean. It is not 
the objective of either episteme or techne to deliberate about their practical ethical employment, 
for this is the job of Aristotle’s most esteemed intellectual virtue, phronesis. From an Aristotelian 
point of view, phronesis is the most important of the three “because it is the intellectual virtue that 
may ensure the ethical employment of science (episteme) and technology (techne)” (Flyvbjerg, 
2004, p. 289).  
 Phronesis is the virtue which Aristotle held responsible for the judgments and choices of 
human action. It can be thought of as the skill we employ when we must deliberate about the values 
and interests concerning a situation where the options for action are variable. In other words, the 
rational of the situation cannot be boiled down to a set of rules, as epistemic or technical knowledge 
would prefer and likely assume. For example, FTF scientists are now using new plant breeding 
technologies to address various stress factors facing staple crops in developing countries, including 
pests and diseases (biotic factors) and soil salinity, drought and heat (abiotic factors). At the same 
time, they are concerned with allocating agricultural resources to meet the needs of smallholder 
and female farmers. To this end, they are working to “advance women’s leadership in science and 
technology through proactive recruitment, mentoring, and targeted research support” (FTF, 2011, 
p. 4). The overarching assumption, however, remains that “the greatest social benefits accrue to 
scientific discoveries with wide applicability” (Feed the Future, 2011, p. 9). In this sense, FTF 
researchers are making the value-rational decision to open spaces of scientific development to a 
greater diversity of perspectives and world views. This decision, I believe, is based on the 
normative values and interests of their organizational network. They are also making, however, 
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the instrumentally rational decision to promote the development, distribution and adoption of 
homogenous varieties of certified seed to increase farmers’ access to global markets. There does 
not seem to be any consideration that this approach might present ethical dilemmas in practice, 
such as the erosion of pre-existing production relations supported by the in-situ preservation and 
evolution of native seed. 
 Food security practiced as episteme and techne tends to pursue widely applicable and 
replicable solutions, like the distribution improved seeds, based on assumptions about poverty and 
food insecurity. As stated in Chapter 2, poverty and food insecurity are assumed to result from a 
lack of new information and technological innovations. This assumption reflects the historically 
positivist tradition in the United States, and in other parts of the developed world, which equate 
progress with technological advancement and increased access to Western scientific information. 
When applied to food insecurity, this assumption makes it appear counterintuitive to pursue 
solutions that do not make use of the latest advancements in agricultural technology. Absent from 
this rationality is a consideration of the ways in which power and values pervade the scientific and 
technological solutions being promoted. For Flyvbjerg, this is the central task of planning research 
practiced as phronesis, “to provide concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which 
power and values work in planning and with what consequences to whom, and to suggest how 
relations of power and values could be changed to work with other consequences” (Flyvbjerg, 
2004, p. 283). 
 Making the relationship between power, values and rationality explicit in food security is 
becoming increasingly important as regional food security actors are beginning to consolidate their 
projects around private sector investments. This distinctly positivist trend elevates the instrumental 
rationality of episteme and techne to an increasingly authoritative position in determining what 
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progress toward food security ought to look like. Unfortunately, by diminishing the value-
rationality of phronesis in the articulation of social goals, we leave ourselves without a moral frame 
of reference to know whether this direction of progress is itself good.  
Daniel Sarewitz describes this phenomenon as the scientization of controversy, whereby 
seemingly value-rational decisions regarding human projects are handed over to “the meaningless 
task of reducing [scientific] uncertainties pertinent to political dispute, rather than addressing 
societal problems as identified through open political processes” (Sarewitz, 2004,  p.399). Sarewitz 
illustrates this point with the debate over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) between plant 
geneticists and microbial ecologists.  These disciplinary perspectives have contrasting scientific 
views on nature. Whereas microbial ecologists are concerned with the impact of GMOs on non-
target soil microorganisms and the unintended genetic transformation of native species, plant 
geneticists are “concerned with controlling the attributes of specific organisms for human benefit” 
(Sarewitz, 2004, 391). Each discipline is primarily concerned with reducing the scientific 
uncertainty in their own work and elevating the uncertainty surrounding their opponents. The 
difficulty here is that both disciplines approach their research from equally defensible scientific 
standpoints. Generally speaking, rigorous standards, in accordance with the scientific method, are 
followed whether scientists are focused on the genetic engineering of soybeans, for example, or 
the unintended micro-evolutionary consequences caused by their cross-fertilization with another 
species. The point is that we cannot rely solely on scientific facts about GMOs to determine 
whether and to what extent they should be incorporated into food security strategies, because an 
excess of seemingly objective facts exists on either side of the debate. This dilemma, what Sarewitz 
describes an “excess of objectivity”, is only more complicated when planning for climate change. 
The author’s underlying message is that we cannot negotiate, let alone arrive at a meaningful 
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understanding of progress, if we cannot work from a basic set of facts. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that the continual outpour of competing scientific facts does little to build a foundation for 
negation. Rather it appears to be contributing to the obfuscation of reality.   
Sarewitz raises the question whether, when tackling controversial issues like climate 
change and food security, we should first strive to discover definitive scientific facts, or whether 
it would be more effective to begin by establishing “agreed upon values that can inform the 
articulation of social goals” (Sarewitz, 2004, p. 399).  He stops short of suggesting how we might 
arrive at such a consensus other than by proposing we implement a “quite period” during heated 
political controversies which have themselves become overly “scientized”. During such a quiet 
period, the outpour of scientific results would momentarily cease while politicians on either side 
of the debate would be required to make their values, interests and allegiances to industry groups 
explicit, rather than hiding behind the excess of scientific “facts” which speak in their favor.  In 
this way, Sarewitz seems to advocate a similar intellectual shift as Flyvbjerg, to de-center the 
epistemic and technical basis for political decision making and to re-center the phronetic activities 
of our democracy. Specifically, they are calling for activities which might make the political values 
of science less inconspicuous and, in turn, help us to become more aware of how values inform 
the relationship between power and rationality. 
   What the two authors are suggesting is not that we adhere to any specific moral theory, 
but that we promote intellectual activities that bring our values to the fore of political debate, so 
that we might examine them for their merits as well as their defects. I believe this is a step in the 
right direction. I am not convinced, however, that simply working harder to deconstruct the nature 
of political power will bring us closer to state of meaningful negotiation, let alone a state of moral 
universalism, as discussed by Benhabib. What are we left with once the inconsistencies and biases 
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of our values are fully exposed?  Toward what direction do we proceed when relationships between 
social power and rationality are deconstructed, and proven to be baseless? Where do we go and 
what tools do we use to guide us? For Flyvbjerg, planning researchers are well positioned to answer 
these questions, as it is their task to increase our capacity to think and act in value-rational terms 
(Flyvbjerg, 2004), or in accordance with our community’s unique situational ethics. In other 
words, when it comes to planning theory, Flyvbjerg favors communitarianism over universal moral 
theory. He describes the pursuit of universals by fields within the social sciences, including 
planning, as a misguided attempt to achieve the same intellectual rigor as fields within the natural 
sciences, such as geology or biology. This attempt, he suggests, results from “physics envy” within 
the social sciences. For Flyvbjerg, there can be no universal moral frame of reference to guide 
progress, because our socially and historically conditioned context is the only solid ground on 
which we have to stand (Flyvbjerg, 2004). The position of communitarianism, much in line with 
the Foucauldian strand of post-modernism, celebrates our situatedness and the relativity of moral 
claims (Sack, 2003). Although this it might serve as a bulwark against positivism in planning 
research, it is less clear how communitarianism protects us from heading down a path toward moral 
relativism or moral absolutism. 
The Postmodern Trend 
For communitarians, the good is defined by the social context, goals and purposes of 
particular communities, rather than a set of abstract principles. Morality within a communitarian 
framework is exercised by humans doing that which achieves – instrumentally – the good, as 
defined by their situated context.  As planning ethicist Elizabeth Howe explains, ethics which are 
concerned with the results or consequences of human goals, or telos, represent a teleological, or 
consequentialist moral view point. For example, the question about whether genetically enhanced 
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seeds and their corresponding technologies yield more benefits than costs to a community is a 
teleological question. Deontology represents the opposite ethical perspective. It is concerned “not 
with the consequences of actions, but with the rightness of the act itself” (Howe, 1990, p. 127). 
For example, the question about whether food insecure communities are engaged in the process of 
developing solutions to food insecurity, which might include the use of improved or certified seed, 
is a deontological question. It does not require any particular outcome from our actions, but rather 
that our actions adhere to moral rules. The question about what these moral rules are, has been 
given serious thought by well-known ethicists, such as Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Before I 
mention these, however, I would first like to conclude the argument for moral theory by completing 
the connection between phronesis and communitarianism, and their roots in post-modernism. The 
central issue is that while post-modernism helps us to expose the inconsistencies within our 
situated values and assumed rationalities, it does not provide a positive view of what to do about 
it (Sack, 2009). 
To summarize, phronesis, from a purely Aristotelian perspective, is the intellectual virtue 
employed in reasoned and ethical action. It is distinct from episteme (science) because the options 
for acting in ways that are ethical are variable, whereas episteme is concerned with that which is 
invariable. It is distinct from techne (technology) because ethical action is an end in itself, whereas 
techne is concerned with achieving or producing an end other than itself. According to Flyvbjerg’s 
interpretation, phronesis guides us toward reasoned ethical action by clarifying the values, interests 
and power relations involved in planning decisions. For Flyvbjerg, the core objective of phronesis 
in modern society is to balance the instrumental rationality of science and technology with the 
value-rationality of our own situational ethics. Other authors, such as Daniel Sarewitz, have also 
spoken in favor of giving more serious consideration to our values, and their link to power and 
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rationality, for the sake of reorienting political debate toward the achievement of social goals, 
rather than the misguided pursuit of definitive scientific solutions. These writings suggest that as 
modern society progresses, we will continue to face a growing need to meaningfully discuss not 
simply what we can do, from a scientific and technological perspective, but more importantly, 
what we ought to do, from the perspective of values. Flyvbjerg’s work is particularly well suited 
to address this growing need because it re-legitimizes phronesis, the intellectual activity by which 
values are deliberated, reasoned and acted upon. Moreover, he makes the convincing argument, 
first articulated by Aristotle, that phronesis belongs at the helm of episteme (science) and techne 
(technology) because without phronesis, these virtues cannot envision a world beyond purely 
analytical or instrumental terms. If we continue, however, to elevate instrumental rationality over 
value rationality, we will produce, time and again, a vision of the world that is simplistic, 
directionless and void of any meaning beyond the pursuits of our own self interests. 
Flyvbjerg’s underlying argument, inspired by the work of Richard Rorty and Max Weber, 
is that the world has been disenchanted by instrumental rationality, and the best way re-enchant 
the world is to focus on the relationship between values, power and rationality in the communities 
in which we live. If take up this task, we ought to ask ourselves “What set of values and social 
arrangements of power should we align our communities with?” Flyvbjerg is intentionally vague 
on this point because, as I have indicated, he is in favor of situational ethics that are rooted in the 
context of a community rather than ethical norms which are derived from a set of abstract moral 
principles. In other words, when Flyvbjerg talks about the power of phronesis to help us think and 
act in more value-rational terms, he is suggesting that we act in ways that embody the moral ideal 
of our communities, rather than a universal moral view. This is the point at which I believe 
Flyvbjerg’s interpretation of phronesis begins to lose its strength. His emphasis on moral 
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contextualism, or situational ethics, is linked to the communitarian perspective held by 
philosophers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, who are of the position that 
morality is embedded in the concrete practices of day-to-day life within community. Daily 
practices, activities and projects, they would argue, cannot be judged from a moral standpoint 
outside their situated context because it is precisely within their situated context that we can 
understand, or get-in-touch with, what makes human action moral and what does not. The problem 
with communitarianism is that it leaves the good to be defined by the situational ethics of an 
individual community, without any way of knowing whether a community’s situational ethics are 
themselves good. This, I believe, reflects a broader trend toward moral relativism in modern 
society. Communitarianism, which appears to have strong influence over contemporary views on 
pluralism, discourages us from pursuing efforts to un-situate ourselves from our empirical 
surroundings so that we might guide and judge what is taking place in the world from a valid moral 
standpoint. This is a problem because it makes the assumption that moral relativism and moral 
absolutism, meaning “the view that central values exist that can be rationally and universally 
grounded, versus the view that one set of values is just as good as another” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 
291), can be resolved through situational ethics, or as Flyvbjerg prefers, contextualism.   
Both relativism and absolutism are undesirable moral positions. Moral absolutism 
“assumes that the good is real but that it is also unambiguously knowable, and that it can be 
summarized in a set of commandments” (Sack, 2001b, p. 118). By making this assumption, moral 
absolutism creates a good that is both simplistic and oppressive. It facilitates the rise of a single 
moral authority and limits the ways of doing good, or being good, to a single and absolute 
interpretation. Moral relativism, on the other hand, assumes that the good is not real, that it does 
not exist independently from our mores, customs and self-interests which themselves are socially 
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constructed. The common concern among scholars regarding the path of moral relativism is that it 
will lead to nihilism, a life without reason or consequence. An equally pressing concern, however, 
is that relativism readily facilitates the rise of moral absolutism. Without the ability to say whether 
one moral position is better than another, there is “nothing preventing one group from finding it in 
its interest to impose its morality on everyone else” (Sack, 2001b, 118). If a moral relativist were 
to argue that this imposition is unjust, would be implying that the good is real and to some degree 
knowable.  
For Flyvbjerg, our socially and historically conditioned context, which is the basis for 
situational ethics, “constitutes the best bulwark against relativism and nihilism” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 
p. 48). I do not find this argument to be very convincing, however, because it attributes the entire 
basis of our moral judgments to contexts which it also assumes are beyond our control. This makes 
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hold each other accountable for our actions. Finally, 
because situational ethics is based on the relativity of context, it does nothing to prevent one 
socially and historically conditioned context, such as that of a colonial power, from asserting its 
moral viewpoint over others. Therefore, situational ethics is not the bulwark against moral 
relativism and moral foundationalism that Flyvbjerg suggests. Quite the opposite; it brings them 
about.  
Where then do we turn as planners, social science scholars, and as movers and shakers in 
the shift toward food sovereignty? How might we un-situate ourselves from the relativity of our 
social and historical contexts to think and act in more unifying, value-rational terms, and to 
substantiate claims made from a universal moral view without accidently setting ourselves on a 
course for moral relativism and absolutism? For Foucault, this would be a misguided pursuit, 
because all moral claims, including those which suggest that we can become less situated, are 
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themselves products of power and relative to the situated interests of those who might claim to 
have a clearer picture of reality (Sack, 2003). The more worthwhile pursuit, Foucault would likely 
argue, would be to engage in deconstructionist activities, such as Flyvbjerg’s phronesis, that 
expose the relationship between power and rationality and the underlying assumptions of our 
values and ways of seeing the world. Indeed, Foucault spoke of his political task not as a project 
to show us “what is to be done”, but to show us that we “no longer know what to do”, so that 
everything which had seemed to go without saying now becomes problematic, difficult and 
dangerous (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 103). Why then, Sack questions, do post-modernists themselves 
make claims? Why make the claim that rationality is a product of power and that power is situated 
in social and historical contexts over which we have no control? Using their own logic, is this 
claim not postmodernists’ own way of gaining power, because it implies that they see the world 
more clearly than the rest of us? This, Sack suggests, is one possible motivation behind 
postmodernism, to give postmodernists power. There is another more radical proposal, however, 
which Sack puts forth, and it reveals the dissatisfaction postmodernists have with their own 
worldview.  
Pulling from the work of feminist theorist Nancy Fraser, in her book Unruly Practices, 
Sack suggests that the reason postmodernists wish to expose the relationship between knowledge, 
power and rationality is that they hope doing so will be morally emancipatory, that it will somehow 
allow our true selves to emerge (Sack, 2003). The irony is that their own worldview prevents them 
from articulating how. For postmodernists, the barriers to moral progress and the contributing 
factors to injustice in the world lie in our flawed categories and relations of power. By disclosing 
the situatedness of power, postmodernism seems to suggest that we can at some point free 
ourselves from its constraints. Be doing so, we emancipate ourselves from this obstacle that has 
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so far prevented us from realizing our goodness as humans, unencumbered by the inherent 
inequalities of our society. This position, however, assumes that once we are free from the 
constraints of power, we will “automatically and invariably choose the good or to act out of 
goodness” (Sack, 2003, p. 99). Otherwise, if we continued to act in ways that were immoral or 
unjust, emancipation from power would be pointless. Therefore, the postmodern position, Sack 
suggests, also assumes that the good is real, but more importantly, that it is real in a way that is 
independent from the reality that we have created for ourselves, even though postmodernists refuse 
to make such a positive claim. 
The point I wish to make, considering modern society’s clear dissatisfaction with a purely 
instrumental world view, is that the popular tools at our disposal for disclosing our values and 
moral positions i.e., communitarianism and postmodernism, are insufficient. While the two may 
allow us to see where our values come from, and how they are perhaps situated in context and tied 
to power, they avoid suggesting that we might be able to act in ways that are less situated, less 
instrumental and more altruistic, although they seem to wish that they could. Again, becoming less 
situated, more value oriented and more universally grounded from the perspective of human rights, 
is not only an interest expressed by modern society, it is a precursor to food sovereignty. I believe 
what is limiting these isms from making the abstract reach to a less situated worldview is that they 
limit their analysis to the social and the historical, ignoring what is perhaps more important, the 
spatial. 
Flyvbjerg, in regards to planning, speaks of phronesis as a means to help us think and act 
in more value-rational terms that reflect the moral ideal shaped by our community’s social and 
historical context. He believes that this context is the only point of reference we have for knowing 
what is good and for acting in ways that are good. This position, shared by communitarians and 
56 
 
postmodernists, overlooks the spatial qualities of the good that become more apparent when we 
consider the moral implications of place-making, which geography helps to illuminate. Sack’s 
moral geographic theory, as discussed in Chapter 1, suggests that there are two qualities or criteria 
of place-making that are derived from a universal, or as he prefers, an intrinsic good: “places that 
expand our awareness of reality and places that increase the variety and complexity of reality” 
(Sack, 2001a, p. 116). The theory suggests that when our place-making activities are guided and 
judged by the joint application of these intrinsic criteria, we move ourselves in a moral direction. 
Conversely, places which impoverish our awareness and restrict the variety and complexity of 
reality move us toward evil, or a state of unawareness and homogeneity. 
It is critical that the two intrinsic criteria be applied jointly, because it assures that the 
places we create are “transparent enough for those inside to see out and those outside to see in” 
(Sack, 2003, p. 25). Here, seeing and transparency refer to the criteria of awareness. Variety and 
complexity ensure that no place is so porous and transparent that “no serious projects can be 
undertaken” (Sack, 2003, p. 25). Most importantly, the joint application of awareness, variety and 
complexity, helps to ensure that we do not fall victim to moral relativism or moral absolutism. It 
firmly asserts that our criteria for judging places and projects should be whether they move us 
towards, or away from, a heightened awareness of the real and the good. Therefore, it avoids moral 
relativism by discouraging judgments based on instrumental criteria, or criteria which do not 
account for the real and the good. It avoids moral absolutism because we can make ourselves and 
others more aware of the real and the good in an infinite number of ways. In other words, there is 
not set of commandments on how to enrich reality. In Chapter 5 I will expand upon the real and 
the good and their connection to geography. I will also discuss the implications that this theory 
might have for guiding the positive aspects of food sovereignty: those projects aimed at bringing 
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about a meaningful right to food through place-making, from the bottom-up rather than from the 























Chapter 5: A Moral Geographic Theory 
 
The Real and the Good 
Sack’s moral geographic theory is built on four sets of arguments concerning free will, the 
real, the good and that the good, is compelling – that it attracts us. From within these arguments 
emerges a great deal of insight about the power of place. It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that while geography helps to illuminate the profound effect that place has in shaping our lives and 
society, Sack’s theory rests on our ability to think ourselves outside of place, to become less 
situated, so that we can know whether the places we create are good and strive to make them better. 
This is where Sack’s theory departs from the postmodernist view of geography, and I begin with 
a discussion of his arguments concerning free will.  
Central to any moral theory is the ability to choose. Our actions cannot be considered 
moral, nor can we be held responsible for our actions, if they are chosen for us either by genetic 
impulses or social forces. The concept of lebensraum or “living space”, for example, was used by 
Adolf Hitler to justify the “natural” expansion of the Nazi Reich and the extermination of the 
Jewish race. If lebensraum were a natural tendency, we would not be able to condemn the horrors 
perpetrated by the Nazi regime because they would not be responsible for choosing their actions. 
Similarly, if the creation of Jewish ghettos were entirely attributable to the social forces within 
Germany at the time, we could not say that the ghettos were immoral places. The choice to build 
and maintain them would simply be attributed to unfortunate social and economic conditions. The 
theory does not deny that natural and social forces exist and that they influence our actions, but it 
maintains that we have the ability to choose to do otherwise. To be moral agents working 
consciously to make the world a better place, we must poses some degree of free will. Sack sees 
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the unlimited and creative potential of our free will most clearly in our role as place-makers and 
users, just as we are language makers and users. 
The theory’s second set of arguments concern reality. It maintains that reality exists, that 
we are drawn to it and that we are compelled to know it more fully. But like an ever receding 
horizon, the real is always beyond our grasp (Sack, 2003). Nevertheless, our contributions to 
reality, such as our political borders, our national parks and our cities are just as real as the parts 
of reality that we did not create, such as the oceans, mineral deposits and the atmosphere. In other 
words, we are constantly contributing to, affecting and changing reality through place-making, but 
our knowledge of reality is always and necessarily partial. The theory also stresses that reality is 
infinitely complex, and that aspects of reality can be accessed from an infinite array of scientific, 
cultural, spiritual and artistic perspectives. All of these perspectives can shed light on certain 
aspects of reality through different avenues of inquiry, but none can provide an absolute picture of 
what reality is. In this way, Sack separates himself from the positivist tradition within social 
science and geography which assumes that reality can, at some point, be fully known by pursuing 
a purely epistemic view. According to the theory, and similar to the ideas put forth by Flyvbjerg, 
the epistemic view represents only one of the many narratives through which reality can be 
described. It is certainly not the only narrative, nor the best narrative for the task. A final argument 
regarding the real is that although we are compelled by it, not all aspects of the real are good. As 
we continue our pursuit to become more aware of the real, our curiosity will inevitably reveal, as 
it has in the past, aspects of reality that might draw our curiosity, but that are in fact evil. 
Fortunately, because we have free-will, we can choose what to do when presented with options for 
acting in ways that are evil. We can consciously decide to make places that bring us closer to the 
good. In order to do so, however, we must have an intimation of the good.   
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The theory’s third set of arguments are its most significant and perhaps most contentious. 
The argument is that we are capable of making choices and judgements that are independent of 
our empirical conditions. For this to be possible, the good must be real and a part of reality, but 
also independently from reality. This makes it possible for us to base our choices and judgments 
on an independent and intrinsic good that we manifest and make real through our actions, but that 
we ourselves did not create. So, the good is real, and through place-making, the good can be 
brought about in innumerable ways and made to affect reality, but the good is not a product of 
reality and our understanding of it will always be incomplete. These assertions are significant 
because they substantiate our free-will. If we assumed instead that the good simply arose from our 
empirical conditions, out of self-interest, there would be nothing to suggest that we were 
autonomous, let alone moral agents. Similarly, if we assumed that the good could be known 
absolutely or that the good could be accessed by following a single set of commandments, we 
would limit, if not end our capacity for moral progress. Indeed, Sack argues that for progress to be 
meaningful, it must act as a lure, pulling us in the direction of a goal that is ultimately unattainable 
(Sack, 2002, p. 113). Attainable, or instrumental goals, are of course necessary for meeting the 
needs of day to day life, but if they are not accompanied by more demanding unattainable goals, 
then we would limit our capacity to envision and pursue meaningful progress. Sack argues that 
“the most worthy yet unreachable goal is a heightened awareness of the real and the good” (Sack, 
2002, 113). 
These arguments, that the good is real and a part of reality and yet independent of empirical 
reality, may be troubling for some. Simply referring to the good in the singular likely raises red 
flags for those concerned with moral theory devolving into moral absolutism. This is why the 
ineffability of the good is critical to the theory. It maintains that there are infinite paths to bring us 
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closer to the good, for this is how we achieve progress, but that no path is ever capable of arriving 
at the good absolutely, for this would effectively end the possibility for progress. In this way, the 
theory avoids absolutism because the good is ineffable. Critics of moral theory generally give less 
concern to the possibility of moral relativism because it is assumed that relativism will lead to 
openness and acceptance in the world. As I have already demonstrated, however, relativism paves 
the path to absolutism by eroding the basis for our moral decisions and our capacity to standup 
against absolute moral positions. Therefore, it is of great importance that the theory and its 
intimation of the good also help us to avoid the path toward relativism. It helps us to do this by 
giving morality a sense of direction. In other words, the theory points us toward the real and the 
good by maintaining that we ought to create places which expand our awareness of reality and the 
variety and complexity of reality. These intrinsic criteria act as guideposts to the good. The theory 
avoids taking a morally absolute position because it does not prescribe ways in which to make a 
more aware, varied and complex world. By maintaining, however, that we ought not to create 
places which diminish the awareness, variety and complexity of reality, the theory also avoids 
taking a morally relative position.  Put another way, the theory’s two guideposts point our place-
making activities in the right direction, toward the real and the good, but the choice to move in that 
direction, and in what way, is entirely our own. 
The theory’s fourth set of arguments concern this last point – that it is our responsibility as 
moral agents to choose to become more aware of the real and the good. Since the good is real, the 
theory maintains, we are drawn to it and compelled by it. It is the reason we strive to uphold human 
rights, create institutions of higher learning, invent cures for diseases that our own communities 
do not suffer from and help our neighbors without expecting anything in return. Unlike the real, 
which also compels us with its negative qualities, the good beckons us in a limitless and 
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intrinsically positive direction. We do not, however, exercise our free will and moral agency by 
merely accepting the good for its compelling qualities. If this were true, we would always choose 
the good because the good is infinitely attractive, but although the good is infinitely attractive and 
compelling, so too is it infinitely demanding. Therefore, we exercise our free will as moral agents 
not when we accept the good, but when we make the effort to increase our awareness of the good. 
The theory then places moral responsibility on both individuals to increase their awareness of the 
world around them, and on society increase our opportunities to become more aware (Sack, 2003). 
These are the main arguments of the Sack’s moral geographic theory – that the real and the 
good exist, that neither can be known fully, that we can choose to become more aware of them by 
creating places which expand our awareness of reality and the variety and complexity of reality, 
and that we are compelled to do so, but that this requires the effort of both individuals and of 
society. These arguments concern the real and the good and their connection to geography. They 
do not stand to replace other moral theories which might draw different connections to the good 
and they are certainly not meant to be adhered to absolutely. Sack is adamant that any moral theory, 
including his own, be adopted provisionally and with a healthy dose of skepticism. Nevertheless, 
I find Sack’s theory to be uniquely practical in the sense that it grounds what we might call its 
categorical imperative – awareness, variety and complexity – in our day to day place making 
activities (Sack, 2003). Its ability to navigate between moral relativism and moral absolutism is 
also encouraging and crucial if moral theory is to play a larger role in modern society. These 
practical qualities suggest the theory is well suited to help guide place-making and planning 
activities aimed at bringing about food sovereignty.  
As I have discussed, food sovereignty is rooted in the particular struggles of food producers 
and consumers to define their own food, agriculture and trade systems and policies. It rejects the 
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assumption that corporate-controlled, market-based research is the best approach to innovative 
plant breeding in the face of climate change and food insecurity. For these reasons, much of the 
literature on food sovereignty suggests a return to national, regional and local values in regards to 
food production, consumption and plant breeding. This emphasis on the particularity of our values 
and interests in food systems can overlook the moral universality required to make the right to 
food sovereignty meaningful. It sets us on an ethical path more akin to communitarianism which 
orients our values inwards, and limits our capacity to guide and judge from a less situated, more 
abstract, but nevertheless real moral position.  
This capacity to guide and judge is the next aspect of Sack’s moral theory that I will discuss. 
It sheds an important light on our geographic condition – that we continuously transform reality 
through place-making to better reflect our image of what we think reality ought to be. It helps us 
to not only better understand this condition, it also helps us to judge whether the places we create 
are themselves good; whether they are guided by intrinsic geographic judgments. The implications 
of this capacity to guide and judge from the stand point of an intrinsic and ineffable good are 
profound, not only for food sovereignty, but for society writ large. In the following section I will 
discuss how our geographic condition might be better understood and guided through the theory’s 
two core concepts; instrumental and intrinsic geographic judgments. It is through the articulation 
of these core concepts where useful connections can be made between Sack’s moral theory, 






Instrumental and Intrinsic Judgements 
While moral theory depends on our ability to choose, Sack’s moral geographic theory 
begins with that which we have no control over, our geographic condition. Simply put, we cannot 
take on the projects necessary to our survival and growth without carving out places for those 
projects to take place in. Therefore, we cannot exist in the world without also transforming it. 
There is little debate about this point, but there are innumerable contrasting opinions about what it 
means for our capacity to be moral. I have highlighted the communitarian and postmodern position 
which are reflected in the work of Bent Flyvbjerg and his take on Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. 
In regards to our geographic condition, these positions would suggest that as we transform the 
world through place-making, we do so not with an intimation of an intrinsic and ineffable good, 
but from a situated understanding of the good molded by the context of the communities to which 
we belong. From this perspective, the justification for a place and the criteria for its evaluation are 
based on its effectiveness at meeting the intended outcome of our individual or community 
projects, projects which we have a stake in, and would like to see succeed. This may serve as a 
basic definition for instrumental geographic judgments. Of course, to a certain degree, instrumental 
judgments are necessary. This is because to be human, we must take on projects, and to take on 
projects, we must transform the world so that we have places for our projects to take-place in. 
Therefore, it should make sense that we would like to see our places help us to achieve the intended 
goals of the projects that we choose to undertake. If this is where the justification for place and its 
criteria for its evaluation end, however, we effectively relativize the moral quality of our places 
and projects, because what is good about them is dependent on our situated judgement. 
Why, though, is this problematic? As Sack explains, places can be instrumentally good, 
that is to say, effective at meeting the desired outcomes of their projects, while at the same time 
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producing what the rest of the world would likely find to be morally abhorrent. Moreover, evil 
places, like concentration camps and slave plantations, might very well be considered moral by 
their creators. Concentration camps, for example, worked effectively towards the Nazi goal of 
racial purity, which they thought to be truly good. Slave plantations were seen by slave holders, 
and certain groups of antebellum society, as effective instruments to bolster the agricultural 
economy, as well as moral instruments to control what was assumed to be an inferior race. 
Instrumental judgments, in other words, do not require a correct interpretation of the good (Sack, 
2003). They merely require that places facilitate projects which are deemed to be good based upon 
the situated moral view of those who created them. This last point helps to convey the circularity 
of instrumental geographic judgments. Their criteria for judging whether a place is working well, 
is held to no other standard than the goal of the project it was designed to facilitate. 
Intrinsic geographic judgements help to break the circularity of instrumental geographic 
judgments by holding them to an independent moral standard, which is itself defined by an intrinsic 
and ineffable good. Like instrumental judgments, intrinsic judgments evaluate the use of place as 
an instrument. Instrumental judgments, however, see place as an instrument to achieve the desired 
outcomes of self-interested projects, whereas intrinsic judgments see place as an instrument for 
enriching reality (Sack, 2009). In other words, instrumental judgments are used to achieve 
outcomes that may or may not make us more aware, but that certainly work in favor of our self-
interest. Intrinsic judgments, on the other hand, tell us whether our instrumental judgments are 
guided by intrinsic goals – to create places that freely provide heightened awareness of the real 
and the good. In this way, intrinsic judgments do not tell us what the good is, nor how exactly to 
get closer to it, only that we are moving in the right direction, or not. In Sacks own word, intrinsic 
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judgments act as a “geographical guide for judging the moral quality of places” (Sack, 2001a, p. 
116).  
That Sack’s moral geographic theory stresses our capacity to make moral judgments, might 
lead some to believe that his theory is entirely substantive. Substantive ethical theory applies 
normative ethical principles to judge the goodness of our actions, projects, and institutions (Harper 
& Stein, 1992). I would argue, however, that similar to Rawlsian and Kantian ethical theory (as 
referred to in Harper and Stein 1992), Sack’s geographic theory is both substantive and procedural. 
Procedural ethical theory concerns the process by which ethical principles are justified. Within 
Rawls’ ethical theory, the procedure for justifying ethical principles is based on the veil of 
ignorance. This idea suggests that ethical principles are those “which would be chosen by rational 
self-interested persons if they did not know their own position in society” (Harper & Stein, 1992, 
pp. 108). If we accept Rawls’s ethical procedure, we would then choose to implement his two 
substantive principles concerning liberty and equality. The essential idea of these two principles is 
that each person be granted equal rights in regards to social, economic and political opportunities 
and that these rights be of greatest advantage to the least-advantaged members of society (Harper 
& Stein, 1992). Within Kant’s ethical theory, as interpreted by Harper and Stein, we see a similar 
means to for arriving at just ethical principles. According to Kant’s categorical imperative, just 
ethical principles would be those that could be universalized and recognized by all persons as just 
basis for action. For example, an environmentalist might argue that it is unethical for Americans 
to take a private vehicle to and from locations that they could just as easily get to if they were to 
car-pool, walk, bike or take public transit. This is because, if all people were to replicate this degree 
of individual motorized transport, human and environmental health would be put at great risk in a 
short period of time. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is then substantive in the same way as the 
67 
 
“golden rule” – that you should do unto others as you would like them to do unto you. In these 
ways, neither Rawls’s nor Kant’s ethical theories specify what principles nor actions are good, 
however, they provide frameworks for evaluating whether our judgements violate certain ethical 
principles, or if they are guided by them. 
Sack describes the joint application of the theory’s intrinsic judgments as a sort of 
geographic categorical imperative. They provide us with the means to judge whether a place is 
helping us to see through to the real and to create a more varied and complex world, but they do 
not specify what seeing through to the real, and variety and complexity, ought to look like on the 
ground. They cannot and should not, Sack argues. They do help us, however, to assess whether 
places and projects violate these two intrinsic criteria. Consider, for instance, the following project 
being conducted in Guatemala by Mercy Corps, a partner in innovation with FTF. Mercy Corps is 
working with seven agricultural companies to introduce the crop traceability software Farmfocrce 
to over 3,000 smallholder farmers. Farmforce provides an alternative to pen and paper 
recordkeeping and provides full electronic traceability of crop location and pesticide use. This 
makes it easier for smallholder farmers to comply with exporting standards. Following the theory’s 
two intrinsic criteria, it could be argued that Farmforce is increasing awareness in places of 
production by making the production process more transparent. It might also be argued that they 
are increasing the variety and complexity of places of production by making it easier for 
smallholder farmers to participate in the country’s export economy, an economy historically 
dominated by large and homogenized landholdings. It seems likely, however, that because 
Farmforce is developed by the agrochemical company Syngenta, that farmers who adopt this 
technology will likely also adopt Syngenta’s improved seed varieties. If this turns out to be the 
case, the project and its places of production will separate smallholder farmers from the plant 
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breeding process, thus reducing awareness. Moreover, it will likely limit production to a few 
improved varieties of non-traditional export crops, thus diminishing the variety of crops being 
grown and the complexity of the processes, both cultural and technical, by which the land is 
cultivated. 
In these ways, the theory’s intrinsic criteria can assess what is both procedurally and 
substantively just. Ethical principles are unjust if the theory finds them to be guided solely by 
instrumental judgments. For example, if FTF’s ethical principles are guided primarily by an 
enlightened self-interest e.g., helping food insecure communities by creating a need for their 
partner’s private technology, rather than a sense of altruism e.g., helping food insecure 
communities to reclaim the reproductive capacity of native seed within their region, the theory 
would see their ethical principles as misguided. Similarly, if the substantive actions taken in this 
project are found to create places which impoverish awareness and diminish the variety and 
complexity of reality, they too would be unjust. The importance of intrinsic judgements, however, 
does not end with their ability to assess whether places and projects are morally supportable. They 
are also a means for animating what it is that we do with our geographic condition. If we must 
transform the environment by creating places to take on projects, intrinsic geographic judgments 
help us to realize that although our place-making activities are certainly influenced by context and 
power, we are not completely beholden to either. If this were not the case, if our judgments and 
actions were entirely products of the empirical, our geographic condition would not change but it 
would proceed without direction. We would create places without knowing whether they are good 
or bad. Morality would be relative and progress would be futile. Fortunately, because the good is 
real, and because we can choose, our places and projects do not need to be directionless or relative. 
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Intrinsic geographic judgments act as a compass pointing our geographic condition toward the real 
and the good, although it takes effort to move in this direction.  
For some readers of Sack’s work, this direction toward a more aware, varied and complex 
world might seem unclear. This is partially the theory’s intention, to allow for infinite ways to 
move towards the good. It should be noted, however, that while the theory’s two criteria for 
intrinsic judgements gives our ability to choose much latitude, the undercurrent of the theory does 
steer us in a discernable path. It brings our instrumental or self-interested judgments more in line 
with intrinsic or selfless judgments. In other words, it steers our geographic condition towards 
altruistic motivations and away from instrumental motivations.  
It is at this point where Sack and Flyvbjerg connect and diverge in two important ways. 
Flyvbjerg speaks of the need within social science and planning to shift the rationality of society 
from instrumental-rationality, characterized by self-interest and the virtues of episteme and techne, 
to value-rationality, characterized by situational-ethics and the virtue of phronesis. Flyvbjerg and 
Sack share similar views on instrumental rationality, which has much in common with 
instrumental geographic judgments. Both see instrumental rationality as a truncated and circular 
form of logic, holding itself to its own standards without the ability to objectively convey its own 
verisimilitude. Where Flyvbjerg sees value-rational or intrinsic judgments as necessarily situated 
in the relative context of a group’s ethical view, however, Sack sees the joint application of the 
two intrinsic criteria as constitutive of a good that is real and un-beholden to social construction. 
To hold this position, Sack argues, does not require a God or any sort of spiritual or religious 
credence, “it simply asserts what seems to be obvious – that reality has multiple facets, some of 
which are more or less accessible, and not all of which can be known in the exact same way” (Sack, 
2003, pp. 83). 
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 To end here, with the argument that creating a more aware, varied and complex world 
leads us in the direction of moral progress, would suffice as a moral position in most fields. 
Importantly, Sack argues that intrinsic geographic judgments are not restricted to the field of 
geography. This is because creating a more open, varied and complex world is a pursuit celebrated 
by many fields within the natural and social sciences. Nevertheless, the “geographic” of intrinsic 
geographic judgments calls our attention to a vital component of our geographic condition that 
remains to be discussed. That is, when we transform reality according to the ideas about what we 
think reality ought to be, we not only invoke a particular moral position, we also materialize our 
moral position through the instrument of place.   
We can think of place as an instrument because it is dependent on our agency to produce 
an effect, but we cannot be effective without it. In the same way that language is dependent on us 
as speakers and listeners in order to facilitate communication, so too is place dependent on our 
agency and engagement in order to facilitate the projects we undertake. We exercise our agency 
as place-makers when we circumscribe an area of space so that we may control what goes on 
inside, and we engage place when we affirm or contest the rules by which it is constituted. A place 
may be as ordinary as a home or school, with implicit and explicit rules about what is and what is 
not allowed to take place inside. A place may also be as significant as an entire nation, a refugee 
camp, a national park, or city under siege. Despite human civilization beginning with a few isolated 
places scattered across a sea of ‘space’, there is now virtually no space left on Earth that is not a 
place. When we create places today, we are most certainly transforming, destroying or replacing 




Much of the academic aim in geography has been to demonstrate that the use of place is 
really an exercise of power. Geographers often reveal how the structure and dynamics of place are 
sequestered by those with ideological, political, economic or military power to maintain control. 
This focus lends insight to the power of place, such as how place may be constructed and used by 
some to control others or to simply pursue a group’s instrumental goals. I have pointed to this 
purely instrumental use of place in discussing the patenting of seed genome. By disseminating this 
restricted-use technology to aid recipients in the Global South, multinational agrochemical 
corporations erode and eventually eliminate the places which have for millennia facilitated projects 
responsible for the evolution of the world’s genetic resources. These places are replaced with a 
few, homogenized places of production, instrumental to the ideological and economic interests of 
multinational corporations and global trade institutions. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
institutions like the WTO, which are responsible for upholding the legal mechanisms that support 
the privatization and restricted use of seed genome e.g., UPOV 91 and TRIPS, hold tightly to the 
belief that poverty and hunger are best addressed through the dissemination and adoption 
privatized technology. These sorts of inquiries into the power of place, while useful in the 
identification of key actors, can perpetuate the idea that place can only be used instrumentally to 
achieve our own self-interested goals. Geographers, in other words, have given much less attention 
to the possibility that our place-making activities might also be guided by intrinsic judgments and 
the outward impulse of altruism. Said differently, place not only enables us to be effective at 
achieving our instrumental goals, it also enables us to be effective at making moral progress. 
The popular focus on power, apart from leading us to believe that the moral is completely 
situated in the empirical, also tends to direct our attention to who, or what institution, is controlling 
the structure and dynamics of place. In doing so, we distract ourselves from the fact that whoever 
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is controlling place is of secondary importance to the actual mechanism by which place is 
controlled. For the mechanism of place does not change from one system of power to the next, 
rather it is the use of place that differs. That is to say, if we wish to contest systems of power and 
to transform, destroy or recreate place, no matter who we might be or what we might stand for, 
“we must use the same mechanisms that allow place to be constructed, but in the other direction” 
(Sack, 2001, p. 115). Therefore, it is arguably more important that we be able to evaluate the 
aspects of how place is used, rather than trying only to reveal who place is being used by and what 
their self-interested pursuits may be.  
In order to conceptualize the instrument of place, Sack has developed a model which 
depicts place as a loom allowing us to weave together elements of both the empirical domain of 
reality and the moral domain.  As you might imagine, the empirical domain relates to our 
instrumental view of the world and self-interested projects, while the moral domain relates to our 
intrinsic view and altruistic motivations. Dominant discourses of power suggest that the empirical 
domain informs decisions in the moral domain, because the assumption goes that we are situated 
beings and that our empirical context is our only point of reference for moral judgment and action. 
In the following section I will illustrate Sack’s essential argument that it is in fact the moral domain 
that informs and animates the empirical. In presenting this argument, I will expand upon the 
mechanics of the loom, the realms which constitute the empirical and the moral domain, and how 






The Structure and Dynamics of Place 
The analysis of place differs from other forms of analysis, such as that of an ecosystem or 
a national economy, because whereas these systems may be reduced to the microbiological or the 
local scale, place is non-reducible. It is of course true that places and the projects they enable are 
created at different scales and often change scales. A certified organic coffee cooperative, for 
example, might begin at the local scale involving a single community. Over time, it might jump 
scales to encompass growers in other communities, thus becoming a regional operation. At the 
same time, the cooperative might gain recognition amongst buyers in other countries for its 
sustainable and ethical business practices, thereby connecting one place at one scale to an entirely 
different set of places and scales. But while the scale of place might change, the indispensable 
quality of place does not. No matter the project, system or plan in question, the fact of the matter 
is that place, like language, is required for virtually any and every human undertaking. For this 
reason, Sack argues that “these issues of scale are all dependent on how places work and their 
connection to projects” (Sack, 2001a, p. 113). That place is indispensable and non-reducible has 
significant implications for how we understand what it means to “make progress”. It implies that 
the structure and dynamics of place – how place works – are not only present in any and every 
place we create, they also function in the same way regardless of scale and context.  So, while we 
use places to take on a variety of projects at varying scales and in varying contexts, Sack argues 
that our use of the structure and dynamics of place can be evaluated by intrinsic geographic 
judgments to assess whether our use of place either contributes to or detracts from moral progress 
in the universal sense. What this means for human progress in the aggregate is rather 
straightforward but its significance cannot be overstated.  
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It means, as Flyvbjerg and others have argued, that our scientific, technical and 
instrumental progress is secondary to, and only as good as, our moral progress. The theory, 
however, takes this argument a step further. Moral progress, it argues, is not only the essential 
human project, but our efforts to move in its direction can be evaluated based on whether our uses 
of the structure and dynamics of place either enrich or impoverish reality. This position calls into 
question the common approach of the Global Food Security Strategy to evaluate progress based 
on instrumental goals, such as those described in the FTF Indicator Handbook (Feed the Future, 
2013). For example, FTF measures progress based on the number of hectares of land under 
improved technologies (Indicator 4.5.2-2), and the number of farmers and others who have applied 
improved technologies (Indicator 4.5.2-5). 
 It demonstrates that instrumental goals, even those which might boost agricultural 
productivity or market access, can be achieved immorally and in ways that impoverish our 
awareness of reality and diminish the variety and complexity of reality. The elimination of pain, 
hunger, and suffering, in other words, can be achieved through sedation, dominion and control. 
And so, this position helps us to understand that without intrinsic judgments, without an intimation 
of the good, we will continue to create places and take on projects, but we will do so without 
knowing whether the places and projects we create are themselves good. And this, Sack argues, is 
precisely the reason why geography demands to know the positive, because “to make places 
without knowing if they are good is to run the grave risk of making the world worse than it needs 
to be” (Sack, 2003, p. 80). 
This positive outlook on the structure and dynamics of place, and the prioritization of 
intrinsic judgments and moral progress, also gives clarity to the central idea that unites food 
sovereignty scholars and activists, that only through activities which instantiate moral 
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universalism, a “necessary precursor to the formal cosmopolitan federalism that the language of 
rights summons” (Patel, 2009, p. 670), will we come to know food sovereignty, and only through 
food sovereignty will we come to know food security. These morally universalizing activities, I 
argue, are precisely those which, at their root, make use of the structure and dynamics of place in 
the same ways that Sack advocates in his moral geographic theory, in ways which expand and 
enrich reality rather than in ways which contract and impoverish reality. Interestingly, the 
connection between the use of place and moral progress has not been articulated by food 
sovereignty actors. It is my belief that a new and open dialogue concerning the distinction between 
moral and instrumental progress, and the role of place in advancing both forms of progress, is not 
only needed, but indispensable to understanding the fundamental differences between food 
security and food sovereignty. In the following sections, I will substantiate my position by 
discussing how structure and dynamics of place work and how its loom-like qualities are used to 
advance both instrumental and intrinsic goals. 
The Empirical and the Moral Domains 
If we think of place as a loom, we can start to imagine how we, as place-makers and users, 
might weave certain threads of reality into the places we create. According to Sack’s model, these 
threads of reality are derived from two domains, the moral and the empirical. Both domains are 
woven into place simultaneously, but whereas the postmodern geographic perspective would have 
the moral domain informed by the empirical, the existence of a good suggests that the moral 
domain can and ought to inform the empirical domain. To better understand the nature of this 
position, it helps visualize the place as a loom. The empirical domain weaves together elements of 
meaning, nature and social relations. These three realms constitute the essential elements of reality 
that we put to use when creating places to take on projects.  Therefore, the fabric of each place we 
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create contains threads of meaning, nature and social relations. Some threads, however, are 
featured more prominently than others depending on the purpose of the project for which the place 
is being used.  
The Empirical Domain 
Consider a community shelter for the homeless. The most prominent elements of nature 
include extreme temperatures as well as the rain, wind and snow, which force homeless individuals 
and families to seek shelter. But elements of nature might also include the illnesses, as well as the 
mental and physical injuries, that disproportionately affect the homeless and which case managers 
at the shelter help their guests to address, treat and manage. Elements of meaning are found in the 
counseling programs available at the shelter to help individuals and families better understand and 
grapple with their situation, their needs and their goals. Elements of nature and meaning are 
constantly being woven into the shelter but they work in support of its primary focus, the realm of 
social relations and the successful reintegration of homeless individuals and families back into the 
larger community.  
Nearby the community shelter is the county jail. And similar to the community shelter, the 
primary focus of the jail is within the realm of social relations, with the realms of meaning and 
nature working in support of this more specific focus.  Although the jail and the community are 
entirely different from one another, as places, they both allow us to weave together elements from 
each realm in such a way so that we may prioritize one in order to take on specific projects. In fact, 
all places share this commonality, “but each type of place does so with different elements and 
proportions” (Sack, 2001, p. 109). Churches and universities, for example, weave more elements 
from the realm of meaning, but unless we are referring to an openly religious university, the 
elements of meaning that they incorporate are likely very different. In a similar way, both private 
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and community based plant breeding operations focus on the realm of nature for drastically 
different purposes. Place helps us to interconnect and weave elements of meaning, nature and 
social relations, and therefore, it allows us to produce the effects we wish to see in the world. For 
this reason, place is an indispensable tool for virtually everything we do. So far, I have discussed 
the realms of the empirical domain and that elements from each realm may be woven into place in 
different ways to facilitate any number of projects. Next, we will look at how the elements of 
meaning, nature and social relations woven into place. 
The Structure of the Loom 
Sack identifies three loops, or causal circuits, that constitute the structure of the loom. Each 
loop is associated with a realm, and weaves elements of that realm into place in accordance with 
a set of rules. The realm of social relations is woven into place by the in/out loop. The in/out loop 
is a set of both implicit and explicit rules about “what may or may not take place” (Sack, 2001a, 
p. 109). In the community shelter, explicit in/out rules apply to those guests who have acted 
violently or inappropriately on the premises of the shelter. Those guests may be revoked their right 
to enter the shelter even in adverse weather conditions.  Explicit in/out rules also apply to the 
community shelter in the form of zoning laws, which have forced the shelter to relocate next to the 
county jail and far away from the city center where the homeless are implicitly excluded, again by 
in/out rules. 
Nature is woven into place by the spatial interactions loop. This loop represents the flows 
that are expected to occur within place as well as between places. Spatial flows are often 
understood as elements from the natural realm, such as the temperature, wind and humidity. There 
also exist, however, spatial flows of people, diseases, pesticides and cross-fertilization. We often 
model and anticipate these flows because we recognize that they move from one place to the next, 
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thus demanding our attention. In the community shelter, extra beds are made available during the 
winter months for the anticipated increased flow of guests. The extreme cold and snow also 
represent spatial flows which are anticipated during this time of year, and these flows are prevented 
from disrupting the shelter’s project by the insulation, furnace, space heaters and the back-up 
generator used in the building. The community shelter represents a place dealing with spatial 
relations at the scale of a single building, but spatial relations are woven into place in the same 
way regardless of scale. At the national scale, for example, a civil war or natural disaster in one 
corner of the globe may cause a nation to attempt to change their spatial interactions loop between 
themselves and the affected country. Depending upon their use of instrumental and intrinsic 
judgments, they may choose to limit the flow of people from the affected country, or increase and 
facilitate the flow of those fleeing from places of violence, war and persecution. 
The in/out loop and the spatial interaction loop, the loom’s two causal circuits of rules and 
flows, interact to create a façade, or the surface of place. Sack also refers to the surface of place as 
its landscape or appearance. When we analyze a place, we see how place-makers, perhaps 
ourselves, have made use of rules and flows to create a place that works in support of a specific 
project or a set of projects. In the community shelter, we see that rules and flows have been put to 
use in a number of ways: to keep some people out, while allowing other in, to accommodate for 
the weather and for the increased number of guests during certain times of the year, to prevent 
against the spread of illness and to provide access to healthy meals, medication and case-managers.  
What we are analyzing here is the outward appearance of the community shelter and the meaning 
that it conveys. The community shelter’s outward appearance presents itself as a place that 
provides homeless individuals and families with a path to a better and more secure future. We hope 
this is true and it may very-well be. However, because we understand that the outward appearance, 
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or surface, of the community shelter has been created through the use of rules and flows, we can 
question and challenge its appearance “in terms of not being what it claims to be” (Sack, 2001a, 
p. 110).  
The third loop of the loom allows us to question and challenge the appearance of place. 
This is the surface/depth loop and it weaves the empirical realm of meaning into place. As the 
name implies, the surface/depth loop calls into question what is occurring behind the outward 
appearance of a place, whether what is shown on the surface reflects what is really going on inside, 
and whether the inner workings of the place reveal any depth, or if the place is thin and hollow in 
its meaning.  If we invoke the surface/depth loop only to find that the community shelter does not 
provide the quality of services that it claims to, if counseling programs are disorganized and 
infrequent, if meals are of low nutritional value and served irregularly and if guests rarely get back 
on their feet, we have problematized the very meaning of the community shelter. We have also 
problematized, however, the elements of nature and social relations by which the community 
shelter is constituted. This point is critical to understanding the structure and dynamics of the loom. 
When one loop or causal circuit is activated, changes are bound to occur in the other loops, thus 
creating a chain reaction affecting how the elements of meaning, nature and social relations are 
woven into place. 
Although in/out rules are most readily applied to the realm of social relations, they also 
socialize the realms of meaning and nature. In the community shelter, guests are not allowed to 
consume alcohol or illicit drugs, although these substances might be used by some guests as a way 
to seek meaning. In this place, however, these pursuits of meaning are socially unacceptable, they 
are not allowed in. The same is true for elements of nature. Outside the community shelter, insects 
and rats are of no concern. When they enter into the community shelter, however, they become 
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pests and their potential to carry disease causes employees to take further action to make sure that 
they are excluded from the shelter. Once outside, they return to the status of insects and rodents. 
In this way, the spatial interactions loop socializes elements of meaning, nature and social 
relations, but this process also works in the other direction. The spatial interaction loop naturalizes 
elements of all three. It highlights the fact each realm has material qualities that must flow through 
space. While the surface/depth loop problematizes elements of all three by allowing us to challenge 
the appearance that they create and the meaning this appearance conveys. 
To emphasize this last point, consider an organic coffee cooperative in the Western 
Highlands of Guatemala. The cooperative holds regular tours throughout the year to show visitors 
the different stages of coffee production. The primary focus of these tours is on meaning. To 
answer the visitors’ questions, “Where does my coffee come from?”, “How is it grown?”, but the 
cooperative is also imbued with elements of nature and social relations. Upon acknowledging this, 
we might be led to ask whether it is natural to be growing coffee in this region, or whether this 
simply represents the cooperative’s understanding of what is natural. We might also wonder 
whether our own presence in the cooperative, observing farmers at work, buying coffee and t-shirts 
to take home as souvenirs, is really a means of entrenching preexisting relations of power between 
ourselves and the coffee farmers. If the cooperative were to activate the in/out loop to include the 
cultivation of native food crops, this change would activate the loops of spatial interaction and 
surface/depth. A change in the rules of in/out would likely lead to a change in the flows of natural 
and social elements, and a change in flows would then likely alter the appearance of the 
cooperative, therefore, changing its meaning. 
Changes in one loop tend to activate changes in the others because each loop is a variant 
of space. “Each simply reworks space so that it can engage the material of that realm” (Sack, 
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2001a, p. 111). The in/out loop reworks space to convey power, the spatial interactions loop 
reworks space to function in accordance with natural laws, such as movement, germination, 
temperature, energy and distance, and the surface/depth loop reworks space so that it can take on 
meaning and become a part of our awareness. This is how the structure and dynamics of the loom 
operate and this is also true for the moral domain. Before shifting the discussion to issues of 
morality, I should reiterate two important points regarding place and its loom-like qualities. The 
first point being that each place possesses, is operated by, and produces these loom-like qualities 
as well as elements of meaning, nature and social relations. These qualities allow place to produce 
an effect, and through our agency over place they allow us to be effective at taking on projects. 
Therefore, it would be unwise to evaluate a project for its instrumental or intrinsic value without 
also considering the place, and the qualities of place, within which and by which the project is 
produced. The second point has to do with power and with contesting and changing place. This 
topic represents the clearest alignment of Sack’s work with the moral foundations of food 
sovereignty. 
Food sovereignty, Patel writes, requires egalitarianism as a prerequisite (Patel, 2009, 
p.670). This implies that food sovereignty is not only critical of existing power structures, but that 
it seeks to change them. As we have seen, power is woven into place through the realm of social 
relations and rules of in/out. The loom that place provides, however, not only allows us to weave 
power into place, it also allows us to unweave power using the same mechanisms but in reverse. 
There are many examples, both past and present, where activists and non-activists who were likely 
unaware of the structure and dynamics of place nevertheless exhibited an intimation of how its 
loom like qualities can be used in reverse to challenge existing power structures.   
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During the American Civil Rights movement, African Americans who were excluded from 
white-only establishments staged sit-ins, sometimes alongside Caucasian allies, to challenge the 
power-structure established by Jim Crow segregation laws. They transgressed space to upend a 
clearly unjust use of place.  More recently, women in Saudi Arabia are contesting the social code 
against women driving by occupying the driver’s seat. In fact, in countries around the world, 
women are regularly contesting power structures by pursuing careers in the fields of science, 
technology, engineering and math, where they have been both implicitly and explicitly excluded 
for centuries. In my own public library, public officials and employees challenge the implicit in/out 
rules of the city by creating and supporting a place in the heart of town where citizens of all 
backgrounds, income levels and housing status, are encouraged to gather, interact and, of course, 
read.  
Existing power structures are also contested by using the loom to challenge the flows and 
appearances of place, as when over three hundred Native American tribes ended construction of 
the Dakota Access Pipeline which stopped the flow of oil underneath a section of the Missouri 
river, half-a-mile north of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. The challenge to existing power 
structures can be leveled at the meaning, spatial interactions and social relations of place. 
Therefore, “a knowledge of the workings of place is especially important to those who are critical 
of existing power structures” (Sack, 2001a, p. 115). This brings us to the final point that I would 
like to reiterate. When it comes to challenging and changing existing power structures, the most 
important project is not in identifying who controls the loom, for this does not provide us a positive 
understanding of what to do about it. The more important and certainly more radical project is in 
understanding how the loom works so that existing power structures cannot merely be exposed, 
but also unwoven and replaced by a better use of place. So far, we have discussed how the loom 
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works. It weaves together elements of meaning, nature and social relations with rules, flows and 
spatial interactions. The loom can be used to weave and unweave, create and contest. Finally, 
knowing how to pull the threads of the loom is more important than who is pulling them.  
The loom’s empirical domain deals primarily with the first half of our geographic condition 
– that we cannot accept reality as it is and so we create places to transform reality. In the following 
section, we will look at the last portion of our geographic condition – that we transform reality into 
what we think it ought to be. This aspect of our geographic condition concerns, once again, our 
intimation of the real and the good, the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic judgments, 
as well as the second component of the loom, the moral domain. What this section will help to 
illustrate is a positive view of how to make our instrumental and self-interested uses of place more 
intrinsic, thus imbuing place with an altruistic or gift-like quality. This tactic represents the 
theory’s positive answer to questions of power and injustice, which Patel and others see as a 
fundamental roadblock to food sovereignty and food security, and which geographers, planners 
and social theorists often lament; they fail, however, to articulate solutions.  
The Moral Domain 
 That a moral domain exists, is not a central focus of debate. Put simply, it is the domain of 
reality in which our conceptions of meaning, nature and social relations are rooted. The point of 
contention arises from the question of whether the moral domain is relative, or if it is guided by an 
intrinsic good. As I have already demonstrated, Sack’s theory assumes a critical realist position 
arguing that the real and the good both exist but that our knowledge of them is necessarily partial 
and incomplete. This is partly because human consciousness is a natural fact. The universe can 
transcend our awareness of it, but our awareness cannot transcend the universe. This is also true, 
however, because the real and the good are infinite, infinitely complex and so too are the possible 
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ways of knowing them, although we can never know them completely. Nevertheless, the central 
premise of Sack’s theory suggests that we move closer to the real and the good by creating places 
that expand our awareness of the real and the variety and complexity of that reality. These are the 
two intrinsic criteria, Sack argues, that allow us to gauge whether we are making moral geographic 
progress. In other words, moral progress is achieved by treating knowledge as a gift and expanding 
the ways in which knowledge can be accessed, understood, shared and created. Sack argues that 
geography helps us in this task because places are not only a necessary tool for virtually every 
human endeavor, but they too can possess this gift-like quality. According to this theory, the moral 
domain then is not relative, rather it points our place making efforts toward the specific task of 
creating places that expand our awareness of reality and the variety and complexity of reality. How 
is it then, that the empirical is rooted in, and animated by, the moral? 
 Just as the empirical domain weaves together threads of meaning, nature and social 
relations, the moral domain weaves together corresponding threads of truth, the natural and justice. 
When we express or contest the appearance of a project or place, we are making claims to what 
we believe to be true. When we facilitate or disrupt the flow of natural and social elements, we do 
so in accordance to what we perceive to be natural. And when we support or admonish the 
conditions of social relations in our society or others’, we are calling attention to what we believe 
to be just.  In this way, threads of the empirical domain and the moral domain are woven into place 
simultaneously, with the moral guiding, animating and ultimately justifying the empirical. 
Consider, once again, the example of the community shelter. As we have discussed, the community 
shelter is a place which focuses on the realm of social relations and is therefore animated by 
principles of justice. For example, guests are not admitted into the shelter after ten o’clock at night. 
Should a woman and her children, however, arrive at the shelter well past midnight fleeing a home 
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of domestic violence, the realm of justice would prevail and they would be admitted. The same, of 
course, would not be true if a drunkard were to show up at the same hour looking for a place to 
recuperate. The principles of justice at the shelter are based on human need, and to some degree 
on merit, but they might also correspond to a more complex view of rights. From a Rawlsian 
perspective, the community shelter might be working towards an intimation of justice by helping 
guests gain access to more social, economic and political opportunities.   
At the same time, the realm of meaning is being woven into the community shelter by case-
managers who wish to impart lessons and skills to their clients so that they might regain their 
independence and self-confidence. These messages are likely more than random bits of advice. 
They likely correspond to elements of truth that the case-manager wishes to share with his or her 
clients. The job of a case-manager is to shed light on the reality of the world that their clients must 
interact with, to help them grapple with the challenges they will likely face and to provide them 
with the lessons and skills to face those challenges head-on. This job then requires that the case-
manager provide as close a depiction of the truth as possible. Finally, elements of justice and truth, 
while being featured most prominently in the shelter, are ultimately subject to the natural realm. If 
during a torrential storm the shelter were to be inundated with several inches of water, leading to 
the growth of noxious mold in some areas of the building, projects of justice and truth would need 
to be set aside while elements of the natural were dealt with. The point of providing these examples 
is to demonstrate how elements from the moral domain and the empirical domain constitute each 
and every place we create, thus making them inherent to each and every project we undertake. The 
point is also to demonstrate that most places and projects, such as a community shelter, university 
classroom, museum, war memorial, wildlife preserve, coffee farm, or jail, focus primarily on one 
realm of the empirical and moral domain with the other realms playing supporting roles.  
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The larger issue, as I have already introduced, concerns the debate about whether our 
claims to what is true, just and natural are dependent upon the context of a place and project, or if 
they in are fact linked to intrinsic qualities of the real and the good. From the standpoint of 
instrumental geographic judgments, place cannot be any better than the goal of the project for 
which it was designed. To hold the instrumental position is to then argue that all moral views 
concerning what is true, just and natural “arise from a context and apply to that context” (Sack, 
2001b, p. 121). To this end, the loom works quite well. So long as the moral domain supports the 
goal of the project, it can help to guide, animate and justify the use of social relations, meaning 
and nature in the empirical domain to achieve that goal. What might this mean for the moral 
domain used in classrooms of the antebellum south? Here, elements of truth, justice and the natural 
were construed to support the project of slavery. The social relations which supported the 
separation, auction, and enslavement of African families could not have persisted without the 
support of places, like classrooms, whose moral weave was used to not only make this system 
appear just and truthful, but also natural. Therefore, without intrinsic judgments the loom still 
operates. We use it to weave necessary elements from the empirical and the moral domain into the 
places and the projects we create so that we can use them to transform reality into our image of 
what we think it ought to be. If, however, we allow the ought in our geographic condition to be 
determined by instrumental judgments, we run the grave risk of not only proceeding without a 
sense of moral progress, but also of creating places that may be used by some to wield power over 
others.  
Intrinsic geographic judgments help us to reorient the virtues of truth, justice and the 
natural towards the real and the good and away from instrumentalism and relativism. As mentioned 
in the previous section, intrinsic geographic judgments are based on the criteria of seeing through 
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to the real and valuing a more varied and complex reality. From a geographic perspective, seeing 
the world more clearly implies seeing how places and their parts operate and are interrelated, and 
this “requires a complex social apparatus that promotes free and open exchange of knowledge, and 
provides everyone with opportunities to expand his or her horizons” (Sack, 2001b, p. 122). Valuing 
a more varied and complex reality implies that we ought to value places which celebrate both 
cultural and natural diversity. How then do these criteria apply to the moral realms of truth, justice 
and the natural? The underlying point is that seeing through to the real and variety and complexity 
only work as moral criteria if they are shared collectively. If only one group is becoming more 
aware, their reality is certainly becoming less diverse because it is being dominated by a single 
perspective. And if only one group is experiencing a more varied and complex reality, this would 
be a sham because they would only be experiencing the diversity that they themselves had created, 
thus limiting their awareness of the rest of reality. With this point in mind, let us turn to the realm 
of truth. 
Truth 
  Intrinsic geographic judgments adhere to the correspondence theory of truth. This requires 
that what we claim to be true, also be the closest approximation to reality as possible. There are, 
of course, other theories of truth, such as coherence theories and consensus theories, which apply 
to the realms of mathematics and religion respectively (Sack, 2001b). However, because intrinsic 
geographic judgments assume that reality does exist and that the good is a part of it, it argues that 
what we claim to be true ought to correspond with our closest approximation to reality. The only 
way of ensuring this, is to promote and celebrate a variety of views. Therefore, “intrinsic 
geographic judgments require that there be numerous places and points of views from which to 
see reality, and that all of these views be made available as public contributions or gifts - that they 
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be open and accessible” (Sack, 2001b; p. 123). Unfortunately, few places come to mind which 
treat knowledge as a public contribution. It is far easier to think of examples, such as intellectual 
property regimes, whose goal is based on sequestering and monetizing knowledge for profit. These 
then are examples of where some groups might be making instrumental progress, but where we as 
a society may also be regressing morally. 
Justice 
In regards to the realm of justice, intrinsic geographic judgments are generally in agreement 
with common principles of liberty and equality, which can be found in most liberal democracies. 
Unlike most liberal democracies, however, which focus primarily on defending the rights of 
individuals to pursue their own self-interests, intrinsic geographic judgments, emphasize the 
functional role of rights in moving us collectively toward the good. How, though, does this work? 
Much like Hannah Arendt’s emphasis on first establishing “a rights to rights”, the theory requires 
that rights not only enable us to receive the gifts of awareness, variety and complexity, but that 
they also enable us to create places through which awareness, variety and complexity can be gifted 
unto others. The theory’s essential view of justice is that people be given the opportunity to not 
only receive rights but also to create places through which rights can be asserted and brought into 
existence. As discussed in Chapter 2, Patel argues in favor of such a view on justice because human 
rights cannot be pulled from thin air. At some point, the right to have a right must be asserted 
because there are many places in the world whose moral and empirical threads have been construed 
in such a way so as to erode rights. Intrinsic geographic judgments work well with the conception 
of justice used by food sovereignty actors, because an essential aspect of their projects is to create 
places through which the right over land, seed, water, food systems and food policies can be 




 The intrinsic view of truth and justice is rather straightforward. These are virtues that we 
would like to preserve and exemplify in our lives, in our communities, in the places we create and 
in the projects that we pursue. The intrinsic view of the natural, however, is less clear, and certainly 
more complex. As Sack explains, the “givenness” of nature provides an idealized image of pure 
altruism while at the same time pointing out our own inability as humans to give selflessly without 
consideration as to how our gifts will be used.  Sack is quick to acknowledge that “nature has no 
purpose, plan or intent” (Sack, 2001, p. 124). We do not attribute conscious choice to the arrival 
of rain after a long period of drought, nor to an earthquake that takes thousands of lives unless, of 
course, we attribute these events to acts of God. Rather, what Sack wishes to emphasize is that the 
natural provides an invaluable example of what it would look like to give without intention, 
without strings attached. The origin story of corn helps to illustrate this point. 
Modern day corn is derived from an ancient grass known as teosinte. Humans did nothing 
to bring this grass into existence, it was a given. But the Maya cultivated the seed of Teosinte for 
millennia, eventually producing tens of thousands of native varieties of corn. Teosinte began as a 
wild grass with unpredictable traits, and through human ingenuity this “gift” was transformed into 
thousands of unique and highly productive varieties of corn, which now represent the genetic 
foundation of the world’s corn supply. Unfortunately, the recent push to patent plant genomes and 
to privatize plant breeding has turned this gift into an exclusive enterprise based entirely on the 
sequestration of what is naturally a common good. And so, we see that when gifts are released into 
the world without intention, as does the natural (although we know that nature really has no 
intention), they may be used in ways that are good or bad. In this way, the intrinsic view of the 
natural serves as a point of reference for the altruistic qualities of our judgments. We ought to 
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create places through which truth and justice are given freely. We must do so conscientiously, 
however, so as to not destroy ourselves.   
The Gift of Place 
 The core idea of Sack’s moral geographic theory rests on two important points. The first 
being that “intrinsic judgements allow us to see place and its products as part of a system of 
altruism” (Sack, 2001, p.124). The second is that we can make our instrumental judgments more 
like intrinsic ones by assessing whether the places and projects we create help us to see more 
clearly and to make reality more varied and complex. This theory, in my mind, firmly establishes 
the reason as to why food sovereignty is in fact a moral imperative. In its most essential form, food 
sovereignty is about creating places and projects that work to decentralize, share, expand and 
diversify control over seed, agriculture, land, and food production. They do this not only by 
exposing and challenging systems of power i.e., intellectual property regimes and neo-liberal 
constructions of common sense agriculture. They also destabilize power by re-assuming control 
over the commons, and by treating the commons as a gift to be shared and propagated through 
sharing. The commons include not only native and heirloom seeds but also complex and deeply 
symbolic sets of knowledge about agriculture, plant breeding, and creative ways of preparing food. 
In this way, food sovereignty is about making the instrumental goals of the global food system 
more like intrinsic ones by creating places through which seed and agricultural knowledge are 
treated as gifts to be shared rather than commodities to be hoarded.  
Therefore, food sovereignty is less about demanding the right to food than it is about 
bringing a meaningful right to food into existence and propelling that right by creating places 
whose structure and dynamics are guided by intrinsic, rather than instrumental goals. I will 
emphasize, however, that simply because a project claims to be working towards food sovereignty, 
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does not mean that instrumental goals do not play a key role. After all, reducing malnutrition and 
producing high yields are both instrumental goals that any food sovereignty project would be 
foolish not to prioritize. If in pursuing these goals, however, the project also becomes more opaque 
by excluding  smallholder farms, and less diverse by favoring a single crop, we can see how even 
food sovereignty projects can fall victim to an instrumental way of thinking. 
This brings us to the subject of the following chapter in which I will discuss the case of 
food sovereignty in the municipality of San Lucas Toliman, Guatemala. The purpose of this 
inquiry is first, to ground Sack’s moral geographic theory in a concrete case of food sovereignty, 
and to bring to light the dilemma in navigating between instrumental and intrinsic progress. The 
additional purpose of the chapter is to show how food sovereignty, in its effort to dismantle systems 
of power, can inadvertently create its own, depending on how the structure and dynamics of place 
are put to use. I present this case not because I believe it speaks for all instances of food 
sovereignty, but because I believe it sheds light on the central role of place in making food 
sovereignty possible, no matter how different it might look from one community or country to the 
next. Finally, with place as the central point of analysis, I believe this case helps to tease out the 
shared and distinguishing views on place between fields of geography and planning. This last point 
will likely become more important as food sovereignty, a movement defined by place (Desmarais, 
2014) continues to gain attention in fields, like geography and planning, whose focus on power, 
values, advocacy and action oriented research, is itself centered around a growing understanding 





Chapter 6: Making Space for Food Sovereignty 
 
Introduction 
Something happened that changed the way I look at the relationship between power and 
rationality in planning and food sovereignty. Prior to beginning my research with the Instituto 
Mesoamericano de Permacultura (IMAP), my view on power stemmed from Flyvbjerg’s 
reinterpretation of the Baconian dictum that “knowledge is power”. In his seminal case study on 
the Aalborg Project in Northern Denmark, Flyvbjerg argues the inverse relation to be true, that 
“power is knowledge”, that power defines what is real and what gets to count as knowledge 
(Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 361). 
In his study, Flyvbjerg revealed that the rationality surrounding the Aalborg Project, a 
massive plan to preserve the city’s historic downtown via reduced automobile congestion, had 
been circumscribed by pro-automobile interests within the city’s Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce, a coalition of private business owners. Together, with the City Council’s Technical 
Committee and the Police Department, this triangulation of economic, political and executive 
power constitutes the City Center Group, responsible for planning and policy in downtown 
Aalborg. In secret, closed-door meetings, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce reviewed 
proposals for the Aalborg project, and rejected plans that would reduce automobile access to the 
historic downtown. These meetings occurred prior to the plans’ review by the technical committee 
and the public.  Therefore, this truncated both the public’s knowledge of what was really going on, 
and their ability to participate in the democratic process.  From this lesson, Flyvbjerg arrives at a 
similar critique of communicative planning shared by other planning theorists: that communicative 
planning i.e., planning which primarily promotes the establishment and engagement of institutions 
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that facilitate open public interaction is naïve in its faith that rationality and common sense will 
save the day (Fainstein, 2012). Flyvbjerg continues this critique, arguing that what is accepted as 
“reason” or “common sense” is simply a promulgation of a dominant rationality of the powerful. 
On this point, Flyvbjerg reminds us that he, as a planning theorist, is not alone. He pulls from the 
work of the late John Friedman, who wrote that perhaps the biggest problem in theorizing and 
understanding planning today is our ambivalence toward the “inevitable question of power” 
(Friedmann, 1998, p. 250).  I too was convinced of the “inevitability” of power in determining the 
rationality behind public discourse, especially in how we define and address the issue of food 
insecurity, that is, until I became involved with a planning dilemma in the Western Highlands of 
Guatemala, and faced what you might call the inevitable question of place. 
During my master’s degree program, I had the opportunity to spend two summers 
conducting fieldwork with IMAP in the municipality of San Lucas Tolimán, Guatemala. As their 
name implies, IMAP is an indigenous permaculture institute, founded in 2000 by a group of 
Kaqchikel campesinos, or farmers. IMAP emerged from a longstanding coffee cooperative called 
IJATZ, which is Kaqchikel for semilla, or seed. The founders of IMAP recognized that the 
cultivation of a single crop cannot make a community sustainable, even with the use organic inputs, 
and especially not when it is destined for foreign markets. Therefore, they set out to create a local 
institution that would help cultivate an alternative system to coffee based on genetic diversity, 
native seed, food production and intellectual creativity. Today, the director of IMAP, Rony Lec 
Ajcot, refers to IMAP as an institution of aprendizaje, an institution dedicated to promoting and 
strengthening local agrarian knowledge, especially concerning semillas nativas y creiollas, or 
native and heirloom seeds. For IMAP, genetic crop diversity is synonymous with cultural vitality, 
security and food sovereignty. Unfortunately, the context of agriculture in San Lucas Tolimán 
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remains overwhelmingly monocentric. Farmers estimate that 90% of all cultivated fields are 
dedicated to the production of coffee for export. Perhaps even more disconcerting is the inequitable 
distribution of land.  
Similar to the rest of the country, a small group of non-indigenous families own roughly 
80% of arable land in San Lucas Tolimán, while the remaining 20% is in the hands local Kaqchikel 
families. Indigenous lands are the most marginal in the municipality, meaning they are the most 
difficult to cultivate because of their remoteness, slope and limited water access. This, of course, 
was not always the case. Rather, indigenous Mayan communities relocated to remote regions of 
the western highlands over centuries of colonization, most recently expelled by the diffusion of 
non-traditional export crops, currency devaluation, rising costs of fertilizer and pesticide, and the 
consolidation of land ownership (Isakson, 2014). Despite these disadvantages, indigenous 
landowners lack alternatives to coffee production because the export market itself is monocentric. 
In fact, while speaking with farmers during my exploratory research period in 2015, I learned that 
those who plant coffee generally do so because they are landowners. Therefore, they have the time 
and security to invest in a crop which takes around three years to mature. In contrast, those who 
plant milpa, corn occasionally interspersed with beans, generally do so because they are land 
renters. No matter what they plant, they are at risk of losing their land and crops through the sale 
of their property, a common occurrence in a monocentric market, which favors consolidated land 
holdings. Therefore, corn and beans, which have a growing period of around five months, are a 
safer bet for land renters. 
Several more farmers recounted this observation, and through their stories I began to see a 
trend that I found to be extremely disconcerting. Land ownership among smallholder farmers 
appeared less likely to improve the prospects for food security in San Lucas Tolimán than it did to 
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bolster rural and indigenous investment in coffee, an export commodity with an increasingly 
uncertain future, and a market in which indigenous farmers are systematically disadvantaged. 
During these two months of exploratory fieldwork, I learned a great deal about uncertainty in the 
coffee market, such as farmers’ inability to negotiate fair prices with los coyotes, the local 
intermediaries for foreign buyers, like Starbucks. I came to learn, however, that the greatest 
uncertainty is in the plant itself. Changing climatic conditions across Central America have 
brought not only warmer temperatures and higher rainfall to the western highlands, but also a 
dramatic increase in the wind-born fungus known as la roya, or coffee leaf rust. In one interview, 
a coffee farmer with IJATZ recounted that during the height of the outbreak in 2013, he and many 
other smallholder farmers went entirely out of production. Many of those who did not own land, 
but who worked as laborers on one of the surrounding coffee plantations, known as fincas, lost 
their job during this period. Coffee growers and laborers in San Lucas Tolimán suffered a 
particularly devastating loss, as most grew a variety of coffee known as Bourbon, which is less 
resistant to coffee rust than the hybrid-variety farmers grow now, known as Catimor. 
Unfortunately, like many hybrid crops, Catimor requires ever-greater applications of synthetic 
fertilizer throughout its exceptionally short lifespan; 10 – 15 years for Catimor as compared to 70 
– 80 years for Bourbon.  
In a separate interview with three Tz’utujil farmers, a main topic of concern was the 
increasing difficulty to ween coffee, and the soil itself, off synthetic fertilizers. The cause for 
concern stems not only from the rising cost of fertilizer, which has been attributed to high rates of 
internal male migration to coastal plantations (Carey, 2009), there is also a close interaction 
between the use of synthetic fertilizers and illness in children. To be sure, foreign aid programs 
are targeting these issues directly, although with little success. Recalling a recent aid program 
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aimed at convincing small coffee growers to adopt organic fertilizer and hybrid seeds, one farmer 
mustered a bit of humor and described the experience this way: Most of the leaves turned yellow, 
and did not take to the organic fertilizer. Plants, like children, have a way of telling you what they 
like, and what they do not like. These plants clearly wanted chemicals not vegetables. From these 
experiences, farmers have learned that the processes of returning a conventional coffee field to its 
naturally productive state is neither a short nor simple task. With the amount of synthetic fertilizer 
required by hybrids, like Catimor, IMAP’s technicians report that it takes roughly three years of 
carefully measured applications of organic material, such as compost or manure, to ween the soil 
entirely off synthetic fertilizer. A common, but costly, mistake happens when farmers stop 
applying synthetic fertilizer all at once, as these farmers experienced firsthand.   
I began to wonder how it was that in a region which receives so much foreign aid, why the 
most food insecure populations had little choice but to compete in a system of production that 
worked so clearly in their disfavor. It seemed like the rationale of the global food security strategy 
was itself, in some way, misguided.  To date, FTF, in partnership with the Coffee Farmer 
Resilience Fund, has raised $8.3 million, out of a proposed $23 million, to help more than 40,000 
coffee farmers in Central America rehabilitate or replace rust-affected coffee trees (Progress 
Report, 2016). In this same report, FTF characterizes the coffee leaf rust crisis as a shock to food 
security in Central America. But on this point, I cannot look past the irony. From my experiences, 
walking with farmers through their coffee fields and listening to their stories, I agree that on the 
surface the coffee leaf rust crisis has made their communities more food insecure. This is only true, 
however, in the sense that they now have more trouble maintaining a vocation that itself has made 
their communities unstable and their children sick. 
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During this period, it became clear to me that the tactic of directing foreign aid to food 
insecure communities of coffee growers was less about making these communities more food 
secure for their own sake, than it was about securing a labor pool for the coffee market. In other 
words, I began to observe how the language of food security might be invoked by one group, 
whether a national government or a multinational corporation, for the instrumental purpose of 
securing power over the means of food and agricultural production.  Of course, this tactic is hardly 
a new one. Language has been used to wield ideological power over agricultural development for 
centuries, from labelling farmers as “laggards” or “backward” if they could not afford, or chose 
not to adopt, Green Revolution technologies (Yapa, 1993), to calling countries, like El Salvador, 
“advanced” if they were early adopters of hybrid coffee varieties, like Catimor (Fulton, 1984). 
There are, unfortunately, many examples of how those with power use language to shape public 
discourse in such a way that agricultural development can only be rational, and therefore, 
“correct”, if it makes use of privately controlled innovations and technologies, like certified and 
hybrid seed.  
One obvious consequence of this “might makes right” rationality in agriculture is that we 
now produce and consume far fewer plants than we used to.  Whereas humans have domesticated 
over 3,000 varieties of plants for food, we now produce around 20 (Vietmeyer, 1986). This, of 
course, elevates the likelihood of more severe instances of food insecurity in places like San Lucas 
Tolimán, where 67.4% of children under the age of 5 suffer from moderate or severe chronic 
malnutrition (Angeles, 2014). One such plant, systematically uprooted from Mayan culture and 
now serving at the forefront of IMAP’s push for food sovereignty, is an ancient grain known as 
amaranth, or amaranto. Like other plants that were first domesticated near the tropics, amaranth 
has been neglected for centuries as a “poor persons’ crop”. Just as Americans refused to eat peanuts 
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because they were considered “slave food”, and the English refused to eat potatoes because they 
were considered “Irish food” (Vietmeyer, 1986), I observed, through conversations and interviews, 
that indigenous farmers generally scoff at the idea of eating, let alone cultivating, amaranth. This 
is likely because the colloquial word for amaranth, bledo, literally means worthless. A common 
phrase, me importa un bledo, roughly translates to “I don’t give a damn”, and more accurately 
implies, “I don’t give an amaranth seed”.  
The origin of amaranth’s unwarranted discrimination began over 500 years ago, with the 
outright ban placed on its cultivation by Spanish colonialists. In Mayan, Aztec, and Inca societies, 
amaranth was not just a staple of the Mesoamerican diet, due to its high concentration of total 
protein and the “nutritionally essential amino acid, lysine, it was also a religious symbol 
(Vietmeyer, 1986). The small grains, more accurately called pseudo-seeds, stuck together with 
molasses and honey to create shapes of religious idols in what the Spanish viewed as pagan 
ceremonies. In Aztec societies, some ceremonies involving amaranth also involved human 
sacrifice (Vietmeyer, 1986), although it is unclear whether this was also true for Inca and Mayan 
societies.  What is important is that amaranth, like many other native plants and seeds, served for 
millennia as the bridge between culture and agriculture. Through the subversive use of power and 
language, however, many native seeds have faded into obscurity. And in their place has emerged 
the conventional rationality toward seed that we see today, where a seed’s worth is measured 
strictly in terms of its ability to achieve maximum short term yields, and where innovations in 
plant breeding flow in a decidedly north – south direction. 
The planning dilemma that I became involved with challenged what I saw as this 
unfortunate, yet inherent, asymmetry between power and rationality in planning, with power 
determining what rational planning ought to look like. It also begged the question, “What gets to 
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count as planning?” outside the field’s professional context? The dilemma arose from IMAP’s 
latest community based project called Nutrición Nativa, or Native Nutrition, which is now on its 
second of three years of funding from the Inter-American Development Bank. The mission of 
Nutrición Nativa is to promote and propel the production of amaranth in local communities to 
combat malnutrition and to form a strategy to achieve food sovereignty. The dilemma lies in the 
fact that amaranth, as I have indicated, has a particularly negative connotation in rural Mayan 
communities. In addition, most farmers find themselves entirely occupied by the production of 
coffee. In one of my first meetings with Rony Lec Ajcot, he phrased the dilemma this way, When 
90% of the land around you is dedicated to coffee, how do you produce food?  This was, of course, 
a rhetorical question, but overtime I began to see that IMAP was developing an answer.  
To promote and propel the production of amaranth, IMAP began by embracing what is 
inherent to our geographic condition, and a necessary part of food sovereignty: to prefigure the 
reality they wished to see and to bring that reality into existence using place as a tool. For IMAP, 
this desired reality is one where native and heirloom seeds thrive on a national level through a 
network of regional seed banks supported by local communities of plant breeders, thus creating a 
basic framework for asserting and protecting the country’s food sovereignty. To bring this reality 
into existence, Nutrición Nativa introduces not only amaranth, but also cultural and technical 
knowledge about native and heirloom seeds into local communities where alternatives to export-
oriented agriculture rarely penetrate. In this way, IMAP challenges the power structure of export-
oriented agriculture by transgressing the rules of place. These are implicit rules dictating what is, 
and what is not, allowed in places of agricultural production. In doing so, they push back against 
the treatment of seed and scientific knowledge as commodities by providing an alternative grass 
roots approach, whereby seed and knowledge are treated as gifts. They take these actions not from 
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the vantage point of planning theory, but from the grounded materiality of a serious planning issue. 
Namely, how to democratize the control of seed and nutrition within indigenous communities.   
To be sure, IMAP’s strategy may be seen as a tactic to destabilize one form of power, only 
to create room for another. Perhaps, even their own. I have learned, however, that this critique 
overlooks what is arguably much more important. That no matter who is in charge of place, 
whether it be IMAP, local community leaders, or the intermediaries of a multinational corporation, 
the mechanics of place do not change, only how they are used and whether their use is guided 
primarily by instrumental or intrinsic judgments, by self-interest or by altruism. If we look beyond 
the asymmetrical link between power and rationality, a level of analysis which I believe grants too 
much power to power, we see that place emerges as the common denominator in all aspects of 
social practice. From this perspective, we see that while some groups may have more influence 
over how the structure and dynamics of place are put to use, their power does not necessarily 
determine whether the rest of us rationalize their use of place as being good. 
In other words, the link between power and rationality is real only to the extent that we 
allow it to be. There is nothing preventing us, apart from our own lack of awareness, from stepping 
outside the places we interact with and asking, “Do these places grant ourselves and others control 
over their structure and dynamics?” If not, it is within our power as moral agents to not only speak 
out against such use of place, but to take hold of the loom and to alter how place is used and who 
it is used by. From what I observed during this period of exploratory research, “taking hold of the 
loom” appeared to be IMAP’s implicit agenda, which is to give local communities control over 
native seed and agricultural knowledge, thereby expanding their control over the structure and 
dynamics of place. I made these observations as IMAP’s Nutrition Nativa project was just getting 
underway. In 2015, IMAP was still in the process of visiting local communities to find farmers 
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interested in growing amaranth. I had the opportunity to participate in four of these visits, where I 
learned of farmers’ hesitancy to invest in a crop that had for centuries been regarded as worthless.  
As the summer ended, it was clear that IMAP was embarking on what would surely be a 
challenging project. It was also clear, however, that Nutrición Nativa had the potential to create a 
feasible and truly local solution to malnutrition in San Lucas Tolimán, and perhaps, a groundwork 
for local food sovereignty. What convinced me of this was IMAP’s pre-figurative process of 
practicing the reality that they wished to see by planting and harvesting amaranth in places where 
it “did not belong”. They were developing, from my perspective, a strategy that might one day 
cultivate their communities’ right to food sovereignty by giving them the material and non-material 
tools to bring that right into existence themselves. As Hannah Arendt observes, people deprived 
of human rights are deprived, not of freedom, but of the right to action and the ability to effect 
change in the world around them (Arendt, 1967). Raj Patel sees Arendt’s emphasis on the ‘right 
to action’, or the ‘right to a right’, as the central motivation of food sovereignty. And from my 
experiences, I found that IMAP’s Nutrición Nativa project channeled a similar and equally 
powerful idea – that a just and moral world is not something which is provided to us, rather it is 
something which we are responsible for creating ourselves, together.  
With the opportunity to return to IMAP in 2016, I set about exploring this idea further. In a 
project which so clearly confronted the instrumental and intrinsic use of place, I wanted to see 
how, and in what ways, instrumental and intrinsic judgments steered the direction of Nutrición 
Nativa, and whether this was a direction toward moral progress. Using Sack’s theory presented in 
Chapter 5, I accept that because reality exists and because the good is a part of the real, we can 
have a positive picture of moral progress. This picture is characterized by the two intrinsic criteria 
of the good i.e., seeing through to the real and valuing a more varied and complex reality (Sack, 
102 
 
2001b). These two criteria, however, only move us toward the good if the moral virtues of place 
i.e., truth, justice and the natural, “provide others with an expanded and more varied world” (Sack, 
2001b, p. 123). Moral progress then, is not achieved when one person has made themselves more 
aware and their reality more varied and complex, but when all people are given the right to see 
reality more clearly and to contribute to that reality so that it becomes more varied and complex. 
In this way, we see that Benhabib’s ‘moral universalism’, which Patel argues is the precursor to 
cosmopolitan federalism and food sovereignty, can in fact be articulated in a meaningful way, 
because we have a ‘moral picture’ of what progress implies and what it does not.  
The connection between moral progress and rights has yet to be made in food sovereignty 
literature. Likely because the push for moral universalism is viewed by many social theorists as a 
step towards moral absolutism. They would rather morality remain situated, context-dependent 
and relative. This position represents the path of least resistance, but it is also a contradictory and 
untenable positon. For in order to claim something as unjust, one must have an intimation of what 
is just and therefore, what is good. To then say that what is good is a matter of situational ethics, 
puts our globalized world in a bit of a quandary to say the least. Therefore, I offer the following 
case study to illustrate how intrinsic geographic judgments might be used to evaluate the moral 
progress of a food sovereignty project. My rational for employing the case study method using 
qualitative research will be explained in the following section, but my reason for involving myself 
in a single case is quite simple. Thoroughly executed case studies provide disciplines with 
exemplars to build their knowledge base. Although food sovereignty has yet to be called a 
discipline, I believe it warrants more exemplars if we are to take the human right to food more 




Logic of Research Methodology 
This is a qualitative research study examined through the lens of human geography. Two 
key questions for qualitative researchers concern the shape of social structures and the individual 
experiences of places and events (Winchester & Rofe, 2010). These concerns are mutually 
constitutive, because social structures mold individual experiences, while individuals can contest 
and change the shape of social structures. Qualitative research also involves gathering and 
interpreting social information (Dowling, 2010) which itself implies personal interaction. 
Therefore, while qualitative researchers ask questions about social structures and individual 
experiences, they too become part of the context they investigate. Qualitative researchers who 
make an effort to become aware and appreciative of the social nature of their work employ critical 
reflexivity (England, 1994). A process, whereby the researcher consciously examines his or her 
own role in the situation being studied and how and in what ways their role, or mere presence, 
effects the social structure of the situation and what information is gathered.  Using the methods 
discussed below and the theory discussed in Chapter 5, I examine the shape of the Nutrición Nativa 
project, itself a social structure. The shape of Nutrición Nativa is formed by the instrumental and 
intrinsic judgements made by IMAP as well their participating communities. These judgments, in 
turn, determine how the structure and dynamics of place are put to use to achieve either 
instrumental or intrinsic progress. I examine how place is experienced by those participating in the 
project, while keeping in mind my own possible influence on the project’s structure. In pursuing 
this direction of inquiry, I seek to illuminate that which makes food sovereignty, as others have 
suggested, an intrinsic or ‘moral enterprise’, as well as that which makes food sovereignty 
susceptible to instrumentalism. 
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 There are several reasons why a researcher might decide to focus on a single case, rather 
than multiple cases. Due to the circumstances of my own research, the reasons were both practical 
and consistent with the nature of the case itself. For practical reasons, it would not have been 
appropriate, nor possible, to embed myself within the project of a local indigenous organization 
and their participating communities, without first developing rapport and trust.  It is for this reason 
that I dedicated my exploratory research period in 2015 to developing both a personal and 
professional relationship with IMAP’s members and their surrounding communities. The case of 
Nutrición Nativa is also consistent with the rational for single case designs. One rational for a 
single case is if it is a critical case. Meaning, it has “strategic importance to a general problem or 
movement” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229), and that it tests a well-formulated theory” (Yin, 2003). 
Nutrición Nativa may be considered a critical case for several reasons, but two are most important. 
To date, Nutrición Nativa represents the largest locally managed operation of amaranth cultivation 
in the department of Sololá. Therefore, it has strategic importance in the department’s fight against 
chronic malnutrition and food insecurity. Additionally, because IMAP must become an established 
business to produce and sell amaranth based products legally, their organization must grapple with 
competing interests of instrumental progress, as a business, and intrinsic progress, as a social 
organization dedicated to the pursuit of food sovereignty. This last point makes the case of 
Nutrición Nativa especially relevant to testing the applicability of Sack’s moral geographic theory 







The study is designed in accordance with the five components of case study research, as 
proposed by Robert Yin. These components include: the study’s research questions, its 
propositions or purpose, its units of analysis, the logic linking the information collected to the 
propositions or purpose, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003, p. 21). 
Research Questions 
 Although much has been written about what food sovereignty stands for, less has been said 
about its idea of progress. If food sovereignty means the right of individuals and communities to 
determine their own food and agricultural systems and policies, does that also imply that they forge 
their own directionality of progress? In other words, how do the planners and recipients of food 
sovereignty know they are moving in the right direction? How do they use place as a tool to achieve 
progress? And what sort of progress is actually being achieved? These questions motivate my 
research.  
 In my thesis, I have adapted my questions to the structure of Flyvbjerg’s classic value-
rational questions for phronetic planning researchers (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 162): 
1. Where are we going?  
2. Who gains, and who loses, by which mechanisms of power?  
3. Is this desirable?  
4. What should be done?  
The purpose of asking questions one, three, and four, is to help planners and those planned 
to think and act in more value-rational terms. They position social inquiry so that society’s values 
are placed front and center, rather than being masked, as they so often are, by scientific and 
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technical rationality. Question two looks at the relationship between the power of place and 
progress. Here, however, I make an important adjustment. Sack writes that it is only by putting the 
structure and dynamics of place to use that we create and dismantle power, whether for good or 
for evil (Sack, 2002). Therefore, my thesis is concerned with how the structure and dynamics of 
place are put to use, as this determines who gains and who loses. With the case of Nutrición Nativa 
in mind, I have re-written Flyvbjerg’s value-rational questions this way:  
1. Where are we going with planning for food sovereignty in San Lucas Tolimán? 
2. How are the mechanics of place used to achieve progress? 
3. Is this desirable? 
4. What should be done? 
According to Yin (2003, pp. 74) case studies can be designed around five levels of 
questions. Questions asked verbally to interviewees, and questions asked to oneself about the case 
in general are known as level one and level two questions, respectively.  
- Level 1: Questions asked of specific interviewees 
- Level 2: Questions asked of the individual case 
Level one and level two questions are the most important for a researcher to articulate and 
distinguish between, as they represent his or her verbal line of inquiry (Level One) and mental line 
of inquiry (Level Two) (Yin, 2003).  For example, to determine whether a particular university 
fosters a racist atmosphere, a student researcher might ask individual students about the extent to 
which they interact with students of different races, a level one question. Rather than asking, “Do 
you think our university fosters racism?” level one questions allow the researcher to extrapolate to 
level two questions concerning the case itself. Level two questions, however, are also explored by 
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the researcher using other forms of inquiry, such as participant observation and critical reflexivity. 
Below, I briefly explain the logic of the case study’s questions. Questions one and two are 
answered using both verbal and mental inquiry, while questions three and four rely primarily on 
mental inquiry. 
1. Where are we going with planning for food sovereignty in the Nutrición Nativa project? 
This is the broadest question of the case study because it is primarily a level two question. 
To ask, “Where are we going?” gives the study context and direction. Flyvbjerg prefers to frame 
the question in terms of planning and democracy. In the Alborg Study, Flyvbjerg’s short answer 
to this question, after having unearthed the interplay between power and rationality, was that 
planning and democracy in Alborg was headed “astray” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 357).  His question, 
of course, was asked in the global “North-West” context of planning which bears little resemblance 
to the “south-west”, or “south-east”, where planners represent only a marginal group in element in 
myriad of spatial agents shaping the nature of cities and regions (Yiftachel, 2012). Mainstream 
communicative planning, Yiftachel writes, with its emphasis on public participation and open 
deliberation, distracts from the materiality of what is at stake “in a more uncompromising 
development environment characterized by creating facts on the ground” (Yiftachel, 2012, p. 542). 
Rather than exporting planning theory from north to south, Yiftachel emphasizes the need for 
“reverse flows of theoretical knowledge” (Yiftachel, 2012, p. 544). This is especially important as 
northern regions begin to take on agendas, such as solidarity around the commons, which have 
deeply rooted histories in the global south. 
My interest in asking this first question is to attempt to understand what it is that makes 
this case, and food sovereignty, planning endeavors, and why they must be understood on terms 
that the professional field of planning is not yet accustomed to. Here I emphasize what the 
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commons might mean in sense of planning for food sovereignty. I ask the question “Where are we 
going?” in relation to how those within the case of Nutrición Nativa understand and use place and 
the commons to foster an intimation of food sovereignty and to pursue a particular direction of 
progress. Therefore, this question also has a verbal line of inquiry involving visits to the homes of 
seed growers who produce the commons through the daily cultivation of native and heirloom seed.  
How are the mechanics of place used to achieve progress? 
This next question looks at how progress is achieved through the use of place as a tool. In 
the field of geography, place is often imagined as a sort of performance stage, with all of the 
necessary conditions for creative social practice (Creswell, 2004). In this same vein, planners often 
view the destruction of place as a violent and undesired act, because it destroys the “established 
patterns of human relationships” (Friedman, 2010, p. 157). These perspectives help us to 
understand place as a reiterative social process (Creswell, 2004), and this is important, because 
place is not a permanent fixture of reality. Place is always undergoing social change. In 
emphasizing the social, however, these conventional views on place reduce nature, meaning and 
space to social constructions, which they are not. Sack writes that unless we only speak of space 
metaphorically, “we must take our cues from the physical sciences, which tells us that though it is 
conceptualized and modeled by human beings, physical space is still thought to refer to something 
out there that is not made up by us” (Sack, 2001a, p. 112). 
 Therefore, when we create, destroy and transform place – neither of these options being 
necessarily better or worse than the other – we are using the structure and dynamics, or mechanics, 
of place as a tool to draw upon the real and material qualities of meaning, nature and social 
relations. As discussed in Chapter 5, the material qualities of social relations are typically woven 
into place by rules of in/out, while the material qualities of nature and meaning are woven by 
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spatial flows and appearance, respectively. Depending upon whether the mechanics of place are 
used to enrich or impoverish reality, determines whether or not we are making moral progress. 
Therefore, in asking “How are the mechanics of place used to achieve progress?” I not only seek 
to understand the materiality of the planning issue i.e., how place is used to pursue the goals of 
Nutrición Nativa, but whether this use of place then translates to intrinsic progress.   
2. Is this desirable? 
The third value-rational question opens a given case to critique. For the Alborg case, 
Flyvbjerg’s answer to this question was a decisive, “No”. He revealed that the city’s Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce had used its power over the rationality of the City Council to influence 
“Alborg’s truth” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 360), so that the Alborg Project would not reduce car access 
to the historic downtown. Flyvbjerg did not find it necessary to explain why exactly this was 
undesirable, as basic democratic ideals were being violated. If the case were more nuanced, 
however, and the role of power less obvious, Flyvbjerg would suggest that we refer to the 
situational ethics of the case itself (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 130). The problem with this approach, 
despite relegating morality to context, is that it limits our critique of projects and places to 
instrumental judgments.  In other words, we are only examining the issue in light of how groups 
and individuals satisfy their own self-interested view of progress. Clearly, the way one group 
satisfies its self-interests might be considered undesirable given the self-interests of another group. 
But this does not tell us why a group’s criteria for progress is good or bad. In my opinion, this path 
of inquiry does not seem particularly enlightening. If we consider the situation from the perspective 
of Sack’s intrinsic geographic judgments, however, we can more effectively analyze whether and 




3. What should be done? 
The simple answer to this question, no matter the case or context, is that we strive to make 
our instrumental judgments more like intrinsic ones. As Sack suggests, we ought to concern 
ourselves with creating places and taking on projects with “a more altruistic and gift-giving 
purpose” (Sack, 2001b, p. 119), rather than a purpose based only on the fulfillment of self-interest 
and accumulation. To this end, there is no limit to how far we may improve. For while most of us 
would like there to be a check on how much greed there is in the world, certainly none of us wishes 
to place a check on how kind, aware and just our society is capable of becoming. Of course, try as 
we might, we will never fully grasp reality, and we will never be completely good, but that is the 
point of progress. As Sack writes, progress is change in the direction of a goal that is compelling 
and demanding, but that is ultimately unattainable (Sack, 2002, p. 113). To become more aware 
with others and to cultivate an increasingly varied and complex world together, is such a goal 
worthy of being pursued in the name of progress. It is by treating truth, justice, and the natural as 
gifts, that we move in this direction. Referring back to the first question, this is where we should 
be going. “What should be done?” then becomes a question of what those within the case of 
Nutrición Nativa can do to change in the direction of intrinsic goals. 
Purpose and Criteria 
 Case studies often contain a set of propositions which direct the researcher towards 
information that may be relevant to the questions being asked. According to Yin, however, case 
studies which are exploratory in nature “have a legitimate reason for not having any propositions” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 22). In this case, the researcher, like Christopher Columbus asking Queen Isabella 
to fund his exploration of the ‘New World’, is obligated to state the purpose of their exploration 
and the criteria by which the exploration will be evaluated. The purpose of my exploration into the 
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case of Nutrición Nativa was to get as close as possible to the reality of an organization employing 
the discourse of food sovereignty in their local communities. Megan Carney explains that it is 
problematic to use the terms food security and food sovereignty interchangeably, because each 
represents “different value-based assumptions about the human relationship to food” (Carney, 
2012, p. 84). There is much to read about the values of food sovereignty, however, I wanted to see 
how they played out on the ground and whether, if I got close enough, I could see the structure and 
dynamics of place being used in accordance with instrumental and intrinsic judgements. My 
criteria for evaluating this exploration is no different than the criteria for intrinsic judgments that 
I employed when observing the case of Nutrición Nativa. I was most concerned with whether my 
inquiry into the project lead to a greater awareness of reality for those involved. For the members 
of IMAP, I was interested in helping to expand their awareness of the obstacles faced by their 
participants in growing amaranth. And for the participants, I was interested in helping them to gain 
a clearer image of the project’s goals. These goals are not only that local farmers grow and sell 
amaranth to IMAP, but that they also harvest and save seed to be replanted and consumed by their 
children. Examples of where I saw awareness being expanded, and also limited, are discussed in 
the case itself. 
Units of Analysis 
As a general rule, a case’s unit of analysis should be outlined by the initial research 
questions (Yin, 2003). Cases which look at the implementation of a project or program, however, 
may have units of analysis which are difficult to define because the project’s timeline and size are 
indeterminate. For example, in the case of Nutrición Nativa, IMAP began teaching local 
communities how to cultivate native and heirloom seeds over seventeen years ago, making it 
difficult to determine when exactly Nutrición Nativa ‘began’. Additionally, over the course of the 
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program’s first two years of funding, the number of participating farmers has expanded and 
contracted while those involved have ranged from single individuals to entire communities. 
Therefore, making it difficult to measure the project’s true size as well as the characteristics of 
those involved and how they are organized. Nevertheless, I found it most useful to look at IMAP 
and individual participants as two embedded units of analysis within the Nutrición Nativa project, 
which represents the topic of the case study. In other words, to understand what progress looks 
like, and how it is achieved in this case, I need to consider the judgements and use of place by both 
the organizers of Nutrición Nativa, as well as those who make the project possible through the 
investment of their time, energy and resources. By combining information collected at both of 
these embedded units, I am able to construct a more accurate image of where the project is going 
in terms of instrumental and intrinsic progress. 
 
Linking Data to the Purpose 
 There are several analytic techniques a researcher might use to link their data to the 
propositions or purpose of the case. These include pattern-matching, explanation building, time-
series analysis and logic models (Yin, 2003). I use the explanation building technique because I 
not only seek to explore the how progress is understood and achieved in the case of Nutrición 
Nativa, but also to explain why a certain direction of progress may be considered moral. As Yin 
writes, the explanatory building technique “is similar to the process of refining a set of ideas” (Yin, 
2003, p. 112). In order for the case to be meaningful, however, the set of ideas ought to reflect a 
significant theoretical proposition. Although this case is guided more by purpose than it is 
propositions, the moral geographic theory being employed links the data being collected to Sack’s 
two theoretical propositions: 
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- That for progress to be meaningful, it must be made in the direction of a goal that is both 
compelling, demanding and ultimately unattainable and; 
- That a heightened awareness of the real and the good is the most worthy of these goals. 
The information gathered in the case builds on these two theoretical positions. As the case 
unfolds, the reality of progress in the name of food sovereignty is brought to light and analyzed 
from this position. 
Field Work Methodology 
In conducting fieldwork, I sought multiple sources of evidence to help build an explanation 
for Nutrición Nativa’s trajectory of progress. Yin refers to this course of data collection as 
triangulation, with its distinct advantage being the development of converging lines of inquiry 
(Yin, 2003, p. 98). Specifically, I relied on the three sources of evidence; 
1. Participant observation  
a. Attending and participating in project meetings 
b. Providing technical assistance to IMAP extension agents to help project 
participants improve their amaranth cultivation methods 
2. Semi-structured interviews with project participants 
3. Focus groups with project participants 
It is important to keep in mind, as Kearns writes, that all observation is a form of participant 
observation (Kearns, 2010). So it helps to think of observation as existing on a spectrum of 
participation, rather than as a participant/non-participant binary. I found myself at the complete 
participation end of the ‘observation spectrum’. Not only was I living within one of the project’s 
main communities and assisting with technical visits to participating farmers, my interview 
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questions and findings were a regular point of discussion during team meetings. Therefore, I not 
only found myself analyzing the project of Nutrición Nativa, but also trying my best help it succeed 
in the little ways that I could. In total, I participated in seven team meetings and twenty technical 
visits to field sites. During two of the project meetings, I presented my research findings using 
PowerPoint to illustrate what socio-economic obstacles were most commonly faced by project 
participants. This information was gathered during interviews and focus groups with project 
participants which I conducted as an independent researcher. During technical site visits to six of 
the seven participating communities, I used a notepad to document the cultivation process and the 
technical obstacles of growing amaranth, such as the small size of the seed, seedlings’ 
susceptibility to ants, and amaranth’s poor germination rate at low altitudes.  
 Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were central to the success of my research. 
As stated in the research purpose, my goal was to expand awareness on all fronts within the 
Nutrición Nativa project. This would not have been possible if I had not been able to speak with 
project participants without the supervision of IMAP’s extension agents. It is important to 
recognize, however, that the opportunity to speak with participants alone would also not have been 
possible to without the permission of IMAP’s extension agents, as the project participants are 
simultaneously their community members, friends and, in some cases, family members.  As Dunn 
suggests, I organized my semi-structured interview and focus group questions around ordered but 
flexible questions. I employed an interview guide that I developed with Nutrición Nativa’s project 
coordinator, Nacario. The questions ranged from the participant’s prior knowledge of amaranth, 
to the amount time and money they sacrificed to participate in the project. The same interview 
guide was used in both single person interviews and focus groups. In total, I held seven single 
person interviews and two focus groups, with the single person interviews lasting around thirty 
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minutes and the focus groups each lasting one hour. The first focus group consisted of three men 
from the IJATZ cooperative while the second focus group included six women and three men from 
the community of Pampojila. 
Criteria for Interpreting Findings 
As stated in the research questions above, my verbal and mental lines of inquiry are distinct 
from one another. In the verbal line of inquiry, I asked project participants directly about their 
experience during the implementation of the Nutrición Nativa project. Interpreting these findings 
is rather straight forward because, as I will demonstrate in the case, participation in the project was 
more economically challenging for some than it was for others. Participation was especially 
difficult for some women and families who had to take time off of work, or pay others to tend to 
their children while they spent time preparing land for the project. Meanwhile, some project 
participants found it rather easy to get involved as they owned land and could pay family members 
to take care of the manual labor to prepare their plot. Clearly, these findings reveal possible power 
inequities within the case. 
My mental line of inquiry is necessarily more nuanced and revealing of the fact that place, 
instrumental and intrinsic judgments play a central role, and arguably a more important role than 
power, in steering the project’s trajectory of progress. While in the process of participating and 
interviewing, I observe how those involved in Nutrición Nativa use place differently depending on 
their motivations and ultimately, their conception of progress. Here, the criteria for evaluating my 
findings is again the based on Sack’s two qualities for intrinsic geographic judgments – whether 
the places being created allow us to see reality more clearly and to increase the variety and 
complexity of that reality. We must remember, as Patel writes, that a key challenge for food 
sovereignty today is not in demanding or receiving rights, but in figuring out the best way to create 
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rights that can be accessed across a range of geographies, by everyone, in substantive and 
meaningful ways. This challenge, he argues, demands that we take on activities which instantiate 
a sort of ‘moral universalism’. I believe a good first step in this direction is to first understand 
place-making as a right and a moral act in itself. Figuring out how, and under what conditions, 
place-making can be acted upon as a right and used as an instrument to move us in the direction 
of moral progress is the topic of this case. 
Food Sovereignty: A Critical Case 
Question 1: Where are we going? 
In studying the Nutrición Nativa project as a planning issue, I had in mind Elinor Ostrom’s 
dual depiction of the commons. On the one hand, the commons represent systems, such as 
knowledge and language, that are difficult to control access to, “but one person’s use does not 
subtract a finite quantity from another’s use” (Ostrom, 2008, p. 10). While on the other hand, the 
commons also represent “common pool” resources which exist in large, but finite quantities where 
one person’s use may very well subtract from another’s use. I also had in mind the arguments made 
by Dolores Hayden and John Friedman, that as we move toward a more globalized world, our 
“place-bound identities” become more, not less important (Hayden, 1995, p.43), and as planners, 
our job is to figure-out how place can be “taken back” (Friedman, 2010, p. 149). As I became more 
familiar with the context of the Nutrición Nativa project, I began to see a strong connection 
between place and the commons.  
One of the ways I went about understanding the context of the project was by visiting the 
homes of several women who regularly trade their saved-seed with IMAP’s seed bank, either in 
exchange for different varieties, or to “re-pay” for the seed they have borrowed. On one occasion, 
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I met with three seed producers who live in the community of Cerro de Oro, on the southern shore 
of Lake Atitlan. Like many other communities in the region, Cerro de Oro was originally built to 
accommodate the demands of a coffee plantation, by ensuring that “labor” lived on-sight. The 
plantation of Cerro de Oro has since dissolved, but many of the men in the community continue to 
work as laborers at other large plantations, such as the plantation of Pampojila, for roughly $5.50 
- $6.80, per day. Men in the community typically do not take part in the cultivation of native and 
heirloom seed, and so the producers I spoke with that day were three women who also happened 
to be close friends. Gregorio, a friend of mine, and an agricultural technician for IMAP, introduced 
me to Antonia, Vicenta and Andrea who have been trading seed amongst themselves, and with 
IMAP for several years. They also represent some of IMAP’s first producers of amaranth. For me, 
it was important to get a grasp on what seed saving looked like and what it meant to people for 
whom it was a part of their daily lives, as an essential goal of Nutrición Nativa is in reestablishing 
the connection between seed and culture. 
Gregorio and I first meet Andrea at her home where she leads us on a tour of her medicinal 
garden. Like most families, the little land Andrea and her husband are able to rent is dedicated to 
supplying their family with corn for the entire year, leaving only a small garden plot available for 
fruits, vegetables, or in Andrea’s case, medicinal plants and peppers. Gregorio challenges me to 
see how many different plants I can count while looking at only one corner of the garden, but 
before I reach fifteen, Andrea tells us to come take a look at all of the seed she collected form her 
recent harvest. Standing in her doorway, I am astonished to see her holding what appears to be a 
large laundry basket overflowing with perhaps twenty bags of assorted seeds. I ask whether she 
plans to sell any of what she has harvested, and she laughs in reply. Hardly anyone knows about 
these plants anymore, she says. I share them with friends and we teach each other how to use 
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certain plants to make medicine for our families. Then, nudging Gregorio in his side she says 
teasingly, But maybe IMAP would like to finally buy some! Gregorio takes the joke in stride, and 
ushers us along to Vicenta’s home where she and Antonia are waiting. Standing on her front porch, 
Vicenta and Antonia have also brought out their own laundry baskets filled with bags of assorted 
seeds. Having learned my lesson from Andrea, I ask a question that I hope they will appreciate. 
“Why do you harvest seed?”, I ask. Vicenta smiles, a good sign, but the corners of her mouth begin 
to straighten as she answers my question. We do not receive any money for doing this, she says, 
but these seeds have a long history. They have adapted to this place, and we have adapted to them. 
Because we keep only the best seeds, they are now very reliable. Most importantly, they have been 
passed down from mother to daughter for many generations and, motioning to her daughter who 
is standing in the doorway behind her, we hope that tradition continues. Not to mention, Gregorio 
chimes in, that while Andrea cultivates medicinal plants, Vicenta and Antonia cultivate several 
varieties of squash and beans. Thanks to each of them, sharing their seed and knowledge with each 
other and their neighbors, Cerro de Oro is less vulnerable to malnutrition than it might otherwise 
be.  
During this visit, it occurred to me that by looking at the commons, such as seed and 
knowledge, strictly as resources, we may overlook what seems to be more important to these 
women, and what may also be more important to food sovereignty: the process of commoning 
itself. Paul Routledge writes that the commons refer not only to resources, but also to the social 
process of being “in-common” with those who defend and reproduce the commons (Routledge, 
2014, p. 73). In other words, the commons can only be as free, accessible and available as our 
capacity to work together to make them so. Knowledge, for example, cannot truly be considered 
part of the commons if one or several segments of society are systematically denied access to 
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education. Therefore, just as rights require our action to be made real and meaningful, so to do the 
commons require our conscious protection and reproduction so that they may be integrated into 
our social projects and goals. 
The opportunity to speak with these women gave me a sense of what the commons means 
to them. More than seed, and the knowledge of how to cultivate seed, the commons also appears 
to represent what those within the Movimiento Campesino a Campesino (MACA) refer to as the 
moral obligation, or the compromiso moral. Eric 
Holt-Giménez describes the compromiso moral as 
the need to share with others what one has learned, 
not because of an enlightened self-interest, “but as 
a logical way of reducing overall social 
vulnerability” and as a way for those within a 
community “to leave an altruistic mark as a guide 
post for future generations” (Holt-Giminez, 2006, p. 95). Andrea, Vicenta and Antonia, seemed to 
view seed saving in a similar light, as a way to reduce vulnerability through the preservation of 
genetic diversity, while also setting an example for their children of how reciprocity, solidarity 
and altruism around the commons creates a stronger and healthier community. I was both inspired 
and humbled by these three woman discussing their obligation to share with one another in the 
production and reproduction of not only seed, but also knowledge. At the same time, I began to 
wonder whether this same sentiment might be replicated within the Nutrición Nativa project. Is 
the process of commoning something that can be planned?  I still was unsure where Nutrición 
Nativa was going with planning for food sovereignty, although I had a better idea of what the 
commons might mean to those who would participate in the project by growing amaranth. It was 
 Personal seed bank – Chucumuc 
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not until I had spent several weeks touring the municipality of San Lucas Tolimán with IMAP’s 
extension agents, and visiting with their new amaranth producers, that I began to grasp where 
Nutrición Nativa was going.  
As we traveled to each of the participating communities, sometimes by pick-up, sometimes 
by bus, but most often on foot, I was reminded of the dominance that coffee has on the local 
economy and on the landscape. Even after having reached a particular community, we usually had 
to walk somewhere between thirty minutes to an hour to reach a family’s field, because the land 
closest to the main highway is dedicated to coffee. Even still, no matter how far we walked, the 
amount coffee never seemed to decrease. 
Rather, it simply occupied more 
precarious positions in the landscape. On 
especially steep hillsides, the land was 
carved into steps to accommodate for the 
slope. I had become so accustomed to 
seeing coffee everywhere I looked, that it 
caught me by surprise the first time I saw 
stalks of amaranth standing firmly 
between rows of coffee, high above the community of San Martin. This image brought to mind 
several ideas that had been swirling around in my head since I came back to Guatemala, but that I 
had yet to fully understand. It was plain to see, as Hayden might suggest, that with IMAP’s support, 
amaranth producers were creating for themselves, and for their community, their own “place-
bound identity” apart from coffee, which represents an identity that has been forced upon them by 
years of market-led agriculture. In this way, it could also be argued, as Friedman might suggest, 
Terraced coffee production – Pampojila 
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that IMAP was doing the job of planners by providing communities with the tools of the commons 
i.e., native seed and knowledge of how to cultivate and process seed, so that place could be “taken 
back”. While I believe both of these depictions bear some truth, I don’t believe they provide a 
complete picture of what is happening.  
Perhaps this is due to the conventional view of 
place by renowned planners, such as John Friedman, who 
suggest that “place must be small, inhabited, and come to 
be cherished or valued by its resident population for all 
that it represents” (Friedman, 2010, p. 154). These 
qualities might be characteristic of a place, perhaps 
especially of urban and residential places, but it is wildly 
misleading to think of places only as distinct locations 
that we love and adore.  We have places because we must 
have projects, and to have projects we must have places. 
Whether or not we use places to take on projects that are 
good and inspiring, or evil and horrid, does not change the fact that they are places. Therefore, 
when we think about how it is that food sovereignty is “planned” we cannot look only at the 
superficial qualities of place. We must also consider how place is used to achieve the goals of the 
project, and whether those goals are morally justifiable or not.  
Amaranth associated with coffee – San Martin 
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In the case of Nutrición Nativa, we see that the instrumental use of place for the cultivation 
of coffee and other non-traditional export oriented crops, is being challenged by intrinsic goals of 
protecting the commons. I also observed, however, that the sites of amaranth production exhibit 
important differences from one another in terms of how amaranth is being grown, and what it 
means to those who produce it. During my research, I came across two typical places produced by 
the Nutrición Nativa project, one where amaranth was being grown as a monoculture on relatively 
large plots of land, roughly 48x48m, and another where amaranth was being grown in smaller 
plots, roughly 16x16m, in association with other crops, or even next to a producer’s home in small 
gardens and nurseries. The former resembles the homogenous linear pattern most often associated 
with cash crops, like coffee, whereas the latter resembles the heterogeneity found in permaculture, 
which seeks to maximize stability and yield through 
genetic diversity. These differences in places of 
cultivation seemed to influence the meaning, or 
value, that producers associated with amaranth. For 
example, the producers I spoke with who had 
dedicated a large plot of land to grow amaranth, 
expressed little interest in learning how to process 
and cook with amaranth seed at home.  
On the other hand, for those producers who had grown amaranth on smaller plots of land, 
closer to home, and in association with other food crops, learning how to process and cook with 
amaranth was their greatest priority. In the community of Pampojila, where women reported 
clearing small plots of maize in order to make room for amaranth, one interviewee explained that 
malnutrition is a serious issue. Pregnant women here, and in neighboring towns, can’t always feed 
Monoculture amaranth plot – San Lucas Tolimán 
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themselves well when pregnant, and their malnutrition is passed on to their children. Once their 
children born, they don’t weigh a whole lot. For these participants, amaranth means something 
more than a new commodity, it represents a solution to malnutrition which they themselves 
control. This added value that the smallest producers see in amaranth, however, is not only due to 
the reality of malnutrition in their communities. Rather, through the power of place, these 
producers, who are mainly women, have greatly expanded their awareness of amaranth, its role as 
a native seed in protecting biodiversity, its deep roots in their own culture, its methods of 
cultivation, and the various ways that it can be prepared for healthy meals. Indeed, those producers 
who reported greater interest in consuming their harvest rather than selling it also reported having 
attended one of IMAP’s many amaranth workshops, which include lessons on harvesting and 
cooking amaranth using common household appliances.  
With the emergence of these two distinct uses of place, I would answer the first question, 
“Where are we going?” by suggesting that Nutrición Nativa is working towards two directions of 
geographic progress, one which focuses on the instrumental goal of production and the other which 
pursues more intrinsic goals to enrich and diversify reality. 
Question 2: How are the mechanics of place used to achieve progress? 
 Geographic progress, as discussed in Chapter 5, is made through our use of place to achieve 
certain goals. Instrumental geographical progress is made when place is used to produce an 
outcome relative to the goals of a project. For example, a central goal of Nutrición Nativa, 
especially so early on in its development, is to promote and propel the production of amaranth in 
local communities. Production is essential to the project’s success because without material results 
the project will simply not get off the ground. Participating farmers will have little incentive to 
dedicate even a small portion of their land to amaranth, local communities will be left without a 
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feasible and sustainable solution to malnutrition, and IMAP will be unable to build their new 
business around amaranth based products. Therefore, production, to a certain extent, is key. In 
order to achieve this goal, places of production will need to weave together an appropriate mix of 
meaning, nature and social relations by including and excluding certain elements of reality, such 
as organic fertilizer and pests, respectively. If done well, places of production will likely generate 
high yields of amaranth, and Nutrición Nativa will be well on its way to success in terms of 
instrumental progress, which is relative to the goals of the project. 
 Intrinsic geographic progress may also be achieved while instrumental goals are pursued, 
since, intrinsic progress is not relative to the goals of a project. Rather, it is rooted in concepts of 
the real and the good. As stated in Chapter 5, intrinsic geographical progress is made when place 
leads us to value being more aware and seeing reality more clearly, while also valuing a more 
varied and complex reality. These are two qualities of the good that geography helps to illuminate 
through the concept of place, but they are certainly not beholden to geography alone. From a 
geographic perspective, seeing reality more clearly implies becoming more aware of how people, 
places and projects are interrelated and interdependent, while valuing a more varied and complex 
reality implies cultivating a more diverse and compelling world, one which never ceases to beckon 
our curiosity, and which lures us toward ever greater degrees of awareness and altruistic behavior. 
Places of agricultural production, can be made to possess such intrinsic qualities; they can lead us 
to see reality more clearly and to cultivate a more varied and complex world. They are not beholden 
to instrumental goals and progress, although the industrial model of agriculture makes them appear 
this way. Rather, places become purely instrumental only when the criteria with which they are 
evaluated is limited to the goals of a project i.e., production. If other more intrinsic criteria are also 
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used to guide a project forward, place may still help us to achieve short-term instrumental goals, 
but the arc of its trajectory will point towards the real and the good.   
For example, a secondary goal of Nutrición Nativa, and core concern for IMAP as an 
indigenous permaculture institute, is to make local knowledge a central part of alternatives to 
industrialized agriculture. A common theme in permaculture is to find opportunities in obstacles, 
or to “creatively use and respond to change” (Veleto, 2008, p.52). Certainly, one of the greatest 
obstacles Nutrición Nativa must face, apart from amaranth’s poor reputation in the region, is the 
significant presence of industrialized agriculture, and the lack of available land in San Lucas 
Tolimán. Coffee is not native to Mesoamerica, nevertheless, it has come to define the landscape 
and livelihoods of indigenous communities. IMAP, in searching for alternatives to monoculture 
coffee production, recognizes that they will not help their communities by promoting a return to 
the agrarian lifestyles of their ancestors. In this new context, there are traditional practices that 
now are simply not sustainable, even though in the past they might have been. Land rotation and 
slash and burn farming, for example, used to be sustainable when there was more access to land 
and a family could work within a ten-year rotation cycle, allowing the land enough time to fully 
rejuvenate after each burn. Now, the majority of families must make do with one or two plots of 
land, and the option for rotation is no longer available for most farmers. If a family were to return 
to the slash and burn practice, this time without rotating fields, they would quickly impoverish the 
soil. Therefore, IMAP and the Nutrition Nativa project must find creative ways to adapt to this 
change in the landscape. They must find ways to be sustainable and to respect the natural world, 
while also supporting their communities who likely have very limited options when it comes to 
making space for a new crop. 
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In order to make local knowledge part of a sustainable alternative to monoculture coffee 
production, IMAP works to ensure that Nutrición Nativa not only focuses on the production side 
of the project, but also on the open and free exchange of knowledge between participating farmers, 
what may be called an intrinsic goal. IMAP extension agents conduct technical visits i.e., visits to 
farmers’ fields to assess plant health and obstacles to cultivation, with groups of farmers whenever 
possible. During my research period in 2016, I participated in group-based technical visits in the 
communities of Chucumuc, Tierra Santa and San Martin. I also participated in technical visits in 
the communities of Cerro de Oro, Pampojila, and several peripheral neighborhoods outside the 
urban center of San Lucas Tolimán; these visits, however, were conducted with individual 
producers. In the community of Tierra Santa, I had the opportunity to participate in two technical 
visits with a group of five female farmers. During my first visit, Catarina, the leader of the group, 
and IMAP’s main point of contact with the community, led us first to the nursery at her home 
where she and her husband, Vacilio, have experimented with raising amaranth seedlings using 
different mixes of soil, organic fertilizer and exposure to sunlight.  Catarina explains to the group 
that she and her husband prefer planting in a nursery and transplanting healthy seedlings to their 
larger plot of land, because the nursery gives them greater control over the plant during its most 
fragile stages of growth, when it is weakest and most susceptible to pests, such as ants and grubs 
which are especially attracted to amaranth. From here, Catarina leads the group of women, IMAP’s 
extension agent Nacario, myself and her two children on a tour of her and her husband’s plot of 
land, as well as the plots of land being cultivated by the other women in the group. Each plot 
measures roughly 16x16m, or una media cuerda, an exceptionally small area when compared to 
the vast expanse of land surrounding us, which is almost entirely dedicated to coffee. At each plot 
we spend between 30-45 minutes assessing plant health, identifying known and un-known pests, 
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and strategizing about how best to manage the unique obstacles each plot faces i.e., too little 
sunlight, inclined slope, large presence of ants etc. We also use this time to discuss each farmer’s 
approach to cultivating amaranth, given the spatial context of their land and their own unique 
obstacles. Some women, for example, who could not afford to clear any of their plots of maize, 
have experimented by planting amaranth between maize stalks. Others experimented in similar 
ways by planting amaranth between rows of coffee, tomato plants or even boulders where nothing 
else could grow. It appears that those who have experienced the greatest success in helping their 
plants to reach full maturity began, as Catarina and her husband did, with an at-home nursery.  
Through this process of sharing each other’s knowledge and experiences, participants 
within the Nutrición Nativa project give place additional and intrinsic value, apart from its 
instrumental value to produce as great a quantity of amaranth as possible. They are able to see 
more clearly and appreciate how the at-home nursery and the agricultural field, as two distinct 
places, are interrelated and interdependent. Their curiosity is also peaked by the variety of ways in 
which their neighbors have incorporated amaranth into other systems of production, such as maize 
and coffee. These observations give each farmer new ideas of how they might be able to better 
cultivate amaranth given their own family’s unique circumstance. It compels them to learn more 
and to expand their awareness even further, perhaps even beyond the scope of amaranth to include 
other native plants or entirely different forms of land use. In these ways, the farmers from Tierra 
Santa are certainly improving upon the use of place to achieve instrumental progress. They are 
addressing, as a group, the elements of the real that facilitate and inhibit amaranth production. 
They are learning and sharing more effective ways, using the mechanics of place, to control what 
may or may not take place within their nurseries and their agricultural fields, all of which allows 
them to be productive within the challenging context of intensive export-oriented coffee 
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production. These steps, although they facilitate instrumental progress, are ultimately guided by 
intrinsic judgments which value seeing reality more clearly and creating a more varied and 
complex world, thus leading these communities ultimately in the direction of intrinsic progress.  
The farmers I met in the community of Tierra Santa are characteristic of those farmers for 
whom agriculture has intrinsic value. This is not the case, however, for all those participating in 
the Nutrición Nativa project. For those participating farmers who are more heavily involved with 
coffee or another export oriented crop, and who tend to own larger plots of land, cultivating 
amaranth is less about sharing knowledge to expand their communities’ awareness of possible 
alternatives to industrialized agriculture, than it is about extracting an additional source of income. 
Although their motivations are quite different than those for whom amaranth has a deeper meaning, 
they still must use place to achieve their goals. During the same research period in 2016, I assisted 
with several technical visits to these larger sites of production, where each plot measured roughly 
48x48m, significantly larger than those in poorer communities. At these sites, I observed that 
farmers either dedicated an entire plot to amaranth, or made room for amaranth by trimming back 
coffee plants and avocado trees that they were also cultivating. In the cases where an entire plot 
had been dedicated to amaranth, the reason tended to be that farmers had allowed a portion of their 
land to lay fallow so that it might recover from previous applications of synthetic fertilizers. 
In these instances, farmers have changed the rules of what may or may not take place in 
their own spaces of agricultural production. Rather than relying on the cultivation of a single crop 
or the application of synthetic fertilizers, they have consciously altered the rules of place so that 
an alternative crop may be allowed to flourish with organic inputs. Introducing this new crop, 
however, has also changed the spatial interactions or “flows” that occur between places. For 
example, amaranth attracts different species of predators that farmers are not used to controlling. 
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IMAP will not purchase amaranth from farmers who have sprayed their plants with chemical 
pesticides, so they must also introduce organic insect repellent, which IMAP provides free of 
charge. Changing the rules of place has, in turn, changed the spatial flows, and as a result, the 
landscape or the appearance of place has also changed. What began as a fallow field, or one field 
of coffee among many fields of coffee, now contributes to a landscape that is more diverse in 
appearance. In this way, despite these farmers’ purely instrumental goals for producing amaranth, 
they have contributed to the richness and complexity of geographical reality by increasing the 
number of different places in San Lucas Tolimán. This diversity may only last for so long, 
however, as amaranth is valued in these places no differently than any other common commodity 
crop. As Robert Sack would explain, there is no guarantee that places of large scale amaranth 
production will not become dominant and thus diminish the need for other places, because they 
are not held to the standards of intrinsic criteria. 
Within the Nutrición Nativa project, the mechanics of place are used to achieve progress 
by changing the rules of what may or may not be allowed in place, compensating for, and even 
encouraging new spatial interactions, and changing, or even challenging, the meaning of the 
landscape. From one community or farmer to the next, however, there is no guarantee that the 
mechanics of place will not be used purely for the attainment of instrumental progress. For the 
time being, it appears more likely that intrinsic geographic progress is more likely to be brought 
to fruition from within communities of farmers, such as the group of women in Tierra Santa, and 
not necessarily from the direction of Nutrición Nativa and IMAP, although this is certainly the 





Question 3: Is this Desirable?  
Allow me to clarify this question in light of the use of place described above. Is it desirable 
that one segment of the population participating in Nutrición Nativa appears to be moving their 
communities in the direction of intrinsic geographic progress, while another other does not? My 
short answer to this question is an emphatic, no!  As Sack would argue, “we make more progress 
when our instrumental judgements become more like intrinsic ones” (Sack, 2002, p.124). 
Therefore, because our geographic judgments affect place and in turn reality, it would reason to 
conclude that we make more progress when our instrumental places become more like intrinsic 
ones. If something is preventing the Nutrición Nativa project from moving in that direction, it 
ought to be corrected. To explore this issue further, it would help to know which farmers are faring 
better in the project. The short period of time that Nutrición Nativa has been in full swing, 
unfortunately, hinders IMAP’s ability to get a clear picture of where their project is truly going, 
who is succeeding and who is falling behind. My role as an independent research has been to help 
piece together part of this picture. 
 During the month of June in 2016, while assisting with technical site visits and consulting 
with farmers about their experiences cultivating amaranth for the first time, I began to take note of 
certain obstacles which may affect a farmer’s ability to succeed in the project. These obstacles, 
included access to land, the amount of time it takes to clear, prepare and plant a plot of land, as 
well as the amount of personal start-up costs one must invest relative to their daily income. In 
consultation with Nutrición Nativa’s program director, I developed a brief questionnaire to gather 
information about these obstacles. During the month of July and into August I used the 
questionnaire in seven interviews and two focus groups in the communities of San Martin, Tierra 
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Santa, Cerro de Oro, Pampojila and Chucumuc. In total, I gathered the following information, 
found in Table 1, from eighteen individual farmers. 
Cost and Range of Investment in Amaranth  
Table 1:Cost and Range of Investment in Amaranth 
Land Invested: 6x8m – 48x48m 
Time Invested: Preparation/Planting: 2 – 5 Days 
Maintenance: Twice a Month (No Variation) 
Capital Invested: Preparation/Planting: $27.50 - $82.50 
Maintenance: $5.50 - $13.75 
Number of producers who paid others to help 
with land preparation and planting: 
4 out of 18 
Number of producers who borrowed money: 6 out of 18 
 
 What becomes most clear from these findings is that during the project’s first year in 
operation, the amount of land farmers were either willing or able to invest varied greatly, and so 
too did the amount of time and cost for preparation and planting. Perhaps most interesting is that 
some farmers reported having paid others to help with labor, while others found it necessary to 
borrow money in order to cover startup costs. Those farmers who reported investing more time 
also reported investing more capital in the form of opportunity costs for having spent time away 
from paid labor. Six of these farmers also reported having borrowed money to cover their families’ 
daily expenses while they went without a portion of their income. Needless to say, this group also 
represents those who had the least amount of land to invest. In other words, those farmers who 
bore the most cost, relatively speaking, during the project’s first year in operation, also appear to 
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be those who were the least well off to begin with. Interestingly these farmers also represent those 
most concerned with cultivating and expanding their knowledge of amaranth in order to develop 
greater sovereignty over the health, nutrition and food systems of their communities. They 
represent the segment of the population, in other words, that appears most likely to help Nutrición 
move in the direction of the real and the good, and yet they are the most disadvantaged.  
Question 4: What should be done? 
 In the thesis I have explored the drawbacks to pursuing a purely rights-based approach to 
food sovereignty, in so far as rights are assumed to precede an awareness of the good. This 
approach provides no abstract moral compass for places and projects of food sovereignty to align 
themselves with, or compare themselves to. This leaves organizations, like IMAP, working in 
support of food sovereignty, susceptible to a sort of circular self-evaluation, where progress is 
dependent solely upon the goals of the projects they pursue. In the case of Nutrición Nativa, 
measures of progress, if left unchecked, might devolve to measures of yield. To break this circular 
and instrumental form of judgement, projects need a language with which to communicate a deeper 
meaning of progress. Robert Sack’s moral geographic theory offer’s the well positioned language 
of geography to help illuminate and communicate certain qualities of the good. This language, 
however, is likely not to be adopted by IMAP and the communities they support anytime soon, nor 
does it need to be. As Sack himself writes, it is possible to “have an intuition about intrinsic 
progress even if we are not conscious that intrinsic judgements exist” (Sack, 2002, p.124). Part of 
this intuition comes from what Sack refers to as our ‘aesthetic sensitivity’ or our ability as moral 
agents to recognize the real and the good within places and instances of beauty and excellence.  
After having spent two summers learning from IMAP and observing their work, it is clear 
to me that they see the real and the good within the beauty and excellence of natural systems. This 
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is the philosophy of permaculture. When human systems, such as food and agriculture come to 
resemble natural systems i.e., by attaining productivity through diversity, then we know we are 
moving in the right direction. In the same way, when human systems cease to resemble natural 
systems their imperfections become apparent and eventually repulsive, and we know we are 
moving in the wrong direction. IMAP applies and promotes these intrinsic judgments within their 
own headquarters, in their permaculture demonstration gardens and their permaculture design 
courses. From a geographic perspective, however, this pursuit of the real and the good in natural 
systems appears contradictory if IMAP simultaneously allow other places, which they benefit 
from, to progress in seemingly unnatural, or instrumental, directions.  
What should be done? In order to achieve real progress, IMAP may continue to pursue the 
real and the good through elements of permaculture and the beauty and elegance of nature, 
however, they will also have to contend with our duality as geographic agents – that we not only 
make progress by expanding our understanding of the world, but also by creating a world that 
allows us to do so (Sack, 2002). If Nutrición Nativa is to make real progress, it must find ways to 
transform those places of instrumental production into places which foster a deeper and more 
radical understanding of seed and agriculture, one that inspires us to look beyond the instrumental 








Chapter 7: Conclusion 
  
Since beginning my master’s program in geography and urban planning, I have been drawn 
to the question, what makes progress meaningful? This is not necessarily a new or revelatory 
question depending on the context to which it is applied, but I felt early on in my exploration into 
food sovereignty, that the meaning of progress, of real progress, had been left, more or less, 
undefined. In this thesis, I have applied Robert Sack’s moral geographic theory to the study of 
food sovereignty projects, and like any place-making project, we can use intrinsic geographic 
judgments to help those involved to expand their awareness of reality and the variety and 
complexity of reality. As Sack explains, these intrinsic geographic criteria of place guide us toward 
the real and the good, which themselves act as an ever-receding horizon beckoning us toward 
infinite degrees of progress. Intrinsic geographic judgments value human actions, including the 
use of our rights, to help one another to see more clearly and to value a more varied and complex 
world. As indicators of progress, intrinsic geographic judgments are, of course, not only applicable 
to food sovereignty projects, because every project we pursue takes place, and every place may be 
imbued with these intrinsic judgements. In this final chapter, I would like to briefly discuss how I 
might apply intrinsic geographic judgments in my upcoming work as a Rural Extension Agent for 
the Peace Corps in Guatemala. 
As a Rural Extension Agent I will serve for two years in the Western Highlands of 
Guatemala as a part of the Ministry of Agriculture’s national extension system, Sistema Nacional 
de Extensión Rural (SNER). My job will be to support local extension agents and community 
promoters to plan, organize and manage the effective delivery of rural extension services.  During 
this time, I will live with a host family in a medium-sized to large rural community, between 3,000 
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and 40,000 people. I am expected to work with small groups of five to twenty farmers in at least 
three communities who receive SNER’s rural extension support. Similar to my experiences 
working with IMAP, I will spend the majority of my time consulting and working alongside local 
community members, community promoters and local extension agents. I am excited to say that 
given this context, it is required as a part of my in-country pre-service training, to receive tutoring 
not only in Spanish, but also in a local Mayan language. 
An interesting, and perhaps lesser known fact about the Peace Corps is that Peace Corps 
Volunteers work in conjunction with Feed the Future food security projects. They are one of the 
many institutions, along with USAID, which reports on Feed the Future indicators. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, these indicators are largely based on instrumental judgments, where 
progress is relative to the goal of increasing the number of farmers who apply improved agriculture 
technologies, or the number of hectares under improved technologies. This is not to say that a 
project which supports the adoption of improved technologies cannot also be guided by intrinsic 
judgments. In Senegal, Feed the Future has funded partnerships between local seed labs and private 
seed processing centers to help train local famers as certified seed producers (Progress Report, 
2016). It is unclear what exactly the motivation is to create such partnerships between these two 
places. The reason may be based on intrinsic judgements, because this partnership would lead to a 
heightened awareness of the geographic relationships between community farmers and private 
businesses. The reason, however, might also be based on instrumental judgments, because this 
partnership would give private companies greater control over the certified seed farmers buy and 
cultivate, thus fulfilling a Feed the Future indicator, while also securing the interests of private 
business to invest in the food security sector. 
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As a Peace Corps Volunteer, I will be asked to serve not only the communities in which I 
will live and work, but also the larger food security effort on the part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s national extension system. Therefore, I may find that I am not in a position to 
question the indicators of progress that I will be asked to monitor, evaluate and report on for the 
various projects that I will serve and oversee. This all may be prove to be the case, however this 
does not change the fact that in the same region of the country local indigenous organizations, 
including IMAP, are rapidly expanding the production and normalization of Amaranth in local 
communities and diets. In fact, near the end of my research period in 2016, I visited another 
indigenous organization, Associación de Mujeres Mayas Oxlojuj E, which is a women’s 
cooperative that has specialized in the cultivation and processing of amaranth for several years. 
Local organizations, such as Oxlojuj E, IMAP, as well as several other regional seed banks in the 
Western Highlands, represent a network of places where seed and agriculture have intrinsic value. 
Their projects are based predominantly on intrinsic judgments which value seeing clearly the 
relationship between agriculture and natural systems as well the security that comes from 
preserving and promoting natural diversity. 
As a Peace Corps Volunteer, I may not be able to create a new trajectory for the services 
and programs that I will be supporting, however, as a geographic agent, I believe it is my moral 
obligation, my compromiso moral, to help those within the Peace Corps, as well as those from 
local organizations, like IMAP, to see as clearly as possible how the other operates, the sort of 
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